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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA, 1990-2005
by
Isa Afacan
Florida International University, 2011
Miami, Florida
Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor
This study examines the contours of Turkish-American foreign relations in the
post-Cold War era from 1990 to 2005. While providing an interpretive analysis, the study
highlights elements of continuity and change and of convergence and divergence in the
relationship between Ankara and Washington. Turkey’s encounter with its Kurdish
problem at home intertwined with the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish authority in
northern Iraq after the Gulf War that left a political vacuum in the region. The main
argument of this dissertation is that the Kurdish question has been the central element in
shaping and redefining the nature and scope of Turkish-American relations since 1991.
This study finds that systemic factors primarily prevail in the early years of the post-Cold
War Turkish-American relations, as had been the case during the Cold War era.
However, the Turkish parliament’s rejection of the deployment of the U.S. troops in
Turkey for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 could not be explained by the primacy of
distribution of capabilities in the system. Instead, the role of identity, ideology, norms,
and the socialization of agency through interaction and language must be considered. The
Justice and Development Party’s ascension to power in 2002 magnified a wider
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transformation in domestic and foreign politics and reflected changes in Turkey’s own
self-perception and the definition of its core interests towards the United States.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
Since the beginning of the Cold War, the Turkish-American relationship has been
very important for both sides. Turkish security during the Cold War was mostly shaped
by its location as a neighbor of the Soviet Union. Turkey was identified as a “bufferzone” or “bulwark” against Soviet expansion. Soviet territorial demands on Turkey in
1945, along with the threat of communism, compelled Turkey to seek western support for
its own defense. The United States (U.S.) Congress passed an historic legislation, known
as the Truman Doctrine, as part of the containment strategy that entailed helping smaller
nations resist Soviet expansionism. The passage of the Truman doctrine was a major
milestone for Turkish-American relations, given that it was designed to help Turkey and
Greece militarily counter Soviet expansionism in the region. As part of its containment
strategy, the United States sought to strengthen France, Great Britain and Germany
economically, and create a strong and unified Europe by including other nations to
counter Soviet power. Providing monetary aid to European countries, including Turkey
and Greece, through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB)
would help revive their economies, adjust macroeconomic stability, and eventually
provide market opportunities for American goods. 1 What was officially dubbed as the
European Recovery Program (EPR) but widely known as the Marshall Plan provided
necessary economic backing to Turkey, which was suffering economic turmoil at the
time. Turkey’s integration into the western economic and security systems concluded
1

See Turkaya Ataov, Amerika, Nato Ve Turkiye (Ankara: Ileri Yayinlari, 1969).; Huseyin Bagci, Turk Dıs
Politikasında 1950’li Yıllar (Ankara: METU Press, 2001).; Namik Behramoglu, Türkiye Amerikan
Ilişkileri: Demokrat Parti Dönemi (Yar Yayinlari, 1973).
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when Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a founding
member in 1952. Thereafter, Turkish foreign and security policies were mostly pegged
into the United States’ interests, so much so, in fact, that the partnership was perceived to
be constant in an otherwise ever-changing international environment that emerged from
the bipolar nature of the era. It does not mean that the relationship did not have its ups
and downs. One has only to recall the Johnson letter of 1964 or the U.S. embargo on arms
sales to Turkey because of the Turkish intervention of Cyprus in 1974. However, the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, which was the prime actor in initiating the Cold War,
changed the very nature of the international system and brought new dynamics to the
relationship between Turkey and the United States. 2
My dissertation thus examines the nature of Turkish-American foreign relations in
the post-Cold War era from 1990 to 2005. The primary purpose of this dissertation is to
illustrate the historical evolution of Turkish-American foreign relations in the post-Cold
War era by shedding light on major developments such as the Gulf War, the emergence
of an autonomous Kurdish authority in northern Iraq, the September 11th attacks, and the
rising activism of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East and the Iraqi War of 2003. I
argue that these developments played significant roles in shaping the nature of
relationship between the two countries in this new era.
The post-Cold War environment left Turkey soul-searching as it needed to situate
itself in an era of uncharted territory, deviating from the relative predictability of the Cold
War international system. Old threats of Soviet expansionism were no longer present.
2

See discussions on the subject, Idris Bal, 21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası (Ankara: Global Arastirmalar
Merkezi, 2006).; Haydar Cakmak, Turk Dis Politikası, 1919-2008 (Ankara: Platin, 2008).; Kamran İnan,
Dis Politika (Ankara: Otuken Nesriyat, 1993).; Baskın Oran and Atay Akdevelioğlu, Turk Dis Politikasi:
Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugune Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (Iletisim Yayinlari, 2004).
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Instead, new and non-traditional security threats surfaced, such as the rise of ethnic
separatism and radical Islamism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
instability in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood. 3 My dissertation primarily deals with
the question of how and to what extent Turkey managed and shaped its relations with the
United States in this tumultuous period. To refine and explain overarching themes and
processes, this dissertation takes the “Kurdish question” as one of the prime driving
forces in defining Turkey’s relations with the U.S. in the post-Cold War era, especially in
the aftermath of the Gulf War. Turkey’s encounter with its Kurdish problem at home
intertwined with the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish authority in northern Iraq after
the Gulf War that left a political vacuum in the region. This dissertation also intends to
answer the question of how and to what extent the interplay of domestic and international
issues on the Kurdish question defined the nature of Turkey’s relations with the United
States.
The secondary purpose of the present study is to shed light on a framework that
explains how and to what extent the Turkish-American relationship has been driven by
agencies’ (Turkish and American) preferences or structural factors. When one looks at
the nature of Turkey’s relations with the United States during the Cold War, and its
aftermath in 1990s, it can be argued that structural factors mostly determined the nature
of the Turkish-American relations. However, Ankara’s refusal on March 1, 2003 to base
3

See Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge University Press, 2009).;
Graham E. Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World (Washington,
DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008).; Stephen Larabee Angel Rabasa, The Rise of Political
Islam in Turkey (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008).; Emin Fuat Keyman, Remaking Turkey: Globalization,
Alternative Modernities, and Democracy (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007).; Kemal Kı̇ rı̇ şcı̇ ,
"Turkey's Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times," in Chaillot Paper (Paris: Institute for Security Studies,
2006).; Bernard M. Hoekman Sübidey Togan, Turkey: Economic Reform and Accession to the European
Union (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005).; Omer Taspinar, Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in
Turkey: Kemalist Identity in Transition (New York: Routledge, 2005).
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62,000 American troops on Turkish soil, and a more assertive Turkish foreign policy in
the Middle East, crystallized doubts regarding the stability of long-heralded TurkishAmerican relations. Both Turkish and American policymakers had good cause for
concern. The conflict over Iraq and the threat of downsizing the Incirlik Air Base, as well
as the detention of Turkish soldiers in Northern Iraq by American troops in early July
2004, put the strategic partnership in jeopardy. 4 These events indicated that the strategic
partnership had not been able to withstand changes in the international system. Against
this backdrop, it is important to determine whether the downward spiral of relations over
the past few years was the result of structural/systemic reasons or resulted from agencies’
redefinition of identity or of ideology.
By the term “structure,” I mean the Waltzian understanding of the international
structure of international relations. As Kenneth Waltz argues, "international structure
emerges from the interaction of states and then constrains them from taking certain
actions while propelling them towards others." 5 Anarchy and the absence of central
institutions (a world government) characterize the structure of the system. In this
framework, individual states are units/agents that interact in the system. They act
according to the principle of self-help and seek to ensure their own survival. The
relationship between agents and structure is limited to the constraints that structure places
on agents through competition.6 Thus, according to structural realism, as Waltz claims,
4

Philip H. Gordon and Omer Taspinar, Winning Turkey: How America, Europe, and Turkey Can Revive a
Fading Partnership (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008).

5

Kenneth Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 1
(1990).

6

Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
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states do not differ in the tasks they execute but in their capabilities. Capabilities define
the position of states in the system and the distribution of capabilities defines the
structure of the system. Similarly, changes in the distribution of capabilities stimulate
changes in the structure of the system, as from a bipolar to a unipolar power
configuration, or from a bipolar to a multipolar one.
By assuming that states are functionally similar, Waltz ignores identity, ideology,
norms and preferences of agency as variables. He also disregards socialization of agents
through dynamic interactions that might shape or re-shape one’s identity and therefore its
interests. States, according to Waltz, seek the same goals. Having made the case for
limiting agency to only powerful states, Waltz recognizes that power is a vital attribute of
agency. On the other hand, constructivists 7 concern themselves with the identity, and
ideational and political preferences of agency, and its implications for international
structure. For example, Alexander Wendt is convinced that agents act according to
interests that are the consequence of identity, which is socially constructed. It is a product
of the normative structures that are in place and the process of interaction in which the
agent participates, namely international relations. Identities are contextual and so are

7

They range from Nicholas G. Onuf, Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Emauel Adler, Jeffrey Checkel, Martha
Finnemore, to Alexander Wendt. See Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World of Our Making : Rules and Rule in
Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).;
Nicholas Onuf, "Constructivism: A User’s Manual," in International Relations in a Constructed World, ed.
Nicholas Onuf Vendulka Kubalkova, and Paul Kowert (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998).; V. Kubálková,
Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, and Paul Kowert, International Relations in a Constructed World (Armonk,
N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998).; Alexander E. Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social
Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992).; Alexander Wendt, Social
Theory of International Politics, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1999).; Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,"
European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 3 (1997).; Jeffrey Checkel, "International Norms and
Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide," European Journal of International
Relations 3, no. 4 (1997).
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interests. States, according to Wendt, are social actors whose identities and interests are
endogenously constructed. 8
Given the discussion of the agent-structure problematique in International
Relations above, Turkish-American relations in the post-Cold War era, especially the
events that unfolded during the Iraqi War of 2003, might be perfect grounds for testing of
these theoretical premises. While the Turkish involvement in the Gulf War in 1990 on the
side of the United States might fit well with the arguments of the Waltzian understanding
of international structure, however, the Turkish parliament’s rejection of the deployment
of the U.S. troops in Turkey for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 cannot be explained by the
primacy of distribution of capabilities in the system. Instead, the role of identity,
ideology, and norms, and the socialization of agency through interaction and language,
should be employed. Hence, it is very important to determine how and to what extent
agency and structure of international system interplay in this particular relationship and
shape one another.
I argue that systemic factors primarily prevailed in the early years of the postCold War Turkish-American relations, as had been the case during the Cold War era. The
rise of the United States as the sole superpower after the collapse of its rival, the Soviet
Union, is the key to defining the nature of Turkish-American relations. As Gideon Rose
argues, “the relative material power resources countries possess will shape the magnitude
and ambition . . . of their foreign policies: as their relative power rises states will seek
more influence abroad, and as it falls their actions and ambitions will be scaled back

8

See Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics."
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accordingly.” 9 Growing U.S. interests in the greater Middle East also coincided with
Turkish interests as Turkey tried to liberalize its economic and political system and hoped
to gain more influence in newly-independent states in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
However, this does not mean that the role of agency does not count. For example, the rise
of nationalism and political Islam among Turkish voters during the 1990s, in part,
challenged the U.S. involvement in the region and showed the role of agency’s new
identity formation. As many constructivists argue, identities are constructed through
narratives and language that eventually shape interests. As language and interaction of
agents, in part, determine policies, identity takes a life of its own. As Ole Waever dubbed
it is a “speech act.” Labeling a problem as belonging to the realm of security legitimize
the use of extraordinary measures by the state. 10 By bringing both material and ideational
elements into the picture, one can see how dynamic interaction of these elements shapes
and redefines one’s identity and interests.
To see how these played out in Turkish-American relations, I considered the
following questions: What was the underlying reasoning for Turkey to support the United
States during the Gulf War? How did the Turkish leaders perceive the involvement and
the presence of the U.S. in the Middle East in general and in Iraq in particular? How and
to what extent did the “Kurdish Question” especially the rise of Partiya Kerkeran
Kurdistan (PKK) terrorism and the emergency of an autonomous Kurdish entity in

9

Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998)., p.
151. The argument that interests expand with power was also introduced in Paul Kennedy, The Rise and
Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500–2000 (New York: Random
House, 1987).

10

Ole Waever Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1998).
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northern Iraq affect the nature of Turkish-American relations? Did Turkish foreign
policy’s orientation experience a convergence or divergence in its interests because of the
U.S. engagement in the region? If so, what are the implications? Additionally, how and to
what extent did the U.S. policies of “war on terror” and the “axis of evil” rhetoric in the
aftermath of the September 11 attacks shape Turkey’s perception of the United States?
Why did the Iraqi War of 2003 strain the relationship and what were the long-term effects
on their relations?
Occasionally, suspicions were voiced that Turkey had hopes to play an enhanced
role in the Middle East, independent from, and, in fact, as an alternative to, the U.S.
initiatives. However, Turkey has not yet come close to being a “regional leader” or a
“role model” in the Caucasus and Central Asia, a prospect the U.S. supported strongly
throughout the 1990s. 11 Whether Turkey has an ambitious design for a regional role or a
foreign policy that is “drifting” without an anchor or direction is one of the points that
will be covered by this study. However, the aforementioned questions will be answered
in a context whereby the evolution of Turkish-U.S. relations from 1990 to 2005 is
properly addressed. To put it differently, the main concern is the fact that all those
questions raised can be better understood by looking at the historical evolution of postCold War Turkish-American relations.
The Significance of This Research
The necessity to focus on this topic is dictated by four main reasons: first, it is
worth examining why Turkey’s foreign policy, at one time status quo-oriented and
11
Andrew Mango, "The Turkish Model," Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 4 (1993).; Heinz Kramer, A
Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 2000).
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comfortable with the United States, became hesitant, cautious and skeptical toward the
U.S. after the Gulf War. There are many studies conducted on the Gulf War and its
implications but there is no comprehensive study that focuses on the primacy of the
Kurdish question in determining the nature of Turkey’s relations with the United States in
the post-Cold War world. Second, there has been an upsurge in theoretical discussions
about the agent-structure debate in the last two decades. This study will contribute to
emerging literature on the subject, and serve as a testing ground of agent-structure debate
particularly on Turkey’s decision on stationing of American soldiers on Turkish soil prior
to the war in 2003. Third, there is a need to address the changing regional as well as
global environment after the Gulf War, September 11 attacks and the U.S. invasion of
Iraq. These events heavily impacted the very nature of Turkish-U.S. relations. However,
they can be meaningful by looking at patterns of relations between two countries in the
post-Cold War era with a flashback on the continuity and change in the history of
engagement between two countries for more than two centuries. Fourth, there is a critical
gap in the scholarship on Turkish-U.S. relations in the post-Cold War era. Although there
is considerable amount of commentary and analysis on different aspects of Turkish-U.S.
relations in popular media, think tank publications and to the lesser extent in academia,
by pundits, policy community and scholars, there is unfortunately no single
comprehensive study (books, monographs or a dissertation) devoted to this specific
subject. There are some chapters in edited books, or journal articles touching some
aspects of this topic, but there is no scholarly book surveying Turkey-U.S. relations in the
post-Cold War era. My dissertation will, I think, provide a historically grounded,
theoretically relevant and refreshing study of the topic.

9

Literature Review
There has been a surge of research on Turkey, specifically on its relations with the
European Union. 12 This increase can be attributed to Turkey’s prospect of accession to
the European Union in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In Turkey, more scholars are
working on the EU accession process than in any other areas in the discipline of political
science. It is quite easy to understand that both the subject matter and the available
funding made possible more research on Turkey’s relations with the European Union. On
the other hand, studies on Turkish-American relations have been limited to a small
number of foreign policy practitioners, journalists and some academics. For example,
former U.S. ambassador to Turkey Morton Abramowitz wrote books on the subject
matter such as Turkey’s Transformation and American Policy. 13 A renowned Turkish
journalist, Cengiz Candar penned scholarly articles 14 in respected journals and columns
in Turkish newspapers. Abramowitz’s book, Turkey’s Transformation and American
Policy, covers numerous issues including changing Turkish domestic politics, Turkey’s
12

See, Meltem Müftüler-Bac, Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe (New York: Manchester
University Press, 1997).; Yannis A. Stivachtis Meltem Müftüler-Baç, Turkey-European Union Relations:
Dilemmas, Opportunities, and Constraints (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008).; Sübidey Togan,
Turkey: Economic Reform and Accession to the European Union.; Burak Akçapar, Turkey's New European
Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to Eu Membership (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
2006).; Knud Erik Jørgensen Esra LaGro, Turkey and the European Union: Prospects for a Difficult
Encounter (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).; Erik Jan Zürcher, The European Union, Turkey and Islam
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004).; Mehmet Özcan Sedat Laçiner, İhsan Bal, European
Union with Turkey: The Possible Impact of Turkey's Membership on the European Union (Ankara: Usak,
2005).; Harun Arikan, Turkey and the Eu: An Awkward Candidate for Eu Membership? (Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2006).; Constantine Arvanitopoulos, Turkey's Accession to the European Union: An Unusual
Candidacy, ed. Constantine Arvanitopoulos (Springer, 2009).
13

Morton Abramowitz, Turkey's Transformation and American Policy, ed. Morton Abramowitz (New
York: Century Foundation Press, 2000).

14

Cengiz Çandar, "Turkey’s “Soft Power” Strategy: A New Vision for a Multi-Polar World," (Ankara:
SETA, 2009).; Graham Fuller Cengiz Candar, "Grand Geopolitics for a New Turkey," Mediterranean
Quarterly 12, no. 1 (Winter 2001).; Cengiz Çandar, "The Kurdish Question: The Reasons and Fortunes of
the ‘Opening’," Insight Turkey 11, no. 4 (2009).
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Kurdish issue, Turkish perception of the U.S. policies, and American policies towards
Turkey. Even though the main theme is Turkish-American relations, Abramowitz
emphasizes the complexities of the subject matter and lays out intricate connections
between domestic and foreign issues in a scholarly way. Even though he covered a wide
array of topics, he was somewhat disconnected with continuity and change dynamics, and
could not present a fuller picture of the relationship. Similar problems also appear in
Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East, 15 edited by Robert D.
Blackwill and Michael Sturmer. Interestingly enough, all contributing authors were from
western European nations, with no scholars of Middle Eastern descent included. To a
certain degree, the book lacks the complexity that only a more intimate and regionally
sensitive scholarship can provide. It is a somewhat dry account of the relations. Without
adequate knowledge of primary resources a reader would not capture the fuller picture.
Heinz Kramer, in his competently written book, A Changing Turkey: The
Challenges to Europe and the United States 16 assesses changing dynamics from the
erosion of Kemalist tradition, the rise of political Islam, the shifting impact of military on
politics, the growing influence of the Kurdish question on Turkish politics to foreign
policy implications with regard to Central Asia, the Balkans, the European Union, and the
United States. His main argument posits that shifting domestic dynamics deeply influence
Turkey’s foreign policy choices. He also argues that, once hyped, Turkey’s weight in the
newly independent Turkic nations in Central Asia is no longer applicable because of its
mistakes and the constraints of Turkish political and economic instability in the mid15

Michael Stürmer Robert D. Blackwill, Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).
16

Kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States.
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1990s. Therefore, he argues that the U.S. was not successful in working with Turkey on
reaching out to Central Asian nations.
An important work published in Turkish is Turkiye-ABD Iliskilerinin Politikasi 17
(The Politics of Turkish-American Relations) that was written by Burcu Bostanoglu. She
argued that there is an apparent “theoretical poverty” in examining Turkey’s foreign
policy. Therefore, she intended not to write a diplomatic history of the Turkish-American
relations but to plan a study of the topic with a markedly different perspective that was
not available in Turkish by utilizing theoretical discussions on national interests, foreign
policy analysis, and contending theories of international relations. Even though her
endeavor is new in Turkish-language books on the subject, it is difficult to comprehend
the Turkish translation of theoretical concepts. One can only wish that she could have
published the text in the English language so as to spark more discussions and research.
Apart from studies solely focusing on Turkey’s relations with the West,
particularly the United States, one book should be noted for its contribution to the
analysis of Turkish foreign policy. Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000, was written by a
leading scholar on Turkish politics and foreign policy, William Hale. 18 This book is a
classic, well-rounded history of Turkish foreign policy that spanned more than two
centuries. In Hale’s book, one could see the dynamics of continuity and change and could
identify multi-faceted aspects of Turkish foreign policy. It has become a reference book
that many scholars cite in their works. Philip Robins in his Suits and Uniforms: Turkish

17

Burcu Bostanoglu, Turkiye-Abd Iliskilerinin Politikasi, 2 ed. (Ankara: Imge Kitabevi Yayinlari, 2008).

18

William M. Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000 (London ; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000).
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Foreign Policy since the Cold War 19 defines the Turkish foreign policy as status quooriented. According to Robins, the Turkish political elite venerated “the sanctity of
borders, of states, of multilateral institutions and of norms of conduct, even when it
became clear that systemic changes had rendered some of these continuities no longer
tenable.” 20 He also posits that Turkish foreign policy is aligned westward by being a part
of NATO and aspiring to join the European Union. Even though he does a good job of
laying out parameters and the evolution of Turkish foreign policy, his work nonetheless
lacked the intricate analysis of non-Kemalist segments in Turkish society, especially that
of observant Muslims and Kurds, and their increasing impact on foreign policy-making
as shaped by their election of center-right and conservative parties to the Turkish
government. To a certain degree, they were one of the driving forces in Turkey’s activist
foreign policy as it tilted towards an independent foreign policy orientation.
My dissertation also brings discussions from journalists such as Cengiz Candar
from Yenisafak, Yasemin Congar from Milliyet, Sami Kohen from Milliyet, Ali H. Arslan
from Zaman, Fehmi Koru from Yeni Safak, and Mehmet A. Birand from Posta. These
individuals write and talk about Turkish-U.S. relations as events unfold, and they are also
considered to be opinion-makers in areas of Turkish foreign policy. However, what is
more pressing is that most of the studies mentioned here have a significant flaw: either
they lack the intimacy of primary resources or they are written from a more “local
viewpoint” that lacks major secondary resources and perspectives. Therefore, my
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dissertation attempts to bridge the gap and focus on both primary and secondary
resources authoritatively.
Methodology
My dissertation aims at giving an interpretive analysis of the U.S.-Turkish
relationship from 1990 to 2005. My study attempts to provide an analysis of the nature of
the relationship by giving relevant historical background to show the elements of
continuity and change. As indicated earlier, both primary and secondary resources will be
utilized. To reflect upon the nature of Turkish reactions on major events such as the Iraqi
War of 2003, views and news from major Turkish newspapers such as Milliyet, Hurriyet,
Sabah and Zaman will be considered. In the summer of 2008, I went to Turkey to do a
field research. The Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy and Citizenship Studies and
the Middle East Studies Center at Florida International University provided research
funding for this research. I conducted research in Istanbul and Ankara for five weeks.
Spending considerable time at the Milli Kutuphane (the National Library) in Ankara, I
primarily went through books, monographs, newspapers, government documents,
research reports and other relevant materials that have been written in Turkish.
Especially, going through seven newspapers with diverse editorial perspectives (Milliyet,
Hurriyet, Sabah, Cumhuriyet, Radikal, Yenisafak and Zaman), covering the period from
1989 to 2005, took most of my time in Ankara. The next venue included the library of
Bilkent University. This library provided a vast collection of the secondary resources as
the Milli Kutuphane did in the areas of primary sources. Additionally, I visited the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara and utilized the special library of the Stratejik
Arastirmalar Merkezi, (the Center for Strategic Research) a research arm of the ministry.
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The last part of the research in Ankara included research and discussions at a think tank
the Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Arastirmalari Vakfi (the Foundation for Political,
Economic and Social Research). I gained access to reports, policy briefs and other
research papers, and attended extensive discussions on the role of Turkey in the Middle
East, the transformation of Turkish foreign policy, and U.S.-Turkey relations. The second
leg of the research took place in Istanbul. Visiting the libraries at Bogazici University
complemented my research especially in the areas of the historical evolution of U.S.Turkey relations, which will be covered in Chapter 2. The library of historic Istanbul
University was the next stop and largely offered resources published in the Turkish
language. The last part of the research in Istanbul was conducted at the Islam
Arastirmalari Merkezi (the Center for Islam Studies). The research continued in the
United States especially in the libraries of Florida International University, Emory
University, Georgia State University, Georgia Institute of Technology, the University of
Chicago and the University of Southern California.
Chapter Outline
My dissertation is thematically driven and consists of introduction, conclusion
and four chapters in between. Chapter II surveys the Turkish-American relationship from
1800 to 1990. The reason behind the inclusion of this historical narrative that spans
almost two centuries is to elaborate on dynamic elements of continuity and change in the
relations. Chapter II starts with early encounters between the U.S. and the Ottoman
Empire. It lays out series of events that played significant roles in shaping foreign policy
objectives on both sides: President Wilson’s fourteenth point dealing with the issue of
self-determination for minorities under the decaying Ottoman rule, the situation of
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American missionary schools both under the Ottomans and young Turkish republic, the
inter-war era politics (1919-1939), the ramifications of the Cold War on foreign policy
and divergent views on the issue of Cyprus and opium production. Chapter II basically
builds up a historical background and points of reference for the discussion for following
chapters.
Chapter III addresses the emergence of a new partnership between Turkey and the
United States during the first Gulf War (1990-1991) as both Ankara and Washington
tried to adjust to the realities of the post-Cold War world. With the demise of the Soviet
Union and the reorientation of Western geostrategic priorities, the future of TurkishWestern relations in general and Turkish-American relations in particular was uncertain
during the early 1990s. Turkey was perceived as an awkward partner with whom
“nobody wanted to be dragged into various local conflicts which could easily increase in
the new political climate.” 21 Many in Turkey feared that the new strategic landscape
would exclude Turkey from the emerging security institutions in Europe, thus lessening
its importance to Washington. Turkish President Turgut Ozal’s support for the Gulf War
coalition brought these fears to an end, solidifying Turkey’s renewed role in emerging
western security and political structures. However, the salience of the Kurdish question at
home and the emergence of the “de facto Kurdish state” 22 in northern Iraq after the Gulf
War brought a significant cloud to Ankara’s relations with Washington. The chapter tries
to dissect the triangular relations with the U.S., Turkey and Kurdish factions in Iraq, and
its implications for larger issues in the region.
21
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Chapter IV deals with nature of the post-Gulf war relationship between Turkey
and the U.S. after 1994 and explores how the relationship was elevated to a level of
“strategic partnership” by 1999. The U.S. interests in securing the Persian Gulf,
countering the rise of Islamism and stabilizing the Balkans, Central Asia and the
Caucasus necessitated the continuation of military cooperation and close strategic
relations with Turkey. To deepen the partnership, Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz and
President Clinton agreed on a five-part agenda that would push the expansion of bilateral
cooperation. Dubbed the “strategic partnership,” the agenda identified energy, economic
issues, security cooperation, and regional cooperation as areas necessitating enhanced
collaboration. While Turkey was seeking the relaxation of U.S. import duties on Turkish
goods, and favored more trade opportunities, the U.S. viewed economic ties as a means
of securing the Turkey’s westward orientation, improving its European accession
prospects and encouraging democratic reforms.
Chapter V examines the question of how and to what extent the September 11th
terrorist attacks and the Iraqi War of 2003 impacted Turkish-American relations. The
September 11th attacks redefined the nature of the U.S. interests in the “Greater Middle
East.” Initially, the “war on terror” reinforced traditional American and Turkish strategic
ties. However, President George W. Bush identified two of Turkey’s neighbors (Iran and
Iraq) as parts of “axis of evil.” The identification of the axis and American emphasis on
Syria as a “rogue state” brought new challenges to Turkey. As the Bush administration
began to expand its war on terrorism into Iraq, the nature of Turkish-American relations
dramatically shifted. Over 90% of the Turkish public opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq
and the Turkish populace pressured the Turkish government not to host American troops
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on Turkish soil to start the invasion of Iraq from the north. Both international and
structural factors pushed Turkey to side with the U.S. for the invasion. The Turkish
Grand National Assembly, however, rejected a resolution that would authorize the
stationing of American troops on Turkish soils for the invasion. Chapter V surveys series
of events and perspectives and tries to analyze the role of agency in forming Turkey’s
identity and interests in a dynamic fashion.
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CHAPTER II: TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES, 1800-1990
Starting with the end of the Second World War, Turkey’s relations with the
United States have been based on a strategic calculation that the imminent Soviet threat
in its neighborhood made Turkey seek a close alliance with the United States. A
relationship that once was considered geographically distant and geopolitically less
significant became paramount to both sides. However, this does not mean that previous
encounters between the U.S. and the Ottoman Empire, and its successor, the Republic of
Turkey 23, were not important. In fact, the two nations’ encounters over centuries laid the
groundwork for present-day engagement. Therefore, elaborating on the relations between
the two nations will help explain the intricacies of the complex history behind TurkishAmerican relations in later periods.
Early Encounters
Relations between the Ottoman Turks and the United States started in the late 18th
century with the arrival of the first U.S. commercial ship in 1797 in Izmir, and of the
frigate “George Washington” in Istanbul on November 11, 1800. 24 In 1830, the Sublime
Porte 25 and Washington signed the “Treaty of Navigation and Trade.” The treaty became
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the main document for bilateral relations for almost a century. 26 One of the treaty’s
significant articles called for extraterritorial rights for American merchants and
missionaries who settled in the Ottoman lands. Another article included “most-favored
nation” rights for the U.S., as was the case for major Western nations such as Great
Britain, France and Germany. 27 After signing the treaty, diplomatic and consular relations
were established. Commodore David Porter was appointed as Chargé d'Affaires in
Istanbul in 1831 and he received the title of Ambassador in 1839. However, permanent
Ottoman consular representation in Washington was not possible until 1867. A second
treaty was signed in 1862 to eliminate some of the differences that emerged over the
decades and to further develop the relations between the Sublime Porte and Washington.
This new treaty included,
[F]ollowing provisions: (1) the Turkish government accorded most-favored-nation treatment to
American citizens and ships; (2) permits to trade were not to be required of Americans; (3) the
Turkish government agreed to charge equal import duties in respect to all nations; (4) the eight per
cent ad valorem export duty then in force was to be reduced one per cent annually to a permanent
level of one per cent; (5) an import duty of eight per cent ad valorem was to be levied upon all
goods, with a provision for refund if re-exported within six months; (6) a provision for the single
payment of duties was inserted to avoid repetition of experiences with corrupt Turkish customs
officers; (7) Americans were guaranteed equality of treatment with regard to warehousing,
bounties, drawbacks, and port facilities; (8) goods shipped in either American or Ottoman vessels
were to have equality of treatment; (9) there was to be no transit charge for passage through the
Dardanelles or the Bosphorus; (10) the old land transit duty of three per cent was reduced to one
per cent; (11) the importation of arms and ammunition into Turkey was prohibited; and (12) a
tariff commission was appointed to draw up a schedule of values upon which to base ad valorem
duties. 28

As many American merchants and members of the diplomatic corps increased
their involvement in the Ottoman domains, another powerful group of people began
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settling there and establishing their institutions: Protestant missionaries. Early
missionary groups arrived at the Port of Izmir in 1820 and then sprang into Anatolian
cities, especially in places that had significant Christian minorities in the Ottoman state.
The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions was the premier institution
that tried to evangelize mainly Orthodox Christian minorities to Protestantism in the
Ottoman state, primarily by opening schools. 29 Robert College, still one of Istanbul’s
major educational institutions in modern Turkey, opened in 1863. By the late 19th
century, many such schools were open in Istanbul, Trabzon, Antep, Erzurum, Maras,
Adana, Aleppo, Harput, Merzifon, Izmir, Tarsus, Antioch, Kilis, and Salonika as they
served non-Muslim subjects, namely Armenians and Greeks. 30 In 1880, there were 331
missionary schools educating over 13,000 students. “By 1913, 450 American missionary
schools were teaching 26,000 students in the Ottoman Empire.” 31 One of the most
important outcomes of missionary schools and activities was to introduce a wave of
nationalism, especially among non-Muslim subjects. As a repercussion, the Sublime Port
closed down some schools and tried to limit distribution of missionary publications,
especially of Bibles. Interestingly enough, some of the leadership of non-Muslim
Ottoman subjects (Armenians), supported the Ottoman authority’s attempts to stop the
29
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Protestant proselytizing efforts as they were a threat to their own Orthodox religious
practice. They did not want to see conversion of Orthodox Christians (Armenians and
Greeks) to American Protestantism. 32 Leaders of Armenian and Greek communities
under the Sublime Porte pressured Ottoman Sultans to cease American missionary
activities in their communities. The issue of missionary schools and their activities was
one of the major sources of friction between the U.S. and the Ottoman state.
World War I, the Interwar Period and the Relations
Woodrow Wilson was reluctant to enter into World War I, having previously
declared neutrality of the U.S. in this “European” war. Public sentiment against the war
was high and he did not want to jeopardize his second run for the Presidency in 1916.
Wilson maintained American neutrality despite the German sinking of a British ship with
American citizens aboard in 1915. However, the U.S. neutrality began seriously
deteriorating after unrestricted attacks of German submarines in early 1917. A German
attempt at recruiting Mexico to join its side of the war, and their offer to Mexicans of the
Southwest United States, practically ended the U.S. neutrality. On April 4, 1917, the U.S.
Congress passed a declaration of war against Germany. It was signed into law by
Woodrow Wilson two days later. Since the Ottoman Empire and Germany were allies in
the war, this put the Sublime Porte in a very difficult position. Germany pressured the
Ottomans in 1917 to suspend relations with the United States. The Sublime Porte
proceeded to do so, but also apologized to the Americans and did not go any further in
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taking action against schools and American Missions. 33 However, Wilson’s Fourteen
Points, which were based on his progressive agenda such as self-determination, open
agreements, and international cooperation to end the war, threatened the very nature of
Ottoman Empire, which was a multi-ethnic state struggling to keep various factions
together under its Ottoman umbrella. His twelfth point declared that “the Turkish portion
of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other
nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security
of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the
Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce
of all nations under international guarantees.” 34 Wilson’s twelfth point clearly provided
the necessary ammunition for non-Turkish minorities to declare their independence from
the Sublime Porte in the last days of Ottoman state.
Another major event that affected Turkish-American relations to this day was the
mass killings of Armenians by Ottomans during World War I. What is commonly called
the “Armenian Genocide” by many was vehemently rejected by Turkey, successor to the
Ottoman Empire. 35 The U.S. Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire from 1913 to 1916,
Henry Morgenthau, played a significant role in relaying to America details of the mass
deportations of Armenians in 1915. In his memoir, he said that "when the Turkish
authorities gave the orders for these deportations, they were merely giving the death
33
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warrant to a whole race; they understood this well, and, in their conversations with me,
they made no particular attempt to conceal the fact." 36
However, his treatment of the subject might severely be hampered by some
degree of racism on his part. As he pointed out in his memoir, “Armenians of the present
day are the direct descendants of the people who inhabited the country three thousand
years ago. Their origin is so ancient that it is lost in fable and mystery. There are still
undeciphered cuneiform inscriptions on the rocky hills of Van, the largest Armenian city,
that have led certain scholars – though not many, I must admit – to identify the Armenian
race with the Hittites of the Bible. What is definitely known about Armenians, however,
is that for ages they have constituted the most civilized and most industrious race in the
eastern section of the Ottoman Empire. From their mountains they have spread over the
Sultan’s dominions, and form a considerable element in the population of all the large
cities. Everywhere, they are known for their industry, their intelligence, and their decent
and orderly lives. They are so superior to the Turks intellectually and morally that much
of the business and industry had passed into their hands.” 37 Bruce Fein argues that “after
statehood was lost, Armenians turned to their genocide playbook which exploited
Christian bigotries and contempt for Ottoman Muslims. They remembered earlier
successful anti-Ottoman propaganda. The United States Ambassador to the Ottoman
Empire during the war, Henry Morganthau, was accused of being openly racist and
devoted to propaganda. On November 26, 1917, Morgenthau confessed in a letter to
President Wilson that he intended to write a book vilifying Turks and Germans to, ‘win a
36
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victory for the war policy of the government.’ In his biography, ‘Ambassador
Morgenthau's Story,’ Morgenthau betrays his racist hatred toward Turks (‘humanity and
civilization never for a moment enters their mind’).” 38 When Morgenthau’s memoir was
published in 1919, it created an unfavorable image of Ottomans among the American
populace. Given the fact that many Armenians from Ottoman lands immigrated to the
United States, and created a dynamic diaspora community in the U.S., the issue of
“Armenian genocide” has become an enduring and thorny issue for Ankara and
Washington.
From the U.S. declaration of war against Germany in 1917 to the Lausanne
Conference in 1923, relations between two countries were frozen. Relations were not
restored to a normal level until a modus vivendi was signed and ambassadors assigned
reciprocally in 1927. 39 The thaw in U.S.- Turkey relations, however, was not free of
friction. In 1928, three Turkish students at the Bursa American Girls College were
converted to Christianity through the influence of some American teachers. This incident
was seen as an attack on secularism by the Turkish state and the school was closed in
turn. Despite the objections of the U.S. ambassador to Turkey, Joseph C. Grew, the
teachers were tried in Turkish courts and deported to the U.S. 40
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At the very beginning of the interwar period, 41 Turks experienced one of the
harshest times in their history. As prominent historian, William Hale, puts it aptly:
Between 1919 and 1923 the Turks passed through the most critical turning point in their modern
history. With the defeat of the Ottoman empire in 1918, the victorious entente powers seemed
poised to divide up almost all its remaining territory, thus practically extinguishing the Turkish
state as an independent actor… Eventually, in 1923, this forced the Turks’ former enemies to
recognize an independent Turkey within what are virtually its present frontiers. The leader of the
resistance movement, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, then used his traditionally derived authority as a
‘Ghazi’, the victor in a war against the infidel, to reconstruct the Turkish state on quite
untraditional lines – as a secular republic, committed to modernism and a Turkish-ethnic rather
than Muslim identity, with himself as president. This outcome was basically determined on the
battlefield, not at the conference table. Nonetheless, the military victory would probably have been
impossible without adroit diplomacy by Ataturk and his colleagues – in effect, the explanation of
the balance of power, and rivalries between the main European states, on which their Ottoman
predecessors had relied. After the victory, their overwhelming aim was to secure peace and
national security, following years of struggle and loss, by avoiding expansionary projects, and
limiting their objectives to what they could achieve by relying on their own resources. 42

Therefore, Turkish foreign policy objectives were very limited, being based primarily
upon the idea that Turkey would do everything in its power not to extensively engage in
any major world events. The Balkan Wars, World War I, and the War of Independence
all occurred in the time frame of about a decade and taught a very costly lesson to the
Turkish leadership. Forming alliances and siding with major powers in the European
continent that had been rattled with long and bloody wars for more than a century
brought heavy tolls to Turks: blood, treasure, and the eventual demise of the Ottoman
Empire. 43 Great suspicion and anxiety among Turkish leadership pervaded relations with
any major Western power, including the geographically distant United States. The
Turkish mindset held that if these Westerners had an opportunity, they would repeal the
Lausanne Treaty of 1923, a peace treaty that recognized Turkey’s borders. They would
41
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try to revive the Treaty of Sèvres, which sealed the death certificate of the Ottoman
Empire in 1920 and officially partitioned it.
The Turkish leadership was also aware that there has been a structural change in
the international system with the result that they could no longer rely on it as the Ottoman
Empire had in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As Mustafa Aydin points out,
The Turkish nation-state emerged out of the ashes of the Empire, it was surrounded with a new
international environment which was no longer identical to that which existed prior to the First
World War. First of all, the breakup of the Ottoman, Russian and Austria-Hungarian Empires
signaled change for the international system. The disintegration of these three empires increased
the number of actors in the international system. Most of the new actors were politically unstable
and economically weak compared to the victorious powers of the First World War. Furthermore,
throughout the war the international system had ceased to be a 'European system' and became a
global one in which Europe was no longer predominant. Moreover, the new Turkey was no longer
an empire, but a nation-state. It had no desire for territorial conquest and had no power to do so
even if it had desired it. It needed a new, realistically sound foreign policy which could respond to
the challenges of the new international system without endangering the existence of the state.
Ataturk's new directions for Turkish foreign policy were thus enormously important. His foreign
policy objectives reflected a departure from the militant expansionist ideology of the Ottoman
Empire. He was genuinely concerned with independence and sovereignty, thus with his motto of
peace at home, peace in the world; he, while aiming to preserve the status quo, sought a deliberate
break with the Ottoman past in virtually every aspect of life. 44

As the U.S. encountered an unprecedented economic crisis in the Great
Depression of 1929, isolationist policies were rampant. Domestic setbacks forced U.S.
policymakers to deal with internal issues; the swing from Wilson’s ambitious
internationalism to avid isolationism was swift, and it limited American involvement in
world affairs. Turkey, a nation-state newly-established on the ashes of the centuries-old
multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire, had to consolidate its political, social and economic
structure. Moreover, Turkey needed to deal with its immediate neighboring powers, such
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as the Soviets and the European powers. 45 Ataturk himself was against military alliances
and pacts, and believed that those were primary reasons for insecurities among
neighboring nations. 46 In light of early 20th-century history, this attitude does not surprise
students of Turkish history. Coincidentally, the interwar period overlaps well with
Ataturk’s rule as the president of Turkey from 1923 to 1938. His ambitious agenda of
modernizing Turkey by taking drastic domestic measures in the areas of politics, law,
economy, and culture kept him busy. As Aydin argues, “the inter-war period under the
leadership of Ataturk and Inonu found Turkey Western in its inclination but jealously
guarding against any intimidation that its independence, either economically or militarily,
might be jeopardized.” 47 Consequently, engagement with the world in the 1920s and
1930s was not paramount on Turkish or American agendas. 48
World War II and the Cold War
Just before the start of the Second World War, young Turkey faced a major hurdle
in its twenty-five-year-old history: its founding hero and of president, Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk, passed away on November 10, 1938. His massive and radical modernization
efforts in domestic affairs, coupled with his strong neutrality in international affairs,
45
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provided breathing room for the young republic. However, the next leader, Ismet Inonu,
encountered two nearly insurmountable tasks, to fill the shoes of the founding father and
to keep the country away from the oncoming storm of World War II. His rule as the
second president of Turkey earned him the title of Milli Sef (National Chief), given the
fact that his authoritarian and heavy-handed measures surpassed that of Ataturk’s
implementation of Westernization and modernization. 49 In his first year as President,
World War II broke out, and he was pressured by the Allied and Axis powers to join in
their respective ranks. However, his skilful diplomacy in keeping Turkey from siding
with either alliance was successful until late in the war. As Aydin pointed out,
“[t]hroughout the war, Inonu came to the conclusion that Turkey's biggest problem after
the war would be the prospect of facing all alone the more powerful Soviet Union. In
fact, he was convinced that if Turkey entered the war, the Soviets would occupy Turkey
either as a member of the Axis or as a 'liberator'. He also foresaw the Soviet post-war
domination of Eastern Europe. Hence, he was determined not to give the Soviets an
excuse to set foot on Turkish soil.” 50
Although Turkey had followed a very strict neutrality policy during the interwar
period, Inonu came to understand that a different shape of international affairs was
emerging. The Soviets were pursuing a policy of belligerency, attempting to claim
territory from Turkey during the war, and made their intentions clear to both the Great
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Britain and the United States at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences in 1945. 51 They
asked for new arrangements at the Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles) that would
virtually allow the Soviets to control them, as well as Turkey’s territorial concessions
(Kars and Ardahan) on its border with the Soviet Union. When their demands were
rejected by Turkey, the Soviet Union increased its aggressive political pressure. Turkey’s
policy of non-alignment and its ambiguity during both the interwar war period (19191939) and World War II encouraged the Soviets. In contrast to other European powers’
clear positions, Turkish ambiguity invited Soviet pressure. Turkey had no option but to
abandon its long-preferred policy of non-alignment during the interwar period. It aligned
itself with the Western powers and especially the United States. It can easily be argued
that the World War II and its aftermath was a watershed moment that bolstered Turkey’s
“western vocation.” In spite of Ataturk’s insistence on charting a non-aligned and
independent foreign policy during the interwar period, the new leadership under President
Inonu came to a realization that the prospect for Turkey’s future should closely be tied to
emerging post-World War II western security institutions. Otherwise, Turkey’s
independence would severely be jeopardized by the imminent threat of Soviet invasion.
In fact, more westward proclivity in the areas of security and economy for the young
Turkish republic had the potential of fully realizing Ataturk’s dream of “modern” or
“western” Turkey. Increasing Turkish association with the west in this emerging post-
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World War II world would also mean that the young Turkey is qualitatively different than
its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire. The move, in the minds of Kemalist elite, would
further “disown” the heritage and the association of the past. 52
From the end of the World War II in 1945 to the early days of 1947, 53 Turkey
tried to convince the Western powers, especially the United States, about impending
Soviet threats and argued for the first time that Turkey is geographically significant to
Western interests since the Soviets could eventually access the Middle East by first
invading Turkey. The Turkish argument iterated that Turkey is a key country and that
giving in to Soviet pressure would allow the Soviets unmitigated influence in the Middle
East and Mediterranean. This argument of the “geographic/ geostrategic significance of
Turkey” has since been a useful staple in Turkish foreign policy, enduring despite the
changing nature of enemies in the decades to come. I argue that Turkey’s claim to a
“strategic position” in the heart of three continents of Asia, Europe, and Africa, has been
the lifeline of the country in countering major national and international challenges since
the end of World War II. It can easily be argued that Turkey delayed facing its issues and
challenges, such as the rights of its Kurdish citizens and the claims of an “Armenian
genocide,” because of its long-standing “significance” and “strategic position” to
European nations and the United States.
On February 21, 1947, the British government relayed an important message to
U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, indicating that it would stop providing aid to
52
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Greece and Turkey because of Great Britain’s economic woes after World War II. The
U.S. had been closely monitoring both Greece and Turkey since both were experiencing
serious economic hardship. Moreover, the rise of the Communist faction known as the
National Liberation Front in Greece, and well-known Soviet intentions towards Turkey,
made President Harry Truman uneasy. He and his top brass realized that unless the U.S.
helped, Greece would be taken over by its communists and fall into the hands of the
Soviet Union. Moreover, Turkey could not defend itself either militarily or economically
against Soviet aggression. The period between the end of the Word War II and early 1947
can easily be assessed as the period when Turkey faced its greatest danger of Soviet
threats. 54 Had Turkey fallen to the Soviets, both the Eastern Mediterranean and the
Middle East would have inevitably fallen under communist domination. After much
deliberation in the Truman administration, it was clear that protecting Greece and Turkey
was vital to U.S. security interests. In his message to the U.S. Congress on March 12,
1947, President Truman said that the U.S. must take immediate action to support Greece
and Turkey against growing Soviet expansionism. 55 President Truman said in his address
to a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress: “I believe that it must be the policy of the United
States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out
their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through
economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political
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processes.” 56 Truman emphasized that helping Greece was paramount to the interests of
the United States. If Greece would fall into the hands of communism, the neighboring
nation, Turkey, could experience serious difficulties, and this wave of communism had
the potential of spreading into other European nations. After making the case for an
immediate and resolute action, he asked from the U.S. Congress to provide monetary
assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of $400 million. On May 22, 1947, the
U.S. Congress passed this historic legislation, later known as the Truman Doctrine, as
part of the containment strategy that helped smaller nations resist Soviet expansionism. It
was a major milestone for Turkish-American relations given the fact that it was designed
to help Turkey and Greece militarily counter Soviet expansion in the region. However, it
was not enough to solve the problems of Turkey and Greece when many other European
nations were reeling, economically and politically, from the devastating effects of the
Second World War. It is worth noting that some communist parties were gaining strength
in countries like France and Italy by exploiting massive economic hardship. Even though
Turkey had not shot a bullet in the war, and even though its communist factions were
almost non-existent, its economy was in shambles and the state could not provide for the
basic needs of its population. 57 An economic aid package for Turkey would ease
domestic needs and bolster political stability amid Soviet threats. 58
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As part of advancing the agenda of containing the Soviet expansion, the United
States sought to strengthen France, the Great Britain and Germany economically with the
long-range goal of creating a strong and unified Europe that could counter the Soviet
Union. Providing monetary aid to European countries, including Turkey, through the IMF
and the WB would help revive their economies, adjust macroeconomic stability, and
eventually provide market opportunities for American goods. Secretary of State George
Marshall delivered a message hinting at an aid package to Europe at Harvard University
in June 1947, what was later officially dubbed as the European Recovery Program,
though it is widely referred to as the Marshall Plan. Turkey requested to be included in
the aid plan although the initial legislation from the U.S. Congress did not include
Turkey. On July 4, 1948, Turkey officially participated in the Marshall Plan by signing
the Turkish-American Economic Cooperation Agreement. 59 According to the agreement,
Turkey would receive immediate economic assistance in the amount of $62,376,000 in
grants from 1948 to 1951, and a $72,840,000 loan under very favorable conditions. 60
When combined with the Truman Doctrine aid package, Turkey received close to $2
billion in military assistance and nearly $1.4 billion in economic assistance, most of
which it used to modernize and mechanize agriculture, improve mining processes, and
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construct highways. 61 Agriculture was the single most important area that benefitted from
Turkey’s receipt of economic aid from the Marshall Plan.
Concurrent with the aforementioned dynamic change in the international system,
Turkey also underwent a transformation in domestic politics. One-party rule by the
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, the Republican People’s Party (RPP), as established by Ataturk,
was replaced by a multi-party system. 62 The Demokrat Parti, the Democrat Party (DP),
won a stunning victory against the establishment party, RPP, in 1950. The sea change
should also be considered significant in terms of what it reveals about the mindset and
perception of the Turkish leadership, which allowed a multi-party system as part of
integrating to the Western world. It is also imperative to see that there were pragmatic
reasons for Turkey moving to the West, namely the immense Soviet threat and the
Americans’ promise to help Turkey economically and militarily. It can be argued that the
DP’s support and enthusiasm for joining the Western world, and especially being closer
to the United States, was greater than the RPP’s. 63 The RPP represented the
establishment of the new republic and it proudly claimed that the RPP was the party of
Ataturk, suggesting that it had been established by him. The DP came to power when the
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multi-party system was truly instituted in 1950. Even though many senior members of the
DP, including Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, who was later hanged by a military junta
in 1960, and Celal Bayar, who was the President of Turkey from 1950 to 1960 and barely
escaped the death penalty because of his age, reached high office- but they were
considered outsiders, peripheral to the core of political authority in Turkey. Therefore, I
argue that the DP’s political, economic and security-based attachment to the United
States maintained the DP’s own legitimacy as the governing party of Turkey, against the
establishment, i.e. RPP, and its extensions in the civil and military bureaucracy. It is
doubtful that the long rule of the DP 64 from 1950 to 1960 would have been possible had
it not received economic and military help from the United States. Both domestic
restraints and international systemic structures forced Turkey to side with the U.S.,
sometimes at its own expense.
In the period between 1945 and 1964, Turkish-American relations deepened
tremendously but not on equal terms. As Nasuh Uslu puts it, it is the “patron-client state
relationship” 65 and he explains characteristics of it as such: First, “[t]here must be a
sizeable difference between the military capabilities of the two states. The bargaining
power of the patron is greater than that of the client because of the resources it has.” 66
Second, “the client plays an important role in patron (superpower) competition. Its
position is determined by the availability of other patrons who can render the client the
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same protection and material support, the mobility of the clients between alternative
patrons and degree to which the patron is dependent on the client’s services.” 67 Third,
“[t]he patron and the client are closely tied to each other for a recognizable period of
time. In almost every issue, the client follows the patron’s lead either to get immediate
positive rewards or to accumulate goodwill and credit for the future.” 68 Fourth,
“[s]ecurity transactions from the patron to the client are more prominent in the
relationship. At a low level of threat to the client, other goals such as economic
development, regional leadership, and international prestige may gain importance. Arms
transfers are powerful tools of influence for the patron.” 69 Fifth, the “[e]lite of the client
state absorbs the patron’s perceptions of the world through foreign and domestic
education.” 70 Sixth, “[t]he patron’s goals in continuing the relationship are more
complicated: ideological goals (demands for changes in the client’s political, economic
and social structure), international solidarity (voting cohesion in the United Nations,
signing of international agreements, visits between senior statesmen, client
announcements of support for the patron), strategic goals (demand for bases).” 71
As these characteristics depict a fully dependent nation to its patron, Turkey’s
position vis-à-vis the United States from 1945 to 1964 was of one-dimensional foreign
policy orientation as Turkey bet its hands on this heavy dependence. In this period, “[a]s
a result, Turkey’s need for foreign aid became an integral part of its foreign as well as
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domestic policy.” 72 Converging Turkey’s interests to those of the U.S.’ became the
cornerstone of Turkish foreign policymaking, which was, at the time, considered to be a
realm of a small elite cadre of the nation. Turkey’s willingness to be part of Western
political and security structures also proved viable when it sent Turkish troops to Korea
in 1950. The move aimed to show the European powers in general and the United States
in particular that it was willing to go the extra mile to be part of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). Even though Turkey lobbied hard to enter into NATO in 1948
when it was established by the U.S. and major European powers, it was not possible until
1952, when both Greece and Turkey were admitted to the organization. The Turkish
entry into NATO was the culmination of Turkey’s integration into the Western world, not
only in economic terms but also in collective security terms.
Three major outcomes emerged from Turkey’s NATO membership: First, its
economic and security woes were eased since it was “more” connected to the Western
world, specifically to the United States. Second, the membership supported the proWestern policies of the Democrat Party as it took power for two years. Its arch-nemesis,
the RPP, was temporarily silenced by the DP’s foreign policy success. Third, the DP
would use this success to promote its rhetoric of Turkey as “Little America,” alluding to
the perception that Turkey was becoming prosperous, powerful, and Western like the
United States. This image of “Little America” has positive and negative connotations for
the Democrat Party. First, it granted more political ammunition for Westernization, which
the founding father of Turkey, Ataturk, characterized as the “ultimate contemporary level
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of civilization”. However, both the senior leadership of the Republican People's Party and
small, emerging left-leaning political factions were using this depiction against the DP,
portraying it as too American. The survey of daily papers such as Cumhuriyet and Son
Posta at the time reveals unease about the DP’s rhetorical flop.
Throughout the 1950s, Turkey further improved its relations with the U.S.,
especially in military affairs. “Under a series of bilateral and secret agreements, important
U.S.-cum-NATO facilities were constructed in Turkey, including, most notably, an air
base at Incirlik, near Adana, with other bases at Karamursel, Cigli, and Diyarbakir, and
radar stations at Karamursel, Sinop, Samsun, Trabzon, Belbasi, and Diyarbakir. Naval
facilities and storage centers were established at Iskenderun (Alexandretta) and
Yumurtalik. The U.S. Air Force stationed strike aircraft armed with tactical weapons on
Turkish soil, under an agreement reached in 1957, and by the late 1960s there were about
24,000 U.S. military personnel on Turkish territory. U.S. aid, equipment and training
were also instrumental in modernising the armed forces and in propping up the Turkish
economy. Total delivered U.S. military assistance to Turkey between 1948 to 1964 came
to $2,271 million, plus $328 million in deliveries of surplus equipment. Meanwhile,
Western economic aid to Turkey between 1950 and 1962 totaled around $1,380 million,
of which the vast majority came from the United States. To put these into context,
Turkey’s annual average exports during the 1950s came to around $320 million, and its
annual imports to around $400 million. Turkey would almost certainly have found it
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impossible to maintain a fairly high rate of economic growth during 1950s (as it did), and
greatly strengthen its defences at the same time, without this assistance.” 73
Disappointments and Crises
The relationship between Turkey and the U.S. was not free of friction or crisis. In
fact, major crises took place in the 1960s. 74 One of the initial disappointments occurred in
1958 when Lebanon called for immediate U.S. assistance as violence escalated between
its Muslim and Christian populations. The U.S. immediately dispatched its support from
Adana-Incirlik airbase in Turkey, without consulting its counterparts in the Turkish
government. Opposition leader Ismet Inonu, powerful leader of the RPP and former
President of Turkey, fiercely attacked the Menderes government and claimed that Turkish
sovereignty was compromised. To a certain extent, the opposition was not ready to see
the Incirlik air base used outside of its primary mission of containing the Soviet Union.
The U.S. action was perceived as prioritizing American interests over Turkish ones even
if they might damage Turkish interests, as by intervening in Lebanese domestic affairs. 75
The second incident involved an American U-2 spy plane that was shot down in 1960 by
the Soviets while flying over the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union accused Turkey of
being part of a covert surveillance mission of the U.S. as the U2 had been ferried through
the Incirlik air base. Two years after the Lebanon affair, the incident alarmed Turkey. In
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turn, Turkey asked the U.S. to inform Turkish authorities about their flight details from
Incirlik. 76
Months before the toppling of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes by a military
junta in 1960, the Menderes government agreed on the installation of “15 Jupiter
intermediate-range ballistic missiles, armed with nuclear warheads, … [t]hey were owned
by Turkey, but the U.S. retained custody of the warheads, and they could only be used
with the joint permission of the U.S. and Turkish governments. Together with two similar
squadrons of Jupiter deployed in Italy, they were targeted on 45 of 129 Soviet mediumand intermediate-range missiles aimed at Europe.” 77 Public opinion in Turkey was
sharply divided on the issue. On the one hand, some argued that this Turkish and
American “offensive” would provoke a Soviet attack. Alternatively, proponents
advocated that Turkey would be more secure against possible Soviet threat since it would
show that Turkey had the capability of responding to it. They also added that this would
prove that the U.S. was committed to Turkey’s protection against any Soviet
aggression. 78
The installation of Jupiter missiles in Turkey was not possible until 1961.
However, the very next year, this installation caused one of the most pressing crises in
Cold War history when the Soviets asked the U.S. for removal of missiles in Turkey in
return for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. Even though the details of the deal
between President Kennedy and Khrushchev were not revealed immediately, it was clear
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to the Turkish leadership that the U.S. would make its own decision when it came to its
national security interests- without consulting or informing its allies. 79 Considering
previous incidents, the Cuban missile crisis was a watershed moment in Turkish foreign
policymaking. With this move, the Turkish foreign policy establishment understood that
Turkey needed diversification of its foreign policy, including finding new ways to
develop friendships outside the Western world, like with its Middle Eastern neighbors.
This analysis of diversification of the foreign policy agenda proved that Turkey could not
prosper and stay safe by aligning itself only with the U.S. Tensions only mounted with
the Cyprus crisis in the mid-1960s, and then grew further through the mid-1970s. It also
demonstrated that the perception of hotly-contested issues differed in both sides.
Issue of Cyprus and its Impact on the U.S.-Turkish Relations
The rising tension between the Greek majority and Turkish minority in Cyprus
proved that this island had the potential to severely jeopardize the relationship between
Washington and Ankara in the early 1960s. 80 Even though the London-Zurich Treaty of
1959 paved the way for the creation of the Republic of Cyprus with guarantees from
three outside powers, namely the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Greece, the United States
had to involve itself in the conflict as a result of the systemic changes in international
relations after 1945. When Makarios, the first President of the Republic of Cyprus and
Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church, tried to incorporate the island into Greece 79
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the idea of ENOSIS - Turkish Cypriots grew uneasy and faced a growing threat of
violence in the island. It is obvious that the tension between Greece and Turkey
increased tremendously as even the United States was wary of the fact that these two
NATO allies were endangering the alliance’s cohesion against the Soviet Union. The
United States wanted to keep the alliance intact and contain the Soviet influence on the
island, especially considering that Cypriot communists were powerful and that Makarios
was in regular contact with Moscow. 81 Cyprus’ constitutional crises of 1960 and 1963,
plus increasing intercommunal violence between majority Greek Cypriots and minority
Turkish Cypriots, further strained the relations between Athens and Ankara. Turkey
demanded from the U.S. that it needed to act proactively on the issue. Otherwise, Ankara
would intervene militarily. The possibility of military intervention in Cyprus, which
threatened to partition the island, at last resulted in a strong letter from U.S. President
Lyndon B. Johnson. It called for restraint on the parts of Turkish leaders and favored
Greece over Turkey. What was later known as the Johnson Letter of June 5, 1964 sent
deep shockwaves through Turkish domestic politics. Feelings of betrayal and doublestandards among the Turkish elite were rampant given the fact that Turkish observance of
pro-Western alliance since 1945 had left Turkey with limited options in countering Soviet
expansionism. The U.S. was now restraining Turkey to protect Turkish Cypriots from
another NATO ally, Greece. President Johnson also emphasized to Prime Minister Inonu
that he not use military equipment of U.S. origin in the case of Cyprus invasion.
I wish also, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the bilateral agreement between the
United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance. Under Article IV of the agreement
with Turkey of July 1947, your government is required to obtain United States consent for the use
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of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. Your
government has on several occasions acknowledged to the United States that you fully understand
this condition. I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any
United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present
circumstances. 82

The harsh nature of the letter stirred reactions from both the Turkish political elite
as well as the populace. Anti-American sentiment increased and mass protests were
organized. The U.S. even asked its military personnel in Turkey not to wear their
uniforms in public. As indicated earlier, growing unease about the U.S. consideration of
Turkish national interests on key foreign policy decisions, and Washington’s letter on
Cyprus, made it clear that Turkey needed more multi-faceted foreign policies. 83 The
Turkish political establishment, including Prime Minister Ismet Inonu, came to
understand that Turkey looked like a satellite state of the U.S. and henceforth considered
a new foreign policy orientation such as rapprochement with the Soviet Union. It could
serve as a balancing act against the U.S. Given the rise of left-leaning political
constituencies, not only in Europe, but also in Turkey, it made political sense for the
Turkish leadership to re-orient foreign policy. However, this new foreign policy
orientation did seek neutrality in conflicts in the Middle East in the mid-1960s. It can
easily be argued that this was, in essence, a mental shift in Turkish foreign policymaking,
and it did not mean that Turkey turned its face away from the Western alliance. Rather, it
was now looking at its Western alliance from a more realistic perspective and prioritizing
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its national interests, trying to find new ways to maximize them with possible partners
such as neighboring nations, even the Soviet Union.
By 1974, the situation on the island of Cyprus had deteriorated further. The nonaligned policies of President Makarios strained the island’s relationship with Greece.
Greek support for a military coup against Makarios, and an eventual replacement of
Makarios by Nikos Sampson’s junta government, alarmed Turkey and raised fears of
unification with Greece. According to the Turkish view, unification would jeopardize
Turkish national security interests due to the strategic nature of the island in the
Mediterranean. This literally meant, to the Turkish political elite, that the balance of
power in the Mediterranean Sea and Aegean Sea would be tipping against Turkish
interests. 84 Hence, Turkish armed forces, with the approval of Prime Minister Bulent
Ecevit, went ahead with military intervention on July 20, 1974. The two phases of
Turkish military advances in the island worried the United States, despite the fact that the
U.S. was deeply embroiled in its own crises, namely the Watergate scandal and the
Vietnam War. Angered by Turkish action on the island, and under the pressure from
Greek constituencies in the U.S., in February 1975, the Congress passed a resolution of
arms embargo against Turkey. The embargo banned “military sales and aid to Turkey
until the president could show that substantial progress had been registered towards a
settlement of the Cyprus problem.” 85 The U.S. Congress wanted to send a message not
only to Turkey but to President Ford, who had focused much of his energy on the postNixon political scenery. Ford was perceived by the Congress not to be giving his full
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attention to the Cyprus problem. The arms embargo defined the relationship between
Washington and Ankara until President Jimmy Carter was able to lift it. Subsequently,
Turks reacted swiftly by suspending all American activities on Turkish soils except
“those deemed to have purely NATO function.” Limiting the ability of American
functions in such a strategic location burdened the U.S. interests and clearly showed the
leverage that Turkey could use against any future problems with the U.S. The struggling
U.S. administration faced Congress’ imposition of the arms embargo on Turkey by
finding creative ways to ease the tension. Ford administration provided financial aid to
Turkey, which in turn convinced Turkey to let American functions to continue on Turkish
soils in early 1976. However, lifting of the embargo was not possible until 1978.
Concurrently with the issue of Cyprus, Turkey and the U.S. had another pressing
problem in the late 1960s and early 1970s: namely the implication of the US “war on
drugs” and Turkey as a source of opium. The growing problem of narcotics and drug
usage was one of leading domestic American problems that preceded Richard Nixon’s
Presidency. He plainly promised in his election campaign that he would fight against
drug production, distribution and usage. He coined the term “War on Drugs” and showed
his resolute implementation of drug prohibition policies with the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. One of the important components of the
“War on Drugs” policy was to control the illegal trafficking of opium coming from
Turkey. Pressured throughout the 1960s, Turkey took measures to limit the growing of
opium from thirty cities to four cities with more restrictions imposed. 86 However, it did
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not satisfy the U.S. authorities, and Turkey was singled out in a report by the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, claiming that “about 80 percent of the heroin illicitly
introduced into the United States was derived from opium diverted from Turkish
production.” 87 Turkish authorities swiftly reacted to the claim, arguing that it was not
possible that Turkey was the primary supplier of heroin in the U.S. It also railed against
Turkey being singled out - the report did not mention of any other country - and
questioned the integrity of the report. Turkey had a hard time balancing the U.S. requests
to control opium production on the one hand and its need to substitute new products for
Turkish farmers on the other hand. Eventually, Turkey banned opium production to
satisfy U.S. demands after the 1971 military coup. 88
Washington’s perception of Turkey as the “sole supplier” of opium to the U.S.
was coupled with other hard-pressing international issues, such as the Cyprus problem
that underscored the growing unease in Turkish-US relations. Consequently, relations
between Ankara and Washington were unsettled and difficult from the mid-60s to the
late-70s. Above all, the Turkish political elite understood that the U.S. would always
prioritize its own national interests over those of Turkey, and they recognized a need to
worry about Turkey’s own strategic calculations. Realism replaced their naïve
perspective on international politics. Given the fact that harsh bifurcation of power
politics of the Cold War in the international system had began to thaw under the détente,
Turkey saw in the reduction of superpower tension a window of opportunity for a
cautious opening to the Soviets and other neighboring nations. However, diversification
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of foreign policy was not easy since Turkey did not have either meaningful engagements
with its neighbors or power capabilities in the 1960s and 1970s. As Aydin stated,
1945-60, during which Turkey's foreign policy was dominated by total Western dependence, was
followed by a period of disillusionment with the West, late detente with Eastern bloc and
rapprochement efforts with the Third World (1960-70). The 1970s, in addition, saw a pattern of
alienation from the West encouraged by the Cyprus crisis of 1974, which in turn showed Turkey
the cumulative result of the foreign policy it had been following since the end of the Second
World War: loneliness in the international arena. Hence, the 1970s witnessed Turkey's efforts to
come back to the international arena as a reliable and friendly nation, just as she was during the
inter-war period. 89

Despite rocky relations between Turkey and the U.S. throughout the 1970s,
Ankara’s relative strategic importance increased due to renewed Cold War tension
between Soviets and Americans in the first half of the 1980s. Washington provided more
military and economic aid to Ankara to bolster its ally against any possible Soviet
aggression. In 1984, U.S. military aid to Turkey reached its peak of $715 million. 90
Another important dimension of the discussion is that the Turkish military intervened in
the government on September 12, 1980, for the third time in the last three decades. As the
generals involved were pro-American, and since the coup ended civil unrest and political
uncertainty in the country, intervention was welcomed by Washington. American
officials preferred to deal with a “reliable partner” on the Turkish side as they attempted
to counter renewed Soviet activism. Six months prior to the military intervention, Turkey
and the U.S. signed the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) to
deepen their military and economic partnership and reclaim time and resources lost in the
1970s. Given the fact that the U.S. lost its most important strategic ally in the Middle
East, Iran, to that country’s Islamic revolution in 1979, keeping Turkey in the Western
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alliance had become more significant. Kenan Evren, commanding general in the 1980
coup d’état, presented his coup as a means of preventing Turkey from slipping into the
hands of communism, fascism and religious sectarianism.
A transition to democracy started with a new constitution, which was written by
the military in 1982, and free elections were held in late 1983. U.S.-educated Turgut Ozal
became the Prime Minister. He was determined to do three things: 1) liberalize the
Turkish economy and make it internationally competitive, 2) deepen political and
economic involvement with the United States, and 3) assert civilian control over Turkish
politics. To these ends, he started a series of reforms in the economic realm, including
providing a more appealing business environment for foreign investors. He helped pass
legislation to reform the state-run economy and took bold measures to shift it to an
export-oriented, free-market economy. What is called the “Ozal revolution” is the reason
for structural change in economic outlook that integrated Turkey into the global economy
as the country had already done with its security institutions in the early 1950s. As a
result of him being educated in the U.S., he admired the values of the free market
economy, American secularism and democracy. He aimed to make Turkey an advanced
industrialized democracy modeled after the United States. 91 As Aral pointed out, “Even
his critics agree that liberalization and transition to a free market economy are among his
most durable legacies.” 92 Ozal also led a mental shift in the Turkish political elite, away
from the role of a subordinate to the U.S. to one of a partner. He thought that requesting
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economic and military aid from Washington perpetuated the disparate relationship and
consequently placed Turkey under psychological and strategic subordination. Therefore,
he voiced a new vocabulary in his new strategy, calling for “trade not aid” in political
dealings with Washington. Rather than complaining about increases in aid packages
given to Greece, he engaged in opening up more commercial opportunities and
eliminating trade barriers not only with the U.S., but also with Europe. The new-found
self-confidence, especially after the instable politico-economic environment of the 1970s,
spurred impressive economic growth of 5% annually, along with an increase of Turkish
exports from $2.9 billion in 1980 to $20 billion in 1990. 93
Ankara’s relations with Washington in the mid to late-1980s were accompanied
by a new soul-searching that reached an all-time high in the early 1990s. Mikhael
Gorbachev’s ascension to power in 1985 set the stage for a shattering of the international
system and the end of the Cold War, which was based upon systemic rivalry between two
superpowers. Gorbachev’s bold initiatives in ending rivalries with Washington would
also result in the U.S. questioning the future of its security and political commitments in
the region. As one can imagine, the Turkish political elite realized that the “utility of
Turkey” to the Western alliance was in question as the long-standing Soviet threat was
about to disappear. Turkey’s presumed strategic role and relative significance to the West
as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism was losing its immediate value and that
prompted the Turkish political elite to find new ways to “situate” Turkey in this
uncharted territory. Ankara faced new and challenging tasks as its long-fixed mindset,
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reliant upon the now-extant realities of the Cold War, adjusted to emerging post-Soviet
environment.

51

CHAPTER III: THE SHADOW OF THE GULF WAR AND THE KURDISH
QUESTION
The young Turkish Republic has experienced four broadly defined transformative
periods 94 in its foreign policy. The first one was its establishment as a country whose
identity was based on a Turkish nation-state ideal on the republican premise. Even though
it has defined its course forward as “western oriented,” its foreign policy can be
categorized as non-aligned between 1923 and 1945. The second is the exclusive
integration of Turkey into western security and political institutions during the Cold War
era (1945-1990) largely because of the imminent threat of Soviet expansion. The third
period (1990-2003) is that of the post-Cold War environment, which signifies the demise
of Soviet Union and the threat therefrom, but also brings a wide array of challenges and
opportunities for Turkish foreign policy making. During this period, Turkey had to face
growing threats of instability in the neighboring regions like the Middle East, the
Caucasus, and the Balkans. Especially, the Gulf War of 1990-91 seriously impacted the
direction of Turkey’s Kurdish question. The main theme of this period for Turkey was to
situate itself in the emerging post-Cold War era while undergoing serious domestic
political and economic challenges. The fourth period signaled the beginning of a new era
of activism in Turkish foreign policy, which started roughly in 2003 with the Turkish
rejection of U.S. troops being stationed on Turkish soil to overthrow Saddam regime in
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Iraq. It should also be noted that the Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) 95 assertive
new foreign policy reflected the growing role of the Turkish populace in foreign policy
making. While keeping its western orientation, Turkey began to assert itself as an
independent and self-confident actor who could heavily invest in the Middle Eastern
affairs that Turkey ignored for a long-period of time. It should also be noted that this
activism in foreign policy was a reflection of a wider transformation in Turkey’s own
self-perception and the definition of its core interests. While systemic changes in the
international system profoundly impacted both Turkish domestic and foreign policy the
author, however, looks at the transformation of Turkish domestic and foreign policy not
only as a function of changes in the international system but rather as a function of the
interplay of agency and systemic variables, thus providing the framework to explain the
evolution of Turkish-American relations in the post-Cold War environment. It is really
key to understanding the dynamics of this emerging post-Cold War world, but one also
needs to weave some of the major events into the discussion such as the Gulf War, the
emergence of the de facto Kurdish state in northern Iraq, the September 11th terrorist
attacks, and the Iraqi War of 2003.
The Post-Cold War Security Thinking and Turkish Calculations
NATO, the prime western collective security organization, was in soul-searching
mode after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It lacked a “sense of meaning” because of
losing its primary mission, which was to counter Soviet expansionism. Re-orienting its
core mission to solving security challenges of the post-Cold war environment required
extensive discussions and deliberations. Acquiring new missions in order to replace the
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already dissolved “Soviet threat” was not easy. It was also true for Turkey as it sought to
“define” or “find” its proper place in this new security environment. Staying in NATO’s
orbit not only for its security umbrella but also re-asserting its “Western vocation” have
been two of the main foreign policy challenges for Turkish policy makers. Discussions
about the diminished, if not lost, role of NATO would also be severely affecting Turkey’s
unique strategic position during the Cold War. “Situating” Turkey in the new western
security apparatus was a challenge because the “utility” of Turkey as a buffer-zone or
bulwark against the Soviet expansion was no longer applicable. Turkey’s long-desired
entry into the European Community, then named the European Union, has not been
realized. Moreover, it has become more difficult to argue the “unmatched position” of
Turkey back in the good old Cold War days since the relative “geostrategic value” of
Turkey in relation to Europe diminished significantly. As William Hale put it, “Turkey
might be seen as strategic and political liability rather than an asset to the West –
strategically because it had a host of complex regional security concerns (which, it was
apparently assumed, were not shared by the Western powers), and politically because of
its non-membership of the EU, its internal Kurdish problem, poor human rights record,
and conflicts with Greece. Turkey’s leaders liked to present their country to the Western
powers as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East and central Asia, but there was a
risk that western Europe might prefer to see it as a barrier against a hostile ‘other,’ left
outside European structures.” 96 This led to major soul-searching for Turkish foreign
policy makers. They needed to find some ways to “situate” Turkey’s standing in this new
world (dis)order in which many of the assumptions of the previous period no longer
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held. 97 Some in Turkey saw the opportunity to open it up to the newly independent
Turkic states in the Central Asia and the Caucasus. However, they steadfastly argued that
this new opening for the Turkish foreign policy is “complementary rather than
contradictory to its links with the Western powers.” 98
As laid out above, the third transformative period in Turkish foreign policy began
at the end of the Cold War dichotomy and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Turkey was
safe from Soviet expansionism, but faced a complex and dynamic web of new challenges
ranging from ethnic separatism, the rising tide of terrorism, the increasing tension and
conflicts in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East in Turkey’s immediate
neighborhood. Countering these challenges was not easy and required the involvement
and cooperation of international organizations, especially NATO, as a result of its
collective security commitments during the Cold War. However, engaging nonconventional security threats was difficult given the fact that the NATO was a collective
security organization that was designed primarily to respond to conventional threats
emanating from the Soviets. In line with Turkey’s concerns and changing perception of
the foreign policy challenges, heads of states from NATO member countries met in Rome
in November 1991. They identified NATO’s new mission of dealing with challenges and
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instability outside of NATO areas. 99 It was argued that new emerging threats were
emanating from ethnic tensions, cross-border issues, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and other non-traditional security threats. Defining such an extended mission
of engagement for NATO would not decrease Turkey’s “relative value” in the western
world; instead, it would put Turkey at the center of engagement given that NATO was
now effectively extending its reach to the south and east of Turkey’s borders. The test of
Turkey's "utility" for the Western world and NATO did not have to wait long: The
invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein brought a global crisis to Turkey's door and
tested its new post-Cold War role in a profound and a very unexpected fashion.
The Gulf War and the U.S. Engagement in Iraqi Kurdistan
The prolonged Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) left both sides devastated both
economically and politically. Though Iraq had accumulated more than $30 billion in its
reserves by 1980, its infrastructure was almost entirely demolished after 8 long years of
war with its neighbor. It became indebted to its creditors in amounts of about $100 billion
by 1988. Most of this money was owed to its oil-producing neighbors, Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait. With its war with Iran ending without victory, Saddam Hussein had a ruined Iraq
whose reconstruction would cost hundreds of billions of dollars. 100 Adding insult to
injury, the price of crude oil, the main source of income for Iraq, was on its lowest-ever
prices in international market. For example, crude oil was valued at nearly $20 per barrel
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in July 1987 but dipped to $12.28 per barrel in October 1998. 101 For Saddam, this was
devastating since his iron fist rule was endangered when Iraqis could not achieve basic
subsistence. If he could not quickly find sources of income to revive the Iraqi economy,
his grip on power might be jeopardized, given the fact that he had ascended to power by
ruthless means in 1979. It is important to note that he escaped as many as four
assassination attempts due to growing unrest in Iraq after the war. He needed to divert his
people’s energy and find ways to ease Iraq’s financial woes. However, he could get it
from neither the Soviet Union, because of its own financial malaise and its disastrous
departure from Afghanistan, nor from western Europeans, who seriously objected to
Saddam’s treatment of his own people, especially the Kurds. Given the fact that Kuwait
is a small country that enjoyed the benefits of a burgeoning economy heavily dependent
on oil, Saddam insisted that Kuwait was responsible for the dramatic collapse of oil
prices. He also thought that Kuwait had historically been a natural part of Iraqi territory
(in the Ottoman domain of Basra) until the British colonial rule established during World
War I. Combining all of these reasons, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on August 2,
1990. It was not clear whether he was also considering the collapse of the Cold War
international system in his calculation as the Soviet Union ended the war in Afghanistan
with defeat in 1988, and discussions of secessions among Soviet republics were
widespread in early 1990. Regardless of Saddam’s understanding of the emerging
international system, his main motivation was to maintain his grip on power by exploiting
the weak state in his neighborhood. That happened to be Kuwait.
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The Gulf War conflict has hardly been a regional one from the outset. 102 The
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq sparked an immediate opposition from neighboring nations,
especially Turkey and Saudi Arabia; the leading world powers, the United States, western
European nations, and Russia; and the international community as embodied by the
United Nations. On August 2nd, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution
660 swiftly “condemns Iraqi invasion of Kuwait… demands that Iraq withdraw
immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they are located
on 1 August 1990.” 103 As Turkey was about to make sense of the changing international
environment, the eruption of war next door put the country in a very difficult position
because it was forced to take a position of engagement one way or another- this in
opposition to its traditional policy of non-involvement in Mideast affairs. Throughout the
Cold War, Turkey followed pro-Western policies, worked closely with the United States
on key strategic security issues. Apart from few minor occasions, Turkey maintained
distance from Middle Eastern affairs, refraining from involvement with any major
problems in Arab nations. 104 It could be attributed, in part, to the nature of the
international system, the ideological preferences of Turkish political establishment, and
pro-Soviet tendencies among some of the Middle Eastern nations. First of all, Turkey’s
distinct position in the intersection of Europe, Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East,
and the emerging new Central Asian Turkic republics was about to open new
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opportunities as well as challenges as the Cold War paradigm based upon fierce rivalry
between the Iron Curtain and the Western World crumbled. Non-involvement in the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait in Turkey’s backyard might mean that Turkey was letting other major
players in the region do whatever they wanted to do without any Turkish participation.
The point of view would further push Turkey away from any possible role of re-shaping
the post-Cold War world in surrounding areas. Second, the Turkish political
establishment has pegged Turkey’s strategic and political outlook to the West, primarily
to the United States during the Cold War. The secular nature of the Turkish republic did
not share some of the “values” of Arab nations. Ideational associations with Middle
Eastern countries or their presumed “values”, according to the Kemalist elite, could be
seen as anathema to the very idea of the “progressive” and “western” aspects of the
Turkish republic. Many in the Turkish political elite saw Arab nations as “back-stabbers”
as they alluded to the assertion that Arabs had betrayed the Ottoman state by giving in the
nationalism and caused the Ottomans to lose the Middle East during the World War I. 105
Therefore, involvement in Middle Eastern affairs, for the Turkish elite, could be
dangerous for Turkey. Related to this perspective, many in the Middle East perceived
Turkish activism in the region as a revival of the pan-Ottomanism that aroused suspicion
of Turkish imperialism. Third, many Arab nations were either siding with Soviets or nonaligned countries. Thus, Turkey did not want to jeopardize its status in the western flank
by engaging with the Middle Eastern nations. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990,
however, did not allow Turkey to be impartial in the matter. Both the international
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community and the western world, especially the United States, were quick to react to the
invasion. Non-involvement in the conflict next door was not an option for Turkey.
However, the level of engagement in this affair has been one of the most contentious
debates in the contemporary Turkish politics in early 1990. 106 Even after that, Turkey’s
level of engagement with a special reference to the Gulf War was fiercely discussed
among the Turkish political elite prior to the Iraqi War of 2003.
Escalating crises in Turkey’s southern neighborhood left the Turkish government
with three important questions regarding its policy implications. These questions, as laid
out by William Hale, were “first, whether it would send troops to join the coalition forces
in the Gulf; second, whether it would open a second front against Iraq along the IraqiTurkish border, if war broke out; whether it would allow the coalition powers (principally
the United States) to use Incirlik for attacks on targets in northern Iraq, given that this
was not strictly within the base’s NATO functions.” 107
President Turgut Ozal understood that answering yes to all these questions would
maintain Turkey’s “western vocation” and show that Turkey was a reliable ally for the
West in the face of an emerging, complex web of conflicts after the post-Cold War era.
Hesitation towards these policies would likely reveal doubts among western European
nations and the United States on the “strategic value” of Turkey with regard to facing
challenges in the Middle East. He also thought that non-involvement in the Gulf conflict
would leave Turkey on the sideline when other major regional and global powers were
about to re-shape political configuration of the Middle East. Instead, activist Turkish
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engagement, for him, would place Turkey into the center of the game. 108 Furthermore, he
knew that any arrangement about Iraqi Kurdistan on the political level without Turkish
participation would cause a huge existential problem for Turkey as a result of its own
Kurdish problem at home. His activist foreign policy orientation, however, faced swift
resistance from opposition leaders such as Suleyman Demirel of the True Path Party
(TPP) (Dogru Yol Partisi) and Erdal Inonu of the Social Democrat People’s Party
(SDPP) (Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Partisi). 109 Some high ranking military officers like the
Chief of General Staff Necdet Torumtay and senior diplomats in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs disagreed with President Ozal in a subsequently-published memoir. 110 They were
particularly unhappy about “his single handed approach to the government, especially on
diplomacy, such as declaring his policy agenda without consulting senior diplomats or
generals,” 111 who were considered to be the prime decision makers on foreign affairs for
a long period. Ozal wanted to assert a civilian mandate against the bureaucratic elite both
in the military and the foreign affairs ministry and clearly criticized Turkey’s traditional
status quo-oriented foreign policy by saying that “my conviction is that Turkey should
leave its former passive and hesitant policies and engage in an active foreign policy.” 112
The course change in Turkish foreign policy could not be understood only in
terms of changes in the international system; domestic elements such as President Ozal’s
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leadership and his worldview also were factors. 113 He became the prime minister in 1983
after three years of military rule following the 1980 coup. Ozal was educated in the
United States and seemed to grasp ideas of a free market economy, entrepreneurship,
democracy, secularism, and even politics, with a markedly American accent. His
admiration of the U.S., in part, came from his conviction that what made the U.S. a
success story was its aspiration toward liberal democracy and a market economy. As
indicated by Berdal Aral, “Ozal persistently emphasized three fundamental freedoms in
his speeches: freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and freedom of enterprise.
Although such emphasis on classical freedoms seems too superficial in human rights
debates, its significance in the Turkish context should not be underestimated, given that
these freedoms had never been transformed into reality, despite the contrary
proclamations of the Turkish constitutions and statutes.” 114
He clearly saw the impending role of the sole superpower, the U.S., and wanted to
have Turkey aligned with the U.S. in economic, political and strategic spheres. 115 He
thought that Turkish engagement with the U.S. had always been strategic to Turkey, a
relationships that he aspired to expand to other areas such as the economy. His motto of
“trade, not aid” best signified his approach to extensive business dealings with the U.S.,
including his goal of having Turkey engaging with the U.S. on equitable terms. With his
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new motto in mind, he tried to shift the Turkish mindset that relations with the U.S.
would entail hierarchical dealings that favored the United States’ interests and concerns
while trumping the Turkish ones. 116 Rather, he developed a strategy of engagement with
the United States that saw the relationship in an egalitarian manner with added selfconfidence. The way he conducted his relations with his counterpart in the U.S., George
H. W. Bush, was new, and exuded confidence to the Turkish populace. As Berdal Aral
argued, his worldview made him indispensible ally for the United States due to his
unique role in the heart of the Middle East, in which major crises were about to erupt.
Turgut Ozal clearly saw the emerging new international milieu that the Soviet threat was
no longer present. Instead new threats could be at the forefront of this environment like
Islamic radicalism. He, however, rejected the idea that Islam and western world would
collide with each other. Ozal advocated the idea that Muslim world can and should work
with the western world, and supported the idea that Muslims needed to integrate into the
world system that is primarily dominated by the West, especially the United States. He
did not see any contradiction between one’s deeply held Islamic beliefs and the western
values. Rather, he saw that the close association with the West would provide benefits of
modern science, technology and sustained economic growth. Therefore, he deeply
disagreed with the premise of an Islamic union, and thought that it is “unnecessary and
impractical.” 117
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He continued his premiership until 1989 when President Evren’s term ended. He
was elected as the eight President of Turkey by the Turkish Grand National Assembly
(TGNA) with the support of his Motherland Party (MP) (Anavatan Partisi or ANAP in
Turkish), which he had established in 1983 after the military coup. Even though the
presidency was a highly ceremonial post, he preferred it as it enabled him to exert more
civilian control in Turkish politics. Therefore, he handpicked Yildirim Akbulut as the
prime minister. His main motivation was to control the two most important civilian posts
in Turkey. His extensive involvement in the Gulf War on the side of the United States
showed that he was not satisfied with his highly ceremonial post, but he wanted to
administer the direction of the country by both holding the presidency and guiding the
prime minister along his own agenda. The Turkish Presidency had been generally held by
military leaders like Ataturk, Inonu, and Evren. Ozal became the second civilian
president after Celal Bayar, who held the highest office in Turkey between 1950 and
1960.
On August 6, the UN adopted Security Council Resolution 661 urging the
international community to implement international sanctions against Iraq in response to
its noncompliance with previous resolutions demanding Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait.
The next day, Turkey declared its compliance with the resolution against Iraq, ended all
business dealings, and closed the Yumurtalik-Kirkuk oil pipeline. The decision clearly
indicated that Turkey was siding with the international community, specifically with the
United States. However, this was not made with ease. As indicated earlier, opposition
parties and other elements in the Turkish elite charged the government with reckless
actions and argued that Ozal’s enthusiastic support for the American cause was pushing
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Turkey into uncharted territory. Therefore, they urged Ozal to use caution and restraint,
taking into account the fact that Saddam Hussein might attack Turkey as a result of its
siding with the U.S. in countering Iraq. 118 In early August and the following months,
Turkey repeatedly requested Rapid Deployment Force from NATO in case of an
immediate attack from Iraq because of Turkey’s participation in the war efforts. By early
January 1991, some in European countries such as Germany, Belgium and Italy stated
that they would send military aircrafts to Turkey; yet, those shipped were outdated and
sparked outrage in Turgut Ozal. 119 On the positive side, the United States, France and
Britain saw the legitimacy of Turkish concerns and sent military jets and stationed Patriot
missiles on the Incirlik airbase, a leading front against Saddam’s Iraq in organizing war
efforts from the north. This move somewhat satisfied Turkish concerns of a possible Iraqi
attack against Turkey and maintained the idea that NATO, at least the leading members,
would protect Turkey in case of an attack from the outside. By the end of February 1991,
the coalition forces’ efforts in winning the war against Saddam Hussein and the liberation
of Kuwait proved successful. However, the Bush administration did not go further in
toppling Saddam Hussein from power, which Turgut Ozal had wholeheartedly advocated
for from the beginning.
After the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, President Bush urged “Iraqi people
to take matters into their own hands” 120 to depose Saddam. However, Saddam's legacy
and power did not allow Kurds and Shiites to rise up to topple him. Both Barzani and
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Talabani appealed to the U.S., but the Bush administration did not intervene as a result of
strategic calculations: That such a move might involve a large scale U.S. involvement in
the northern Iraq, which would not be popular in U.S. domestic politics. It could have
also triggered the disintegration of Iraq and eventual destabilization of the Middle
East. 121 This would consequently endanger strategic U.S. interests in the region.
Engagement with Kurds in Iraq would also deeply impact U.S. relations with Turkey,
Iran and Syria. Long-term commitment and supporting Kurds would increase Turks’
suspicions that the U.S. was supporting the establishment of Kurdistan that supposedly
included southeastern Turkey. Any such signal would alarm Turkey and eventually break
its bonds with the U.S. in the Middle East. The U.S. thus could not ignore the suffering of
Kurds in Iraq, the sensitivities of Turkey in particular, or the importance of regional
stability.
With the passage of the UNSC Resolution 687, the international community
welcomed “the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity and the return of its legitimate Government” 122 and affirmed “the commitment
of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of
Kuwait and Iraq.” 123 This was a reason for celebration for both Turkey and the United
States. They had eliminated a major enemy and taught a lesson to Saddam on respecting
the status quo and sovereignty of other nations in the Middle East. However, the
jubilation for Turkey ended swiftly. Even though the war ended with the Kuwaiti
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liberation, one major problem for Turkey and the United States immediately emerged. It
was a large and sudden influx of Kurdish refugees from northern Iraq escaping into
Turkey as they fled possible retribution from Saddam Hussein. 124 The first wave of Iraqi
Kurds were seen on the Turkish border in late March 1991, and, according to Mustafa
Aydin, “it presented Turkey both a refugee problem of unprecedented proportions and a
political problem, since the sensibility of its own Kurdish question for Turkey made it of
far-reaching importance, thus left Turkey with an immediate dilemma… The main reason
for Turkey’s initial reluctance to permit large numbers of Iraqi Kurds to enter the country
was the fragile situation on the Turkish side of the border. It was feared that an influx of
Iraqi Kurdish refugees in Turkey for an undetermined time period might have a
radicalizing effect on Turkish Kurds. Moreover, security problems were presented by the
possibility of infiltration by the PKK guerillas into Turkey with refugees.” 125 It was,
however, not new, given that Turkey encountered the same problem on a smaller scale in
the late 1980s when Iraqi Kurds were targeted by Saddam Hussein after they supported
Iran with its war with Iraq. Many Kurdish villages in the northern Iraq were burned and
Kurds were forced to flee to Turkey to save their lives. Robert Olson indicated that “[b]y
1987-88, it is probable that more than 1,000 Kurdish villages were destroyed; some
estimates range as high as 4,000. Some sources estimate that by early 1988 up to onethird of the population of Iraqi Kurdistan had been depopulated. After the ceasefire with
Iran in August 1988, 60,000 to 70,000 Iraqi troops attacked Kurds they thought had been
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loyal to Iran in the war and forced another 100,000 Kurds to flee to Turkey; 40,000 of
whom were fleeing from Halabja, a small town in northeastern Iraq near the Iranian
border, where they had been attacked with chemical gas by Iraqi forces during the middle
of March.” 126 In fact, the Kurdish refugee problem at this time proved very costly for
Turkey in both economic and political terms because many refugees stayed permanently,
increasing the country’s economic burden and making it more difficult and complicated
for Turkey to deal with its Kurdish problem.
Facing Twin Problems: the de facto Kurdish State in the Neighborhood and Kurdish
Insurgency at Home
The post-Gulf War environment posed serious problems for Turkey. First, Turkey
did not want to see a repetition of the series of 1987 events when as many as 100,000
Iraqi Kurds fled from northern Iraq to southeastern Turkey to save their lives from
atrocities inflicted by Saddam Hussein. Second, Turkey did not want to see the
establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, which had a sizable Kurdish population
that might aspire to do the same thing in southeastern Turkey and eventually establishing
a Kurdistan that encompassed parts of Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey. Third, Turkey would
not want to see the recurrence of a political vacuum after the Gulf War as was the case
during the Iran-Iraq war. In the mid-1980s, a political vacuum in northern Iraq was filled
by a PKK insurgency that caused considerable military and political damage to
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Turkey. 127 In fact, this was one of the two red-lines for the Turkish establishment, who
saw separatism 128 and backwardism (religious extremism) as anathema to Turkey. The
PKK insurgency would benefit from a lack of order in northern Iraq; therefore, it was
crucial for Turkey to have Iraq’s authority on its northern region, which was populated by
Kurds.
Once it became clear that the U.S. would not intervene in Iraq to protect Kurds,
nearly 1.5 million Kurds flooded into the borders of Turkey and Iran to escape Saddam’s
wrath. The sheer size of fleeing Iraqi Kurds posed one of the most daunting challenges
for the Turkish administration. It was in no way comparable to the one Turkey
experienced in 1988. Adding insult to injury, the western media showed the desperation
of Kurdish refugees on the mountain passes near Turkish-Iraqi border, who were not
allowed into Turkey. 129 They depicted the Turkish administration as violating human
rights by not allowing fleeing Kurds into its side of the border. Ozal faced a very difficult
dilemma: either to see continuing western press coverage on the conditions of Kurdish
refugees, which defamed the Turkish governments’ image in the international public
opinion, or tolerating the political, economic and social consequences of entry of more
than one million Kurdish refugees into Turkey.
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The United States adopted a new approach, choosing not to intervene in Iraq
militarily to protect Kurds, but helping to pass UNSC Resolution 688 on April 5, 1991,
which denounced Saddam’s repression of Iraqi Kurds and asked Iraq to stop the
persecution of Kurds. With the help of allies in western Europe (particularly the United
Kingdom and France), and of Turkey, the U.S. instituted “Operation Provide Comfort”
(OPC), a host of measures to protect Kurds in northern Iraq from Saddam Hussein. The
initiative under UNSC Resolution 688’s premise of protecting Kurds brought a no-flyzone for Iraqi aircrafts in the north of 36th parallel that was enforced by the U.S., the
U.K., and France. There would also be small ground forces based in Silopi, Turkey to
provide humanitarian relief for Kurds. Many in Turkey believed that OPC was creating a
huge vacuum of authority, which was filled by PKK, the terrorist organization launching
deadly attacks in Turkey from northern Iraq. They also thought that the creation of the
OPC was paving the way for the establishment of Kurdistan at the expense of the Turkish
Republic, 130 reminding them painfully of the Treaty of Sèvres of 1920 that partitioned the
decaying Ottoman state among its multi-ethnic minorities and the Allied powers. What is
dubbed the “Sèvres Syndrome” in the Turkish lexicon has been rampant throughout the
1990s. It was basically a conviction that Turkey was surrounded by enemies that aimed to
divide it up according to their “historical” claims. This psyche, however, was not limited
to enemies. It has also developed a habit of cynically perceiving its allies on the same
premise. For example, Turkey has long aspired to be part of the European Union, then the
European Community, and developed deep-rooted economic and political relations to
that continent during the Cold War. However, Europe’s increasing critique of Turkey’s
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human rights violations against Kurds in the late 1980s and the1990s roused se Turkey’s
suspicions of European support for Kurdistan. Therefore, any critique of the Kurdish
issue or hint of western support for Kurdish causes alarmed the Turkish elite. In the same
vein, any U.S. involvement in Kurdish entities in the northern Iraq provoked the Sèvres
Syndrome not only among Turkish populace but the Turkish elite, who were deeply
indoctrinated in the ideas of Turkish national sovereignty, unitary government, and
territorial integrity. Given that the PKK’s extensive operational capability caused
enormous damage in blood and treasure reinforced a widespread conviction that the
West, including the United States, was supporting the establishment of an independent
Kurdistan. 131 Regardless of statements made by the senior U.S. officials, many in Turkey
saw the U.S. committed to the establishment of Kurdistan. 132
At this crucial juncture, President Ozal heeded the UNSC Resolution to establish
“safe heavens” in northern Iraq and provide security by the coalition forces against
possible Saddam-backed attacks towards Kurds. The unconventional and resourceful idea
of creating “safe havens” in northern Iraq had both its opportunities and challenges for
Turkey. The establishment of “safe havens” in northern Iraq seemed less threatening than
an influx of Kurdish refugees into Turkey in the minds of the Turkish political elite.
Nevertheless, the idea of “safe havens” opened the door for an autonomous Kurdish
entity next door. There was a potential that this entity could grow into an independent
state, which Turkey had vehemently opposed. By the end of April 1991, 17,000 coalition
troops started “Operation Provide Comfort”, which had a mandate from the UN to
131

Turan Yavuz, Abd'nin Kürt Kartı (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1993).

132

Ibid.

71

establish a security zone in north of 36th parallel in Iraq. 133 Most of the Kurdish refugees
returned to “safe havens” in northern Iraq by June with security provided by OPC
presence. Suffering heavily from the western media’s unfavorable coverage on Kurdish
refugees, the orderly return of refugees provided breathing room for the Turkish
leadership. Turgut Ozal was credited for his creative and unconventional approach to the
solution. However, he received his fair share of criticism from the Turkish media on the
possible side effects of “safe havens” in leading up to an independent Kurdish state. In
July 1991, “Operation Provide Comfort” was succeeded by “Operation Poised Hammer”
with the mission of preventing Saddam Hussein from attacking Kurds in the region.
However, the mission of the operation garnered great suspicion among the Turkish public
as well as the Turkish intelligentsia, who argued that it would eventually lead to the
creation of the independent Kurdistan. Some even argued that Turkish involvement in the
mission might drag Turkey into conflicts with neighboring nations. 134
The post-Gulf war environment provided one of the most convenient
opportunities for Kurds to establish their long-awaited state or at least to have
autonomous governance in northern Iraq. 135 However, there were major obstacles to this
dream. All surrounding nations, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey clearly saw any move
towards autonomy for Kurds as a zero-sum game, resulting in loss of territories in those
nations. Moreover, any such move would jeopardize the internal status quo of those
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surrounding nations and might lead to territorial disintegration, given that each had
sizable Kurdish minorities in their soils. Specifically Turkey, as mentioned earlier, was
mindful of this reality, and very sensitive to any such claims of establishing a Kurdish
state. To head this off, Turkey took some serious measures to contain any such
aspirations by Kurdish minorities in northern Iraq.
During the Cold War, the U.S. did not support Kurdish causes and even ignored
human rights violations against Kurds in Turkey. It was obvious that the Cold War
security environment and U.S. security calculations had always focused on the larger
picture, which was to contain and defeat Soviet expansionism. Any issue of repression of
minorities would not be considered as high politics because the highest priority was to
preserve close alliances like that with Turkey. 136 In the mid-1980s, the State Department
issued reports on human rights violations of Kurds by the Turkish state as it countered
PKK activities. However, these reports had no major consequences in shifting Turkey’s
treatment of its own Kurdish citizens. For Turkey, dealing with the PKK insurgency
could be done through heavy-handed military measures in the mid-1980s and early
1990s. Keep in mind that Turkey had military rule from 1980 to 1983, and that the
military’s role in Turkish politics was overwhelming even when Turgut Ozal as the prime
minister was trying to liberalize the politico-economic system to reduce generals’ role on
the key political issues. As Turgut Ozal was to reform Turkey, he thought that the
Turkish political elite, mainly the military and civilian bureaucracy, had false senses of
domestic threats to Turkish republicanism and its territorial integrity. These elites
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believed that rising religious observance and its increasing manifestations on the public
sphere, and Kurdish minority’s requests for cultural rights, were existential threats to
secular Turkey. As Aral put it, Ozal thought otherwise: Turgut Ozal understood that
Turkey’s deliberate distance to its past, namely to the heritage of the Ottoman Empire
was artificial, and it was also an impediment to strong and influential Turkey. He thought
that Turkey would eventually come to terms with its past that he saw as example of
tolerance and pluralism. Additionally, he contended that Turkey would not be a
successful country unless it would solve its major domestic problems, namely the
exclusion of non-Turkish identities, and marginalization of Islamic influences. Therefore,
he vigorously worked on the elimination of these impediments in order to foster a nonideological state that would accommodate both non-Turkish minorities and Islamic
manifestations in Turkish society. 137
Ozal himself understood that Turkey’s strict policy on the Kurdish question both
at home and abroad was not sustainable. Being an observant Muslim himself and halfKurdish, he thought that Turkey’s domestic Kurdish issue had links with its foreign
policy choices regarding the situation in northern Iraq. His unorthodox policy of
promoting “safe havens” in northern Iraq for Kurdish refugees led to another opening in
dealing with the Kurdish tribal entities in northern Iraq: directly talking to Massoud
Barzani, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) or (Partiya Demokrata
Kurdistanê in Kurdish) and Jalal Talabani, the leader of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK) or (Yekîtîya Nîştîmanîya Kurdistan in Kurdish). Up to that point, Ankara
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consistently avoided directly talking to or even contacting them, believing that any such
move would give “legitimacy” to these “tribal chiefs” and might encourage them to
pursue their autonomy from Iraq more persistently. 138 However, Ozal believed otherwise.
He thought “the importance of differentiating Kurdish discontent in Turkey from that of
Iraqi Kurds” 139 Moreover, engaging with Kurdish groups in northern Iraq would give
leverage to Turkey to isolate the PKK in northern Iraq and thereby limiting its attacks and
political activities in southeastern Turkey. By mid-March of 1991, both Barzani and
Talabani came to Turkey incognito and had discussions with senior bureaucrats in the
foreign affairs ministry. 140 It should be noted that this unprecedented shift in Turkish
policy towards Kurdish groups in Iraq could directly be attributed to the Ozal’s initiative
in handling de facto emerging Kurdish authority in northern Iraq. It is obvious that both
leaders of opposition parties, Suleyman Demirel of TPP and Erdal Inonu of SDPP, were
outraged by the Ozal’s directive of meeting with Kurdish leaders. They raised the
concern that this was a clear departure from the Kemalist tradition of non-interference
with the domestic affairs of another country. However, their main contention was that
Turkey was now directly dealing with Barzani and Talabani, who, they thought, did not
represent the Iraqi government, but gave “legitimate representation” to Kurds. However,
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many scholars on Turkey believed that the Ozal’s move was bold and correct in dealing
with the challenges of post-Gulf War environment and its own Kurdish problem. 141
Prior to the Gulf War, Turkey was importing nearly 60% of oil from northern
Iraq. Ozal foresaw the significance of Iraq especially after the post-war environment. To
a certain degree, his “activism” in the Gulf War affairs could be attributed to his
calculations that Turkey needed to position itself to exert greater influence in accessing
oil in northern Iraq. He also wanted to counterbalance Iran’s influence because of the
large Shi’ites population in Iraq, had Saddam be removed from power after the U.S.
intervention. Gesturing to Iraqi Kurds, he wanted to improve relations with them. As
some analysts suggested, his presumed support for enhanced Kurdish autonomy in Iraq,
in turn, generated the policy that Iraqi Kurds refrained from supporting PKK activities in
the region. Given that the PKK terrorist activities significantly increased in Turkey in
early 1990s, having Iraqi Kurds siding with Turkey was in fact a success because Ozal’s
policy in northern Iraq achieved the separation between the PKK leadership and Iraqi
Kurdish factions. 142
Ozal also sought to ease Turkey’s own Kurdish problem by proactively talking
about it and taking measures such as repealing the ban on Kurdish language. He promised
more cultural rights overall, such as Kurdish broadcasting rights, though this was not
possible until 2009, when JDP government successfully implemented the Kurdish TV
141
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initiative by establishing TRT 6, a state-owned channel under the Turkish Radio and
Television (TRT). Though Ozal’s reforms in providing cultural rights to Kurds in Turkey
seemed limited, the era in which he proposed them made them revolutionary in nature. 143
No one among the Turkish political elite, it seems, had the courage and the vision of
extending rights to Turkey’s Kurdish minority, given that the Turkish establishment saw
it as putting dynamite to the foundation of Turkey’s territorial integrity. It should, of
course, be noted that Turkey’s rising civil society, Kurdish minority and conservative
segments of Turkish society were supportive of Ozal’s reforms since they represented the
periphery of the Turkish nation that were often repressed or kept away from the political
center. Employing rhetoric and actions that promoted individual rights and the promise of
more inclusive politics, Ozal was able to attract the support of these masses. 144
However, the influence of Ozal on the Turkish parliament and the government
was severely hampered when the governing Motherland Party lost the election on
October 20, 1991. The new coalition government formed by the TPP’s Suleyman
Demirel and the SDPP’s Erdal Inonu spelled the start of a new era in Turkish politics.
The question of whether Turkey’s new leaders would follow Ozal’s initiative of
engagement with Iraqi Kurds and his activist foreign policy with the United States was
raised. Interestingly enough, both Demirel and Inonu who opposed Ozal policies
regarding Iraq and Kurds when they were opposition leaders, shifted their rhetoric and
policies regarding the engagement with Barzani and Talabani forces in northern Iraq. As
Prime Minister Demirel said after ascending to the power, “…the people in the southeast
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are our brothers, the people in the northern Iraq are their brothers and ought to be our
brothers too. …Turkey was just a bystander in the past when faced with events in
northern Iraq. For instance, there was the Halabje incident. We said ‘that’s outside our
frontiers, it’s nothing to do with us.’ This policy ought to change. Turkey’s new policy
should be as follows: if Baghdad commits another barbarity in northern Iraq, it will find
us opposing it.” 145 It clearly showed that the policies Ozal once instituted were now the
main staples of Turkey’s Kurdish policy. Demirel, who had once fervently criticized Ozal
on his policy of engagement with Iraqi Kurds and the implementation of the OPC,
became the prime supporter of these policies. However, Turkey, as hinted at above,
entered into a new era of weak and inefficient coalition governments throughout the
1990s and early 2000s. 146 What is popularly dubbed the “lost decade” of the ’90s (with
the start of Demirel-Inonu coalition government) paralyzed Turkish politics and its
economy, faltering under eleven different governments in a decade. 147 Managing the
relations with Iraqi Kurds, the United States, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Greece, the EU as well as
the growing role of the military on Turkish politics and society, once again proved a
daunting task for those coalition governments. Therefore, fluctuations in policy
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orientation occurred according to the political forces dominant in Turkish politics. In
reference to aforementioned point, specifically on government’s handling of Kurdish
issue, a major shift on Turkey’s handling of the Kurdish problem occurred in 1993. As
Philip Robins puts it, “[t]he critical development in this change of attitude in Ankara was
the Faustian pact between the newly installed prime minister, Tansu Ciller, and the chief
of the general staff, Dogan Gures. In order to consolidate her grip on government, Ciller
believed that she needed to neutralize the military as a political force. She did so
extremely successfully by ceding to the armed forces virtually complete control over
policy towards the Kurdish issue, while she concentrated on the rest of the national policy
agenda. Ciller consequently proved to be even less willing than reticent predecessor
Demirel to meet the Iraqi Kurdish leadership, effective political consultations coming to
an end with Barzani’s visit to Ankara in June 1993.” 148 The shift of transferring political
authority over Kurdish policy to the military indicated that Ozal’s civil and liberal
initiative on the Kurdish issue both at home and in northern Iraq was partially abandoned
in favor of heavy-handed military measures. Ciller’s main motive at the time, as indicated
by Phillip Robins, was to consolidate her weak power on domestic affairs so that she
could create more breathing room for herself on challenging issues. However, this plan
did not provide the desired outcome. Instead, Turkish politics was heavily consumed with
political instability, economic turmoil, and the prospect of military intervention. Many in
the Turkish political elite considered 1993 to have had an unannounced military coup. 149
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It is also important to note that some mysterious and dangerous events in 1993 were
unfolding, which signaled some significant discomfort among some influential circles in
the Turkish establishment, especially in the military. Obviously, the main source of
friction was the Kurdish question. The leading journalist Ugur Mumcu was assassinated
on January 24, 1993. He was known for his investigative reports and it was believed that
he was at the time working on a possible link between the PKK terrorist organization and
Turkey’s intelligence unit known as Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (the National Intelligence
Organization). 150 Esref Bitlis, the commander of the Turkish Gendarmerie died in a
mysterious plane crash on February 17, 1993. Some blamed the United States, arguing
that he had opposed the OPC activities in the northern Iraq on the assumption that
Americans were helping to create an independent Kurdish state, asserting that he had
some “evidence” of Americans delivering arms to Talabani and Barzani concealed in
food crates. 151 Adding insult to injury and darkening the political atmosphere, President
Turgut Ozal, who had faced Turkey’s Kurdish issue by implementing impressive
reforms, passed away on April 17, 1993 due to a heart attack- but many, including his
wife, Semra Ozal, believed that he was poisoned. 152 To this day suspicions about the
deaths of these three individuals continue, and many in Turkish society still believe they
were eliminated because of their deep involvement in the Kurdish issue. As one could
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imagine, these deaths brought significant suspicion to the Turkish political system and its
foreign policy objectives regarding the Iraqi Kurds and the United States role.
Implications of the Kurdish Problem for the Turkey-U.S. Relations
Both Barzani and Talabani wanted to have an independent Kurdistan from the
beginning. It suffices to say that a close look at the history of Kurdish revolts in Iraq
would confirm such ambitions. However, great powers in the Middle East (the UK in the
19th century and the first half of the 20th century, and the U.S. in the second half of the
20th century) were not trusted fully on the premise of independent Kurdistan. For
example, Massoud Barzani developed distrust of the U.S. government given that his
father passed away in exile in the U.S. under poor conditions in the mid-1970s. He
believed that the U.S. has given priority to its own interests regarding the suffering of
Kurdish people in Iraq. The cynicism and sense of betrayal have always been in the mind
of Barzani and he did not totally trust that Kurds in northern Iraq would get statehood
with the support of the United States. Even though the post-Gulf War configuration of the
Middle East presented the most suitable condition for statehood since World War I, he
understood that the United States could not promise and fully support Kurds in attaining
statehood. Such a move would alarm Turkey, a crucial ally that the United States could
not afford to lose, especially in light of the U.S. having lost Iran, its closest ally in the
Middle East at the time, to the Islamic revolution in 1979. The Turkish suspicion of the
OPC’s “hidden agenda” of establishing Kurdistan proved that Turks were vigilant and
would use any means necessary to avert such actions. It could easily be argued that the
OPC could be credited for the creation of a functioning de facto Kurdish state and
government in northern Iraq. On the other hand, it should be noted that it also gave
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Turkey the military capability to launch incursions into the Kurdish region of the
northern Iraq to curb PKK sanctuaries. It is really intriguing to see that Turks wanted to
eliminate PKK forces by cross-border operations in the Iraqi Kurdish regions but caused
collateral damage among Talabani’s Kurdish factions, thus enraging Talabani and
eventually damaging their cooperation on removing or at least limiting the PKK’s
activities. “The U.S. also faced enormous task of juggling on several contradicting tasks:
protecting Kurds from Saddam, letting Turkey for cross-border operations in northern
Iraq, and but facing with a growing Turkish perception that the U.S. aimed at establishing
independent Kurdistan.” 153
The prominent scholar on Turkish politics, William Hale, claimed that Ozal’s
enthusiastic support for the U.S. mission in the Gulf War was to re-assert Turkey’s
strategic importance in the eyes of the West, especially the United States. He wanted to
demonstrate to westerners that Turkey was still relevant, and that strategically positioned
in the emerging security schemes of the post-Cold War environment. He easily captured
the U.S. support by exerting more Turkish control in Operation Provide Comfort, and by
presenting Turkey as a possible candidate for counterbalancing Iran’s influence in the
region. 154 As a bottom line, Ozal successfully navigated Turkey in this uncharted territory
of the newly-emerging international system. He saw the opening of a new era of
unchallenged American leadership and wanted to situate Turkey closer to it. His
wholehearted and often-times single handed support for the Gulf War on the side of the
United States was a clear indication of this conviction. He also advanced the rights of the
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Kurdish minority and of Turkey’s observant Muslims amid fierce opposition from the
ardent Kemalist establishment. Extending more rights to Turkish citizens and limiting
military tutelage in Turkish politics gave way to a vibrant civil society and growing
middle class that emerged not from Istanbul but from Anatolian cities such as Kayseri,
Konya, Gaziantep and Adana. Once considered the exclusive realm of the military and
foreign affairs bureaucracy, Turkish people enjoyed growing influence on their state’s
foreign policy-making. Thus, accountability and public opinion, to a certain degree,
entered into Turkish politics, especially on issues of foreign policy. As Ozal and other
successive leaders learned, keeping the status quo of Iraq and of the Middle East intact
has been the main goal of Turkey in the post-Gulf War environment. However, this came
at a cost: permitting the establishment of a semi-autonomous Kurdish authority in the
northern Iraq and facing growing economic costs from the UN sanctions against Iraq.
When all these costs are noted, however, ensuring that Turkey would be among the
Western political and security structures in this emerging world order was paramount to
Turkey. Last but not least, Ozal wanted to eventually see Turkish entry into the European
Community with the support of NATO members, especially the United States. The
episode of turmoil and dynamic changes both in the international system and Turkish
society brought a host of new challenges and opportunities for Turkey and defined the
very nature of evolving Turkish-American relations in the post-Cold War era.

83

CHAPTER IV: TOWARDS STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, 1994 – 2000
The Gulf War and its strong Turkish involvement, as discussed in previous
chapters, became a defining factor in Ankara’s relations with Washington. It left a lasting
impact on the identification and redefinition of Turkey’s domestic and foreign affairs,
especially with the United States. The Kurdish question both at home and in the
neighborhood continued to be one of the top agenda items for Turkey throughout the
1990s. The increasing intensity of PKK attacks in Turkey, coupled with the ever-pressing
reality of an autonomous Kurdish authority despite the in-fighting among the Kurdish
factions in northern Iraq, resulted in more aggressive Turkish measures, especially from
the military. Some of Turkey’s anti-PKK actions in southeastern Turkey led to
widespread human rights violations among Turkey’s Kurdish citizens. The United States
and European nations repeatedly cautioned Turkey on its treatment of Kurds, thereby
straining their relationship with Turkey. While the U.S.’s strategic outlook on Turkey
always trumped concerns like human rights violations, Europeans conversely pressed
Turkey harder. They were bolstered by their proximity to Turkey, a vibrant Kurdish
diaspora in Europe, and the EU’s commitment on human rights issues. Since the mid1990s, Turkey’s domestic affairs became messier. Weak coalition governments could not
produce stability in economy and politics and thereby incited a greater role of the Turkish
military in Turkish politics. In addition to instability in domestic affairs, Turkey’s
relations with Greece and Syria were severely strained and both came close to the brink
of war with Turkey. On the other hand, the rapprochement between Turkey and Israel,
and passionate U.S. support for Turkey’s bid for European Union membership, resulted
in a new phase in the Turkish-American relations: strategic partnership. In Chapter IV,
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the question of how and to what extent the dynamic interaction of Turkey’s domestic and
foreign affairs challenges between 1994 and 2000 had implications on Ankara and
Washington will be addressed.
Disappointments and Prospect for Engagement
Mounting challenges like dealing with PKK terrorist attacks and Turkey’s
Kurdish problem received widespread attention and triggered discussions on the question
of how to solve them. 155 One major analysis of the Turkish government showed that
Kurds in southeastern Turkey were left impoverished and faced severe economic
difficulty. Economic issues were the root causes of the discord among Kurds and
therefore for PKK support. 156 If measures in economic development and greater cultural
rights were to be taken, the logic went, the Kurdish question could largely be diminished,
if not solved. For this purpose, President Demirel launched the Southeastern Anatolian
Project (Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi, GAP) in November 1994. 157 The GAP was a large
network of irrigation projects and 22 hydroelectric dams that would be constructed in the
basins of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. It was intended to create massive irrigated

155

See James Brown, "The Turkish Imbroglio: Its Kurds," Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, no. 541 (1995).; Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and
Turkey : An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict (London ; Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 1997).;
Taspinar, Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey: Kemalist Identity in Transition.; Metin
Heper, The State and Kurds in Turkey : The Question of Assimilation (Houndmills, Basingstoke,
Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).; Olson, "The Kurdish Question in the Aftermath of the
Gulf War: Geopolitical and Geostrategic Changes in the Middle East."; Philip Robins, "The Overlord State:
Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue," International Affairs 69, no. 4 (1993).; Abramowitz, Turkey's
Transformation and American Policy.
156

For a discussion of the economic cost of the PKK terrorism, see the report "Terörün Ekonomik Maliyeti:
Diyarbakır Olayları Örneği," (Ankara: USAK, 2010).
157

The idea of the GAP project was initiated by Turgut Ozal as he was trying to address grievances of
Kurdish citizens in the areas of cultural and political rights and economic development. See the extensive
coverage of Turkish media on the launch of the GAP, "Guneydogu Sorununa Gap Cozumu," Milliyet
November 10, 1994.; Hurriyet November 10, 1994; Sabah November 10, 1994.

85

farming areas where predominantly Kurdish populations would benefit economically
while satisfying the Turkish economy’s growing needs for energy from the dams.
Turkey’s delicate engagements with Iraq’s Kurdish factions and the U.S.’s
balancing acts in the region became increasingly difficult in the mid-1990s with the
unsettling impact of the post-Gulf War environment. 158 In mid-1994, two Iraqi factions,
Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party and Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan,
engaged in a civil war, putting both Turkey and the U.S. in a very difficult position.
Turkey could no longer rely on Barzani to remove or at least restrict the PKK from safe
havens in northern Iraq. On March 20, 1995, Turkey took matters into its own hands and
sent 35,000 troops to northern Iraq to combat the PKK terrorists. The U.S. Deputy
Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke supported the Turkish incursion in northern Iraq
and said Turkey’s security was connected to that of Europe; therefore, Turkey’s action
was justifiable. 159 Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller visited the United States in April
2005 and had extensive talks with President Clinton. The top agenda items were the
situation in Iraq and PKK terrorism. 160 The in-fighting between Kurdish factions also
made the U.S. task of protecting Kurds difficult. The situation was only helpful to
regional rivals of Turkey and the U.S., namely Iran, Syria, and Iraq (Saddam Hussein).
Iran and Syria opposed extensive U.S. engagement in regional politics and wanted to
derail the U.S.-imposed settlements among Kurdish factions. Saddam opposed the
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Turkish and the U.S. engagements in Iraq for obvious reasons. The Clinton
administration wanted to end this civil war and did so by inviting the two warring parties
to Dublin, Ireland in August 1995. Turkey was invited as an observer and Turkish
concerns for the PKK’s cross-border attacks were addressed by the presumed KDP’s
measures along the border to prevent PKK incursions in Turkish soils. The in-fighting
ended with a cease-fire between the KDP and the PUK in the fall of 1996. As Ofra
Bengio observed, Turkey played a significant role in brokering a cease-fire in October
1996 between warring factions in Iraq. The main motivation for Turkey was to situate
itself as mediator so that it could influence the decision making process and, to a certain
degree, control the direction of northern Iraq. According to Bengio, Turkish government
had three objectives: “keeping the two parties under Turkish control, minimizing the
involvement of other local and regional players in the issue, and most important of all,
employing the two parties against the Turkish Kurdish Party and the [PKK], which
established its base in Iraqi Kurdistan... It was indeed the PKK threat that dictated
Turkish involvement in the Iraqi Kurdish issue, not only through military incursions into
Iraqi Kurdistan but also through the alliances Turkey formed with the local Kurdish
players.” 161 Interestingly, Turkey named its conflict resolution efforts between the PUK
and the KDP as the “Ankara peace process,” markedly stamping Turkish influence and
desires. On the other hand, the U.S. also tried to mediate between the Kurdish factions,
and especially worried that the PUK could be siding with Iran, and that the KDP could be
inching toward Baghdad.
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In May 1997, Turkey started another massive incursion called “Operation
Hammer” with 50,000 troops entering northern Iraq to curb the PKK presence and
consolidate KDP strength against the PKK. Turkey for the first time did not retreat after
the incursion, leaving a sizable force to control the border. Talabani saw this as a
reinforcement of Turkish-Barzani cooperation and so it almost severed his relationship
further with Barzani. The PUK attack against the KDP areas provoked Turkish anger and
brought heavy Turkish involvement (Operation Dawn) on the side of the KDP in
removing PUK from KDP areas in September and October 1997. Despite repeated ceasefires, in-fighting continued between the KDP and the PUK through the next year. On July
18, 1998, David Welch, from the State Department responsible for Near Eastern affairs,
led a U.S. delegation in northern Iraq, inviting warring Kurdish parties and the Turkish
delegation to mend their differences. After a series of meetings, Talabani and Barzani
were invited to Washington in September 1998. Before the two leaders met in
Washington for the first time since 1994, they separately stopped in Ankara to discuss
Turkey’s relations with their respective parties. After long and heated meetings in
Washington, Talabani and Barzani reached a tentative agreement, the “Washington
Accord,” as Secretary of State Madeline Albright announced. 162 “The U.S.-brokered
accord calls for the rival Iraqi Kurdish factions to begin revenue sharing, reestablish a
united legislature abandoned in 1992, unify their militias, and hold parliamentary

162
Michael M. Gunter, "United States Foreign Policy toward the Kurds," in The Kurdish Question in U.S.
Foreign Policy: A Documentary Sourcebook, ed. Lokman I. Meho (Praeger Publishers, 2004)., p. 25

88

elections by July.” 163 According to Alan Makovsky, "[t]here are at least three positive
factors that suggest that stability can endure in the region even if the agreement is not
implemented. One is the fact that the Kurdish leaders are talking to one another again.
Second of all, the Kurds perceive the U.S. to have reinvigorated its commitment to the
Kurds, to protect them against attack by Saddam as a result of this agreement. Thirdly,
there is more money in the area now, including in the PUK areas thanks to UN Security
Council oil-for-food resolutions. So, even without the transfer of funds from the KDP, the
PUK areas are doing much better. The analyst cites Turkey's acceptance of the
Washington accord as a fourth influence for stability. Ankara, which is fighting Kurdish
rebels of its own, accepted the accord after Washington and London affirmed their
commitment to Iraq's territorial integrity. The Iraqi Kurdish factions also assured Turkey
they will deny the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) any bases in northern Iraq. Turkey has
frequently carried out military operations in northern Iraq, in alliance with the KDP, to
attack PKK bases.” 164 On other hand, the Washington Accord did not live up to its
premise of repairing relations between the KDP and the PUK. As Michael Gunter
argued, 165 in spite of the hype behind the Washington Accord, only the cease-fire had
sustained. Other ambitions decisions such as revenue sharing, creating a joint KDP-PUK
government and administering elections could not be realized by the deadline. Even
though the U.S. government made attempts to resolve the differences by inviting the
KDP and the PUK to the Higher Coordination Committee, power struggle between
163
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warring Kurdish factions and regional powers prevented the implementation of the
Washington Accord.
The Washington Accord took the initiative from Turkey to resolve the conflict
between warring Kurdish factions. Turkey’s “Ankara peace process” initiative was
supplanted by the Accord even though if it had satisfied many of Turkey’s concerns in
the document, such as keeping Iraqi territory intact and limiting the PKK’s offensive
against Turkish targets. 166
Turkey’s push for curbing PKK terrorism and eliminating safe havens for the
group’s leader, Abdullah Ocalan, became increasingly aggressive. 167 In October 1998,
Turkey threatened Syria with military action in retaliation for its providing sanctuary for
Ocalan and for not heeding repeated Turkish warnings on closing terrorist training camps
in Syria and Lebanon. To show its resolve, Turkey sent more than 10,000 troops to the
Syrian border. Understanding the serious nature of Turkey’s show of force, Syria agreed
to close down the training camps and eventually forced Abdullah Ocalan to leave Syria.
According to the reports, “[s]ince October [1998], Mr. Ocalan had been on the run - from
Syria to Italy to Russia to Greece. He finally landed in the Greek Embassy in Nairobi,
Kenya, on Feb. 2.” 168 American intelligence officers helped capture Abdullah Ocalan,
who caused the death of more than 37, 000 people from 1984 to 1999. 169 He was
delivered to Turkish commandoes in Nairobi, Kenya on February 15, 1999. He was tried
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and sentenced to death. However, the death penalty was abolished due to Turkish
compliance of the Copenhagen Criteria to enter in the EU, and thus his sentence
commuted to life in prison without the possibility of parole. It was obvious that both
political and public sentiments in Turkey were against the commutation. 170 The U.S. help
in detaining Ocalan was well-received by the Turkish government and improved the
Turkish public’s perception of the U.S., which had long suffered from suspicions about
U.S. intentions for the creation of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. 171
Apart from the determining role of the post-Gulf War environment and the
Kurdish question in the region, some other regional issues also influenced and redefined
Ankara and Washington’s interactions in the 1990s. For example, Turkey’s relations with
Greece had always been contentious between Ankara and Washington. As a result of the
sizable and influential Greek diaspora community in the U.S., some adverse actions were
taken against Turkey by the U.S. Congress, which was understandably susceptible to
pressure from Greek-Americans. For example, in August 1994, the U.S. House of
Representatives approved the foreign aid bill that included a military aid package with a
10% cut to Turkey. The cut was conditional upon the improvement of human rights and
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progress on the Cyprus issue, both of which touched a nerve in Turkey. The Turkish
government rejected the conditional part of the deal. As Marcia Christoff Kurop pointed
out in her Foreign Affairs article, “[t]heir long standing hostility, marked by mutual
suspicion and distrust, is of more than parochial concern given the strategic importance of
the region, lying at the crossroads of the Middle East, Central Asia, and Europe.
Compared with Greece’s past regional controversies, its disputes with Turkey are more
vast and complicated – political problems in essence, but overwhelmed by historical bad
blood, incessant second-guessing of motives, and high-pitched rhetoric that plays well in
each side’s press. These two countries, for all their past intermingling and cross-cultural
ties, are simply different animals, psychologically and politically.” 172 Proving her point in
terms of defining the nature of Greek-Turkish relations in the 1990s was the danger of
war with Greece in late 1995. When a Turkish cargo ship ran ashore on the uninhabited
islets called Imia (or Kardak in Turkish) in the Aegean Sea in December 1995, both
Turkey and Greece claimed that they were their islets. A tiny islet with an estimated area
of 10 acres brought two rivals to the brink of war. 173 President Clinton called on both
Turkish and Greek leaders to stop the escalation and start discussions on long-standing
issues between Turkey and Greece, including the Cyprus issue and maritime problems in
the Aegean Sea. Richard Hollbrooke successfully negotiated with the two parties to
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withdraw from Imia/Kardak islets. 174 However, this did not fully solve the conflict
between Greece and Turkey. In fact, Ocalan, as indicated earlier, was captured in the
Greek Embassy in Nairobi in 1999, a situation that demonstrates Greek enmity towards
Turkey. Harboring the “head of terrorists,” 175 namely Abdullah Ocalan, caused
heightened tension between two countries, both of which were NATO members but
considered each other enemies. For the United States, such degrees of enmity and the
possibility of war between Athens and Ankara could threaten the stability of the region
and might jeopardize vital U.S. interests in keeping the NATO alliance intact. Clinton’s
intervention in the Kardak crisis could explain why the U.S. administration saw the
possibility of massive instability in the region. One also needed to remember the Cyprus
crisis in the 1960s and the Turkish invasion of the island in the 1970s to recall the bad
blood between Greece and Turkey.
One of the high marks of the 1990s in the relationship between Ankara and
Washington was the U.S.’s unwavering support for the Turkish bid for European Union
membership. The United States saw Turkey as a “bulwark” at the southeastern flank of
NATO against Soviet threats during the Cold War and considered it an indispensible ally
in the Gulf War. The successive U.S. administrations supported the idea that Turkey’s
closer relations with European nations would serve vital U.S. interests. The basic premise
was that keeping Turkey in the western flank would be a source of stability and
prosperity. It also reinforced the idea that Turkey’s push for democratization and reforms,
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despite its poor human rights records at the time, indicated its enduring will to enter into
the exclusive European club. Additionally, Turkey’s unmatched geopolitical position and
its unique identity as a Muslim majority nation, being both democratic and secular at the
same time, could coincide with American engagement in the region. It would also serve
as a “model” for other Muslim nations in which Washington had significant vested
interests ranging from access to energy resources to the security of Israel, a strategic U.S.
ally. From the Turkish view, EU membership would be the culmination of its “western
vocation” that was shown as the “contemporary level of civilization” by its founding
father, Ataturk. Many among the Turkish elite thought that Turkish modernization and
westernization since 1923 would culminate and be considered complete with EU
membership. Therefore, fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria for entry into the EU was
widely accepted by both the Turkish political elite and the populace. 176 One such
development occurred when the European Parliament signed the Customs Union
agreement with Turkey on December 13, 1995, enabling goods and services to be
exchanged between Turkey and the EU without any custom duties as of January 1996.
Initially, Europeans were reluctant to include Turkey, but the Clinton administration
successfully lobbied on behalf of Ankara in European capitals. The U.S. support for the
Customs Union was duly noted by Turkey as another sign of “enhanced partnership” with
the U.S. despite the engagement in Iraq. Yet, Turkey’s accession process did not go
smoothly. On December 12, 1997, Turkey was excluded from the next wave of European
enlargement at the Luxemburg Summit of the European Council even though the Union
176
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accepted all other applicant countries for accession negotiations. 177 “The Luxembourg
summit provoked a wave of outrage in Turkey and prompted it to freeze its political
dialogue with the EU. Most Turks believed that the Luxembourg decision was taken due
to religious and cultural factors. This impression was fuelled by a statement of the
European Christian Democratic Union that ‘the EU is in the process of building a
civilization in which Turkey has no place.’ Other concerns were of a more political
nature, such as German anxiety over Turkish immigrant workers, and French and Italian
reservations over Turkish exports of textiles and agricultural products. However, these
concerns usually remained obscured by the official rhetoric that focused on the ‘Greek
veto’, human rights and a lack of democratization.” 178 Angered by the EU’s decision, the
U.S. sought a more aggressive role in acquiring Turkish candidacy status for EU
membership at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999. President Clinton personally
called European leaders and State Department officials lobbied hard for Turkey’s EU bid.
The work paid off when Turkey attained candidate status for EU membership, reversing
the Luxembourg Summit’s decision. It should be noted that this decision was made by
the Europeans in part due to the Clinton administration’s pressure. Other major support
for Turkish membership was provided by the Bush administration. Sabri Sayari indicated
that “prior to the EU summit meeting in Copenhagen in December 12, 2002, the U.S.
once again launched a major campaign to advance Turkey's prospects for entry into the
EU. When President Bush met the leader of the Justice and Development Party, Tayyip
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Erdoğan, at the White House on December 11, he reaffirmed Washington's support for
Turkey and declared that the U.S. ‘stands side by side with Ankara in its bid to join the
European Union.’” 179 It could easily be argued that the U.S. support for Turkey’s
membership for the EU had been more enthusiastic than it was for many other European
nations. The U.S. even received considerable criticisms from European leaders who
argued that the U.S. was meddling into the EU’s business. 180 As Sabri Sayari laid out,
there were significant disagreements between the U.S. and the EU on the idea of
Turkey’s membership. The United States as an emerging sole superpower recognized that
Turkey was an important country in the region despite the fact that Europeans did not
appreciate Turkey’s unique position. Washington believed that Turkey could be an asset
in countering conflicts in the intersecting regions of the Middle East, the Balkans, and the
Caucasus. However, Europeans rather focuses on non-traditional security threats like
illegal immigration, drug trafficking, asylum seekers and environmental problems.
Therefore, the European impression of Turkey was less favorable than the United States,
and the EU did not share the strategic value attached to Turkey by Washington. For
example, the U.S. saw Turkish bid for the EU accession as critical given that Turkey’s
unique identity as a secular, democratic and Muslim nation could resolve the issue of the
“clash of civilizations.” Anchoring Turkey to the west through the EU, for Washington,
was the best bet that Turkey’s pro-western orientation could be fully secured. However,
the EU did not share the same sentiments given that Europeans worried about large influx
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of migrant workers to European cities, and that large Turkish population would result in
more seats in the European parliament and thereby more representation in the European
affairs. Many European officials claimed that all the problems associated with the
Turkish membership would be faced by Europeans not by the United States. 181
It was obvious that the U.S. push for the Turkish membership caused considerable
strain in transatlantic relations. Many in Europe saw the U.S. activism as an intrusion to
its domestic affairs and expressly indicated that the decision should be left to Europeans.
The prospect of Turkish membership in the EU has not been realized yet, but it was clear
that the U.S. would support the Turkish bid, partially because Turkey’s active
engagement in Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and the European Union in 2000s
increased its strategic value to the transatlantic alliance. Regardless of the EU’s shortsighted political hindrances, Turkey and the U.S. will seek EU membership until an
outright rejection or inclusion is realized.
As Turkey’s activist policies of the Gulf War on the side of the United States
signaled a shift in the transformation of Turkish foreign policy orientation, another major
Turkish initiative emerged: strengthening the relations with Israel in political, economic
and strategic areas. 182 Meliha Altinisik observed that “[t]he newest and at the same time
the most controversial aspect of Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War Middle East
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has been constantly developing Turkish-Israeli relations. In a relatively short period of
time economic relations flourished between the two countries and culminated in the
signing of a free trade agreement in 1996. Cultural and educational links accelerated at an
unprecedented degree. Furthermore, and the most controversial of all, the two countries
increased security cooperation within the framework of two agreements that were signed
in 1996. This increasingly deep and open relationship between the two countries
disturbed some of their neighbours in the region. It has been argued that growing ties
between these two countries were steadily changing the regional balance of power.” 183
The rapprochement and the defense cooperation in 1996 alarmed Arab nations in the
region, as Bengio and Ozcan argued, “because it caught the Arab world at one of its
weakest moments, in the aftermath of the fragmentation caused by the Gulf War, and
because it was interpreted as being anti-Arab to the core. Hence, it’s being termed an
anti-Arab alliance. The fear, in fact, was fourfold: that the alignment would increase the
strategic threat to the Arab countries in general and the more vulnerable ones - Syria and
Iraq - in particular; that it would marginalize the Arab world in the international arena;
that it would further fragment the Arab world by bringing to the alignment an Arab
country - Jordan; and finally that it would jeopardize the Arab-Israeli peace process or at
least weaken the Arab partners’ bargaining power by providing Israel with new strategic
depth, as it were, and thus strengthen its hand, as well as its intransigence at the
negotiating table.” 184 Turkey’s unique history with Israel since its establishment in 1948,
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and Turkey’s formal recognition of Israel as a state the very next year, made IsraeliTurkish relations qualitatively different from those of other Middle Eastern nations. As a
close ally of the U.S., and a NATO member, Turkey saw Israel favorably and considered
it as useful a partner in both regional and international affairs. The Turkish political elite
understood that enlisting Israel as a partner and an ally would strengthen its ties to the
United States due to the influential role of the Jewish lobby in Washington. The alliance
with Israel and therefore with the Jewish lobby could also counterbalance the negative
influence of Greek and Armenian diasporas in curtailing Turkey-related issues in the U.S.
government, including Congressional issues like the Armenian-Americans’ push for the
passage of a resolution on the Armenian genocide issue. Many in the Turkish elite
continuously sought access to the Jewish lobby in the U.S. via Israel. 185 In the same vein,
the United States welcomed the rapprochement between Israel and Turkey and saw this
as helpful to wider U.S. interests in the Middle East. The relationship between the two
countries, according to the U.S. calculations, would provide more leverage in dealing
with the regional rivals of Israel as the United States considered Israel’s security and
legitimacy part of its “vital national security interests” throughout the Cold War and its
aftermath. The triangulation of the U.S., Turkey and Israel relationship paved the way for
a shift in the balance of power and to a certain degree successfully countered the policies
of Iran, Syria and Iraq in the 1990s. As a first sign of the rapprochement, in December
1991 “Turkey upgraded its diplomatic relations with Israel, and as well as with the
185
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[Palestinian Liberation Organization] PLO, to ambassadorial level” 186 The rapid pace of
economic cooperation, ever-increasing flow of Israeli tourists to Turkey and the Turkish
military’s aspiration to access to Israel’s advanced military technology in the 1990s
elevated Israeli-Turkish relations to an unprecedented level and dubbed them “strategic
relations” by 1996. For instance, the volume of trade between Israel and Turkey was
close to $100 million in 1989, but it reached to an astonishing $620 million in 1997, a
more than five-fold increase under eigtht years. 187 Additionally, the Turkish military
envisioned a modernization plan for the armament that would cost about $150 billion in a
period of two decades to bring up the army to task in countering possible conflicts in the
region. 188 As a result of Turkey’s negative human rights records, western nations,
especially European nations, were increasingly reluctant to provide military technology
to Ankara. The U.S. State Department’s references to human rights violations increased
especially in the mid-1990s, hindering the approval of armament-related bills in the U.S.
Congress. Therefore, Turkey’s national security establishment saw Israel as an important
partner because of Israel’s advanced technology know-how and defense industry. “On 5
December 1996, they signed an agreement to modernize 54 of Turkey's F-4 Phantom
aircraft for 650 million dollars. In 1997 Israel also won the tender for upgrading Turkey's
F-5 aircraft. Israel and Turkey also agreed to produce the sophisticated Popeye II air-toground missile in a deal initially worth about $100 million. Turkey had already bought 50
Popeye I missiles for its F-4 fighters. The deal involved a consortium with two Turkish
186
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firms to produce Popeye II, a smaller version with more advanced technology. In addition
there were talks for deals for the modernization of tanks and other aircraft.” 189 One also
should note that initial contacts in reviving the rapprochement were made by Turkish
generals. Many in academia would agree that “[t]he principal ideologists of developing
the relations with Israel on the Turkish part were the Undersecretary of the Foreign
Ministry Onur Oymen and the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Cevik Bir. According
to them, the strategic menaces to the Turkish national security are different from those of
the Cold War years which demands new approaches including the military-political cooperation with Israel, the sole secular state in the Middle East, adhering to the proWestern positions, Western values and democratic principles.” 190
Turkey’s Domestic and foreign affairs intricately mingled: Israel and the United States
The triangular engagements of Israel, Turkey and the United States in the 1990s
truly reflected the changing dynamics of the Middle East as the United States asserted its
newfound “sole-superpower” status by taming the excesses of Saddam’s ambitions.
Turkey claimed active involvement in the Middle East on the American side, in contrast
to Turkey’s long-preferred regional policy of non-involvement. Israel reinforced its
regional standing and national security interests by enlisting Turkey as a Muslimmajority nation against its neighboring foes. The strategic calculations of these three
nations throughout the 1990s were largely driven by their respective converging interests.
However, the level of strategic partnership between Israel and Turkey did come at a cost.
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While deepening relations with Israel was a matter of foreign policymaking, the
implications of this decision for Turkish domestic political affairs were intricate and
dynamic. The domestic ramifications of Turkey’s Israel orientation had far-reaching
effects even in the case of Turkey’s seriously strained relations in the years 2008 through
2011.
To grasp the multifaceted linkage of domestic and foreign affairs, one needs to
look at Turkey’s domestic landscape in mid 1990s. National identity has been a
battleground for Turkey since its founding in 1923. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk founded
Turkey on the premise of secular nationalism. While venerating Turkishness and secular
western identity, the Turkish state marginalized non-Turkish minorities such as Kurds
and religious Islamic masses. Islam was seen as an impediment to modernity and a
bringer of economic backwardness. It was Islam, they argued, that left the Ottoman state
backward and that was not compatible with its European counterparts. 191 They also took
note of the multi-ethnic nature of the Ottoman state and believed that the idea of a
Turkish nation state on the premises of French Revolution and republicanism would fit
the new Turkish state well. In a way, the new Turkey was an anti-thesis of what the
Ottoman Empire was. Therefore, any close association with the Ottomans or their values
was perceived as a threat to the Turkish republic. 192 It is important to note that there were
191
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four major Kurdish rebellions in Turkey from 1925 to 1937. It was no surprise that the
PKK terrorism started in the early 1980s and that the Kurdish question has been a major
domestic and foreign policy issue for Turkey since then. From 1923 to the 1980s,
manifestations of Islamic beliefs and of non-Turkish identities were heavily suppressed.
When Turgut Ozal was popularly elected in 1983, the Turkish state’s ideological
obsessions about non-Turkish identities and Islam began to thaw. Ozal took bold
measures to liberalize the economy and provided opportunities to Anatolian
entrepreneurs who generally held conservative values. The rise of these “Anatolian
tigers” 193 and new emerging manufacturing centers in Anatolian cities such as Kayseri,
Gaziantep and Konya began to challenge the primacy of the traditional business elite,
which was largely represented by the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's
Association ( Turk Sanayicileri ve Isadamlari Dernegi, TUSIAD). 194 Economic
diversification and an increase in the visibility of religious conservatives in the Turkish
economy and politics thus paved the way for more vibrant political demands and its
manifestations, such as the ever-increasing number of private television stations,
newspapers, magazines, educational institutions, trade unions, cultural institutions,
religious foundations and political parties. Highly-educated youth who generally came
193
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from unprivileged backgrounds began to hold positions not only in diverse business
enterprises but in government. Interestingly, as Hakan Yavuz noted, “several decades of
economic expansion and political liberalization have provided the grounds for the
construction of an Islamic political identity. However, it is important to note that the
current movement of Islamic identity is not a reversion to old ways but rather a ‘modern
creation, constructed in relation to current politics.’ This form of Islamic identity is
detached from its traditional rural environment and rooted in an urban, market driven
context.” 195 The diversification of the elite and new discourses obviously brought new
demands and power to the center, which had been largely occupied by the Kemalist
establishment since the founding of the republic. Facing the risk of losing the hegemony
that the establishment enjoyed for so many years, Kemalists accused the emerging elite of
being an extension of Iran’s “grand ambitions” to convert Turkey to an Islamic sharia
state or directly associate them with Islamic backwardism. 196 The fear among the
Kemalists became very discernible when the political Islamist Welfare Party (WP) (Refah
Partisi) 197 won the elections on December 24, 1995 with 21.38% of the total votes cast. It
was the first time that an Islamist party succeeded in general elections in Turkey.
However, it took more than six month for Erbakan to get the official word from President
Demirel to form a coalition government. Demirel had beforehand given the duty to form
a government to the Motherland Party’s Mesut Yilmaz, who came in second place in the
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election, even though doing so was against the Turkish state’s established practices. The
leader of the WP, Necmettin Erbakan, and Tansu Ciller of TPP formed a coalition
government on June 28, 1996 in which Erbakan was the Prime Minister. Political
Islamists’ “capture” of the premiership, intense PKK attacks in Turkey, raging in-fighting
among Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, Syria’s support for the terrorist training camps
in its soils, and charges and countercharges of spying with Iran deepened the sense of
insecurity among the Kemalist establishment. Fervent critiques from Europeans and, to a
certain degree, Americans, on Turkey’s widespread human rights violations isolated
Turkey further in the international arena. Lasting impacts of the April 5, 1994 economic
crisis worsened the political prospect for stability at home as well. 198 The weakness of
coalition governments between 1991 and 1995, some argued, led in part to the rise of the
Islamist Welfare Party, which was untried and therefore looked upon with hope by some
segments of society, who looked to untested sources to drag Turkey out of its economic
and political downward spiral. 199 It could easily be argued that the period between 1995
and 1998 was one of the most difficult episodes in Turkish political history, in which
domestic and foreign affairs intricately intermingled and posed deep challenges for
Turkey and its future. Adding insult to injury, European officials wounded Turkish pride
at the Luxemburg Summit in December 1997 when they refrained from including Turkey
in the EU’s next enlargement phase. This exacerbated the Kemalists’ sense of isolation
198
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and insecurity, for they perceived the slight as evidence of Europe’s rejection of Turkey
because of its Muslim identity. In this context, one can easily see why both the Turkish
political and military elite decided to upgrade Turkey’s economic and security relations
with Israel to the level of strategic cooperation in 1996. As indicated earlier, the Turkish
military wanted to institute Israel as its strategic partner to quell isolation in the
international arena, to show Europeans that Turkey had “secular credentials”, to send a
message to Syria, Iran and other Arab nations that it could counterbalance their strategic
presence in the Middle East, and to get more leverage in Washington through Israel and
the Jewish lobbies. 200 “After the formation of Erbakan’s coalition government in June
1996, yet another motivation was added: to embarrass the pro-Islamic government by
exposing its powerlessness to halt an alliance it had openly opposed.” 201
Prior to his win in December 1995, Erbakan in his election campaign made some
peculiar statements that were considered by many as anti-western, anti-American and
anti-Israeli. For example, he wanted to withdraw from NATO, end military and political
ties with Israel and halt the U.S. initiative of Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq.
Instead of Turkey’s western vocation, he sought to establish “Islamic” mirror images of
institutions like the IMF, EU, NATO and G7 that would be populated exclusively by
Muslim nations.202 “Erbakan’s strategic aim was to turn Turkey into a leader in the
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Muslim world as opposed to a ‘subservient follower’ in the western bloc.” 203 Americans’
anxiety and skepticism concerning Erbakan’s fiery rhetoric 204 was best captured by
Morton Abramowitz, former U.S. ambassador to Turkey. He said, “[h]ow do you deal
with a NATO ally led by a man who is fundamentally anti-NATO, fundamentally antiSemitic and fundamentally pro-Islamist, even when he’s largely behaving himself.” 205 In
his first week in the office, Erbakan met with U.S. Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff
on July 2, 1996, he said in the meeting that “as a first step to secure peace in the Middle
East, [Israel] must withdraw from the territories it invaded, including the Golan Heights
and that his government intended to form closer ties with all the brotherly Muslim
countries in the region.” 206 Prime Minister Erbakan made his first official foreign visit to
Iran in August 1996, broaching cooperation with a formidable enemy of Israel and the
United States. His high-profile visit ended with an agreement of a $20 billion deal for
Turkey to buy natural gas from Iran. Just days before his visit, the U.S. Congress passed a
law 207 intending to isolate states sponsoring international terrorism. The law basically
barred third countries from doing business with Iran and Libya. It was a major factor in
straining the relations between Ankara and Washington. Erbakan’s defiance of the U.S.
203
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in the foreign arena continued when he paid a visit to Libya, another adversary of the
United States. Erbakan’s initiatives fell short of any real accomplishments, especially his
trip to Libya, on which Libyan leader Qaddafi scolded him for Turkey being a puppet of
the west. 208 Erbakan’s humiliations deeply resonated not only among the Kemalist elite
but also in Turkish society. His silence after Qaddafi’s reprimand was an unacceptable
affront to Turkish honor and dignity. 209 His extremist rhetoric and anti-western, antiIsraeli rumblings were somewhat toned down as a result of overwhelming pressure from
the Kemalist establishment, especially the military. In a way, his utopian ideology
faltered against the stark realism of Turkey’s complicated and dynamic intermingling of
domestic and foreign policy challenges. However, the military was extremely
uncomfortable with Erbakan’s inflammatory behavior. 210 The Chief of the General Staff,
Ismail Karadayi, hastily visited Israel in February 1997 to counterbalance Erbakan’s drift
toward Islamist nations; he intended to show off the military’s leverage in determining
the true orientation of the Turkish foreign policy. 211 More importantly, the military
demonstrated its power in domestic affairs through the National Security Council (NSC)
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on February 28, 1997. What is dubbed as the “February 28th process” in the Turkish
political lexicon was initiated when the military through the NSC practically forced the
Erbakan government to agree on curbing Islamic social and political movements in
Turkey. Many in Turkey considered the February 28th process as a “post-modern
coup.” 212 Rumors about the alleged U.S. involvement in encouraging the Turkish military
abounded in the Turkish media. 213 However, one recent revelation from an aging Erbakan
has ignited a debate as to whether the U.S. was behind the postmodern coup in 1997.
Samil Tayyar from the Star daily published an article on December 15, 2010 about an
alleged U.S. national security document which suggested that the U.S. administration of
the time was very uneasy with the Erbakan government and its policies, and even urged
the Turkish military to take appropriate action against him.214 It was claimed that thenSecretary of State Warren Christopher sent a document to the U.S. Ambassador to
Turkey on October 30, 1996, stating that the U.S. was extremely concerned to see that
Turkish government was drifting away from the western world and moving toward the
Arab world. According to the alleged document, Turkey should remain a key strategic
ally of the U.S.; the Turkish military should take action against the current government.
Erbakan argued that the alleged document clearly indicated the role of the United States
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in urging the Turkish military to topple his government. 215 Whether or not the United
States was involved in toppling the Erbakan government, however, the “post-modern
coup” left very deep social, political, economic and even foreign policy prerogatives for
the Turkish military. 216 The Turkish military-bureaucratic elite immediately sought to
regain the hegemonic discourse based on the “homogenizing policies of Kemalism” 217 by
instituting sweeping measures in the areas of education, media, politics, economy, culture
and international affairs. For example, universities were asked to set up “persuasion
rooms” for female students who wore headscarves. Inside, these students were
“educated” in modernity and literally forced to remove their headscarves in order to be
able to enter university campuses. In short, the post-modern coup was in fact a serious
blow to Turkey’s democratization and the reforms taken to fulfill the EU accession
process. The collision of the secularist military and the Islamist WP resulted in a highly
fractured society, after which the normalization of politics and society would take more
than a decade.
Gearing towards Strategic Partnership between Ankara and Washington
Given the complexity and the depth of the growing relationship between Ankara
and Washington in the second half of 1990s, Mesut Yilmaz, who became Prime Minister
after the Islamist Erbakan government resigned on June 18, 1997, paid a visit to President

215

Ibid.

216

The Chief of the General Staff Huseyin Kivirkoglu claimed that the February 28th is a process. If
bacwardism (read Islamism) continue, the “February 28th process” will continue a thousand years. See "28
Subat Bitmedi ", Milliyet September 4, 1999.
217

Coined by Hakan Yavuz. See typical Kemalist arguments, Emre Kongar, Yozlasan Medya Ve Yozlasan
Turkiye (Ankara: Remzi Kitabevi, 2003).

110

Clinton in December 1997. 218 Just after a rejection from the European Union at the
Luxemburg Summit that faulted it for not including Turkey in the next wave of the
enlargement, Yilmaz’s visit in a way looked for assurances from the U.S. administration.
In fact, Yilmaz and Clinton decided to elevate their enhanced partnership to a “strategic
partnership” by expanding the scope of bilateral relations. The Clinton administration
declared a “five-part agenda” in the areas of energy, economic issues, security
cooperation, regional cooperation and the issues on the Aegean Sea and in Cyprus. 219
“The impetus behind extending the relationship into the economic sphere was twofold.
First, the Turkish government held that the deepened security relationship necessitated
expanded economic ties... Ankara sought ‘trade not aid,’ seeking the relaxation of U.S.
import duties on Turkish goods. Second, Washington viewed economic ties as a means of
securing Turkey’s westward orientation, improving its European prospects and
encouraging democratic reforms.” 220 One must also note that previous bilateral economic
steps also resulted in the announcement of the five-part agenda between Ankara and
Washington in 1990s. Economic ties were placed under an institutional framework when
the “Joint Economic Commission” and the “Business Development Council” were
created in 1993 and 1996, respectively. Their agreement on agricultural cooperation was
renewed in 1995. In 1996, another agreement was signed to eliminate double taxation in
trade between Turkey and the United States. After the “five-part agenda” declaration, the
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“Development of Trade and Investment Relations” agreement was signed when Prime
Minister Bulent Ecevit visited President Clinton in Washington on September 28,
1999. 221 According to the U.S. State Department “Country Commercial Guide” report on
Turkey in 1998, “the volume of bilateral trade--over $5.5 billion--strongly favors the
United States. Turkey exported $2.12 billion to the United States in 1997, with apparel
and textiles, tobacco and iron & steel dominating. U.S. exports to Turkey last year
totaled $3.54 billion and was led by aircraft and spare parts, machinery and tobacco.
Total U.S. investment in Turkey, as of the end of 1997, was $2.2 billion.” 222 The main
Turkish position in late 1990s was that “security dominated bilateral relations had to be
diversified and that the U.S. had to relax some of its import duties on goods imported
from Turkey.” 223 The commitment on the diversification of the nature of the relations, to
a certain degree, was met by the United States. The trade volume between Ankara and
Washington increased 70% between 1991 and 1999. The volume of the foreign direct
investments by American companies in Turkey tripled in 1990s as compared to the
previous decade. The number of American tourists visiting Turkey also significantly
increased from 79,000 in 1991 to 439,000 in 1998. 224 However, some of the protectionist
measures, especially on the issues of a quota for Turkish textiles, created contention. In
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fact, the quota on Turkish textiles was one of the permanent agenda items in bilateral
meetings throughout the 1990s.
In addition to the bilateral economic relations, strong U.S. support for the BakuCeyhan oil pipeline and the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline projects, both of which were
planned to pass through Turkey, strengthened Turkish-American relations. The main
objectives behind these two initiatives were two-fold: the first was to diversify energy
routes as more countries were demanding more oil and natural gas for their growing
economies. The second was to secure energy routes that passed through politically stable
counties. By default, it would limit the roles of Iran and Russia, inhibiting their abilities
to dominate energy markets while taming their regional strategic ambitions. Advocating
these two projects in fact signaled that the U.S. sought Turkey as a regional hub for
energy flow and that the newly-instituted “strategic partnership” between Ankara and
Washington in fact was reassuring to both sides. 225
One of the most important components of the strategic partnership was of course
on the issue of arms sales to Turkey. As mentioned earlier, Turkey’s quest for a massive
military modernization required the purchases of large amounts of arms. In fact, 80% of
the Turkish Armed Forces equipment came from the U.S. From 1993 to 1999, Turkey
purchased arms from the U.S. to the tune of $5 billion. 226 Additionally, the U.S.
government provided subsidized surplus military equipment valued about $2 billion from
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1991 to 1998. 227 To illustrate the content of surplus transfers to Turkey, one can examine
lists with entries like: “922 main battle tanks, 250 armored personnel carriers, 72 artillery
pieces, 145 combat aircraft, 42 helicopters, and 9 combat ships.” 228 While the U.S.
Congress, facing pressure from Greek and Armenian diasporas, made occasional threats
of arms embargo, it did not change the fact that the U.S. was the top arms-seller to
Turkey throughout 1990s.
In conclusion, the relations between Ankara and Washington in the 1990s were
qualitatively different in terms of their scope, depth, complexities and magnitude, as
compared to the nature of relations in previous decades. Assistant Secretary of State
Richard Holbrooke testified in March 1995 before the U.S. Congress and said that
“Turkey is at the crossroads of almost every issue of importance to the United States on
the Eurasian continent.” 229 The relative simplicity and predictability of the Cold War
strategic environment on the Turkish-American relations was no longer applicable during
the 1990s. The issues ranged from the Gulf War, the emerging de facto Kurdish state in
northern Iraq, Turkey’s bid for the EU membership to the triangular strategic alliance
between Turkey, Israel and the U.S. coupled with Turkey’s own Kurdish problem at
home, the rise of the Islamist WP to power and an increase in the visibility of a new elite
mainly from Anatolian cities. Once the foreign policy decision-making in Turkey was
considered to be exclusive to the Turkish civil-military bureaucratic elite, the burgeoning
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new social and political elites from the periphery began, to a certain degree, to exert
influence on the U.S.-Turkey relationship. Even in its developmental stage in the 1990s,
the role of emerging social and political agency on Turkish politics and foreign policy
would be seen in the 2000s, especially after the rise of Justice and Development Party
(JDP) (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi). Therefore, the next chapter will explore the dynamic
and complex interactions of new Turkish political actors and the United States’ policies
of its “war on terror” and the Iraqi War of 2003.
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CHAPTER V: TOWARDS AUTONOMY, 2001-2005
The relationship between Ankara and Washington was elevated to a “strategic
partnership” in the late 1990s, as laid out in Chapter IV, despite a divergence of opinions
and perceived interests on both sides. The Clinton administration’s extensive engagement
strategy with Turkey largely centered on the conviction that Turkey was an indispensible
ally 230 in furthering the American agenda of promoting economic interdependence and
democracy in the region. 231 Then-U.S. Ambassador-designate to Turkey, Mark Parris, in
his confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said that
“Turkey is important to the United States of America… because of its influence on a
remarkably broad range of American interests: from bringing peace to Bosnia to bringing
peace to the Middle East; from containing Iraq and Iran to opening up the New
Independent States of central Asia; from solving the problem of Cyprus to normalizing
the situation in the Caucasus; from combating regional terrorism to shutting down drug
trafficking. Turkey is important to us as a paradigm: it is a large, predominantly Muslim
country in a troubled region with a tradition of secular governance and expanding
democracy, with a 70-year commitment to integration and cooperation with the West, and
with a 50-year record of standing shoulder to shoulder with American forces from Korea
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to the Gulf War to Somalia to Bosnia.” 232 The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard
Holbrooke claimed in 1995 that “Turkey was as important in the new era as West
Germany had been during the Cold War.” 233 The U.S. Department of State’s report to
Congress in 1999 also reflected the Clinton administration’s overarching perspective on
Turkey. “Turkey is vitally important to U.S. interests. Its position athwart the Bosphorus
- at the strategic nexus of Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Caspian – makes
it an essential player on a wide range of issues vital to U.S. security, political and
economic interests. In a region of greatly weak economies and shaky democratic
traditions, political instability, terrorism and ethnic strife, Turkey is a democratic secular
nation that draws its political models from Western Europe and the United States.” 234 On
the Turkish side, President Demirel shared similar convictions when he hosted President
Clinton in November 1999. He noted that “[c]ommon areas of interest and action
between Turkey and the United States are rapidly expanding. We are working together
for peace, stability, welfare and security of a vast geography, from the Balkans to the
Caucasus, from Central Asia to the Middle East and Europe, and developing together a
political agenda in accordance with the new political conditions in the world.” 235
Nonetheless, sources of friction between Ankara and Washington ranged from the future
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of the Kurdish administration in northern Iraq to the compensation of Turkey’s economic
loss due to the UN embargo in Iraq to human rights violations against Kurds in the 1990s.
Just before the end of President Clinton’s second term in office, one important
element determined the Turkish perception of the United States: the Clinton factor.
President Clinton paid a visit to Turkey three days after a powerful earthquake hit the city
of Bolu in November 1999, 236 where he met with victims in the quake-ravaged city. 237
His friendly demeanor in talking to people and effectively communicating with them was
well-received by the Turkish public. Images of him walking through tents and hugging a
one-year old baby boy named Erkan, who famously squeezed Clinton's nose, resonated
among the Turkish populace. 238 During his visit to Turkey, he also gave a speech at the
Turkish Parliament, becoming the first western leader to address the deputies there. 239
Arguably, the image of the United States in the eyes of both the Turkish elite and public
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was at its highest point in years in late 1999. This was, in large part, the result of
Clinton’s popularity and the U.S. push for Turkey’s EU candidacy.
When George W. Bush took office in January 2001, the usual sources of friction
came to the table even as he assured Turks that the U.S. would respect Turkey’s (and
Iraq’s) territorial integrity and signaling that the U.S. did not intend to support the
creation of an independent Kurdistan. Prime Minister Ecevit criticized the United States
for not informing the Turkish government of its bombings in Iraq 240 and Turkish foreign
minister Ismail Cem relayed the Turkish government’s concern over sanctions against
Iraq, which bore a devastating impact on Turkish economy. 241However, one of Turkey’s
major economic crises erupted on February 21, 2001 when the Istanbul Stock Exchange
plummeted more than 18%, a record fall in its history, in one day. 242 Never-ending
relations with the IMF in economic stabilization programs, overvaluation of the Turkish
lira and a nearly unregulated, weak financial sector led to one of Turkey’s most painful
economic crises. Twenty-two out of eighty Turkish banks were bailed out by the
government, costing the Turkish taxpayers billions of dollars. Unemployment increased
dramatically from 6.5 percent in 2000 to more than 10 percent in February 2001, when
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the economic crisis started. 243 Ecevit invited Kemal Dervis, 244 then in the United States,
to return to Turkey as Minister of Economic Affairs, a post in which he would undertake
Turkey’s economic recovery program in March 2001. The Turkish government
immediately asked the IMF’s and U.S.’s help in stabilizing the economy. After long and
grueling negotiations on austerity measures, the IMF extended $19 billion credit to
Turkey on May 15, 2001. 245 However, painful memories of the crisis and Ecevit’s
invitation of Dervis 246 from the U.S. triggered resentment among Turkey’s nationalists
and Islamists segments. Some claimed that Kemal Dervis was the “clerk” of the IMF and
served U.S. interests rather than Turkey’s. 247 In fact, his effective leadership in
formulating and implementing the economic recovery program despite popular discord at
the time was credited for Turkey’s long-term growth under the JDP’s rule since 2002. 248
Allies Agreed and then Disagreed: The September 11 Attacks, and the Polices of “War
on Terror” and “Axis of Evil”
While Turkey was dealing with a deep economic crisis at home, the September
11, 2001 attacks on the United States’ symbols of power, the World Trade Center and the
243
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Pentagon, understandably shocked Turkey. The scope, magnitude and execution of the
terrorist attacks of massive proportion in New York and Washington were
incomprehensible worldwide, including in Turkey. The general thinking among the
Turkish political elite and the public was that the world’s sole super power could not be
attacked. 249 Seeing such attacks inflicted by a non-state actor, Al-Qaida, on U.S. soil
deeply disturbed assumptions about international relations and the future of the nationstate system. Many in Turkey uttered that a new era of uncharted territory in international
affairs started on September 11, 2001. 250 In that same vein, the Turkish political elite 251
acknowledged the unprecedented nature of the attacks and unequivocally claimed that the
“Turkish thesis” of dealing with terrorism was vindicated in the aftermath of the attacks.
Turkey had been dealing with the menace of terrorism since 1984 and the ensuing
conflicts had resulted in more than 35,000 casualties and $100 billion in economic losses.
As laid out in preceding chapters, Turkey largely employed military-security based
approaches to its Kurdish problem at home and possible de facto Kurdish state in
northern Iraq in 1990s and early 2000s. Military operations in southeastern Turkey led to
widespread human rights violations among its Kurdish citizens and drew criticism from
249
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the United States and even more so from European countries. Turkey’s occasional crossborder incursions, named “hot pursuits” by the Turkish military, in northern Iraq to root
out PKK elements also caused the bombings of Kurdish villages that outraged the
international community. Against this backdrop, Turkey repeatedly brought the issue of
dealing with international terrorism to the attention of the international community in
various venues to convince its counterparts to institute a common anti-terrorism policy. It
was largely unsuccessful because of Turkey’s human rights records and the influence of
the Kurdish diaspora in European countries. However, it is important to note that the
European reluctance to limit PKK activities in European cities, and its refusal to
recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization (instead identifying it as a “separatist
group”) were constant and major sources of friction. Although the U.S. designated the
PKK a terrorist organization, Turkey remained uncomfortable about the “future
intentions” of the western world, including the U.S. After witnessing the terrorist attacks
in the U.S.in September 2001, the Turkish political elite felt vindicated in their antiterrorism approach of forging a consensus between nations to deal with terrorism. These
sentiments could best be described in the words of President Necdet Sezer when he said
that no country except Turkey could understand the pains and sufferings of the United
States. “We are ready to share our experience, which we have gained over 15 years.” 252
He also argued that those attacks should be a lesson for European countries. He urged
their leaders to adopt changes in their attitudes and states of mind towards terrorism.
After pointing out that terrorism was a crime committed against all humanity, he said,
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“that's why we have always repeated in all international platforms that international
cooperation in the fight against terrorism should be improved. The attacks on the U.S.
had shown how correct Turkey is in her stance against terrorism. I guess the attitudes of
European countries have begun to change too.” 253 The same sentiment was shared by the
former Turkish Ambassador Yuksel Soylemez in his op-ed essay titled “My Terrorist
May Be Your Friend.” 254 While acknowledging the concerted U.S. efforts for more
united front against international terrorism over the years, he noted that some European
nations did not pay enough attention to the problem and even supported terrorists groups,
alluding to the PKK presence in Europe. He bluntly said that “[m]y terrorist should not be
your friend or vice versa. There cannot or should not be different and contradicting
definitions of the terrorist, which unfortunately has been the case up until now.” 255 What
could be dubbed as the “we were right” view among the Turkish elite were fiercely
employed when meeting with European counterparts as they pressured Europeans to take
strong measures on the PKK activities in their borders. This led to success in European
countries identifying the PKK as a terrorist organization.
On the implications of terrorist attacks on the U.S., President Bush hinted his
response and the new orientation of the country when he said at the National Cathedral
on September 14, 2001 “[j]ust three days removed from these events, Americans do not
yet have the distance of history. But our responsibility to history is already clear: to
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answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. War has been waged against us by stealth
and deceit and murder. This nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. The
conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour,
of our choosing.” 256 Less than a week later, he laid out his plan for responding to
terrorists and their supporters by saying that “we will starve terrorists of funding, turn
them one against another, drive them from place to place until there is no refuge or no
rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation
in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the
terrorists.” 257 His threatening rhetoric of “either with us or against us” did not bother
either President Sezer or Prime Minister Ecevit (or, for that matter, the Kemalist
intellectuals) since they thought that a rising tide of anger against radical Islam in the
world served to bolster Turkey’s success story as a secular Muslim country. The
September 11 attacks, according to them, reaffirmed the wisdom of Kemalist Turkey and
increased its strategic importance in the start of this new era. 258 Turkey offered its
unconditional support to the U.S., signaling its goodwill but also calculating its interests
on the premise that its strategic value was increasing in the eyes of the U.S. For this
256
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purpose, on October 10, 2001, the Turkish parliament granted full war powers to Ecevit’s
government, giving it the right to send troops abroad or host foreign troops on Turkish
land. Additionally, it allowed the government to authorize foreign aircrafts’ usage of
Turkish airspace, in an attempt to help the U.S. fight Al Qaida and the Taliban in
Afghanistan. 259 Turkey’s full support for the American mission met with American
jubilation. In fact, U.S. Congressman Curt Weldon described Turkey as the “shining
crown jewel” 260 in a tumultuous region and Congressman Robert Wexler declared that
there was no other country that matched Turkey’s level of support for America’s fight
against terrorism after the September 11th attacks. 261 In his visit to Washington in January
2002, Bulent Ecevit reaffirmed Turkey’s commitment to fight terrorism and its continued
support to work in Afghanistan to root out terrorist elements.
Even though the September 11 attacks generated a sense of understanding in
Turkey, whose people sympathized with the destruction and the loss of life that blighted
the U.S. in unprecedented proportions, the Turkish elite was deeply concerned about the
Bush administration’s policies of unilateralism and pre-emptive war 262 as unveiled in the
September 2002 National Security Strategy document. 263 Many in Turkey thought that
unrestrained American power would create excesses and lead to instability and war in an
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area of worrying proximity to Turkey. 264 Additionally, the “war on terror” policies made
conservative circles in Turkey especially uncomfortable since they inherently led to the
marginalization of Islam in the public opinion and the belief that the U.S. saw Islam as a
threat against which it would use tough counter-measures. 265
Strategic Partnership in Jeopardy: Iraqi War of 2003
The Turkish elite’s major concern was that the U.S. would not stop with toppling
the Taliban in Afghanistan but expand its agenda to Turkey’s neighboring states,
especially Iraq. The U.S. request from the Turkish government to open its Combined Air
Operation Center, a NATO base in the central Anatolian city of Eskisehir, signaled an
intention to strike Iraq in the near future. 266 The U.S. delegation’s visit to northern Iraq
reinforced Turks’ conviction that the post-September 11 environment would create
another episode of the Gulf War, which had enormous political, economic and foreign
policy implications for Turkey. The Turkish fear materialized when George W. Bush
gave his State of the Union address on January 29, 2002. He labeled Iran, Iraq and North
Korea as the “axis of evil”, arguing that these states were sponsoring terrorism and
pursuing weapons of mass destruction. 267 Later, Syria, Libya and Cuba were identified as
“rogue states” as they, the U.S. argued, also sponsored terrorism and had the potential to
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pursue weapons of mass destruction. Ertugrul Ozkok, editor in-chief of Hurriyet daily,
broke important news in March 2002 when he wrote that the U.S. would attack Iraq in the
near future, citing then-opposition leader Tansu Ciller. Ciller had just returned from the
U.S. where senior U.S. officials allegedly shared these intentions with her. 268
The U.S. definition of Iran and Iraq as an “axis of evil” and of Syria as a “rogue
state” pressured Turkey since Bush’s “either with us or against us” lexicon did not leave
any wiggle room for Turkey. However, it did not mean that critiques of the Bush
administration and of the oncoming storm of the Iraqi War stopped. In fact, there was an
atmosphere of vigorous debate on the question of what Turkey’s policy orientation would
be in this new era of American unilateralism. 269 Some argued that Turkey should join this
axis on the side of the U.S. not as a subordinate but on equal terms. 270 With mounting
pressures from the Bush administration to initiate war efforts from north of Iraq, Turkish
political elites were left with a dilemma. They had either to side with the U.S. or reject it
altogether. 271
Turks were most concerned about both Kurdish separatism in northern Iraq and
the growing possibility of instability associated with its own Kurdish question. In this
respect, the post-Gulf War environment and its impact on Turkey’s domestic and foreign
268
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affairs were deeply engrained in Turkish perceptions. Observers must also note
arguments that the Bush administration was strongly determined to invade Iraq no matter
what, and that Turkish participation in the war efforts could win a seat in the table in the
aftermath of the war, which could in turn give Turkey huge leverage in determining the
possible establishment of independent Kurdistan. 272 Even the JDP leader Erdogan argued
that Turkey was doing everything in its power to prevent the war but saw the efforts of
establishing a new world headed by the U.S. 273 He went on to assert that Turkey needed
to claim its own space in this emerging world. Interestingly enough, there was also a
belief not only among columnists but also among members of the parliament that
Turkey’s non-involvement in the Iraq War could prevent American intentions to invade
Iraq due to its high costs. 274
In January and February of 2002, American officials increased their efforts to
open up Turkish soil for American troops to invade Iraq from the North. To entice
Turkish leadership in both the government and the military, the U.S. started a negotiation,
offering economic incentives in addition to the promise of Turkey’s involvement in the
post-war equations. What was dubbed in the Turkish lexicon as “at pazarligi” (horse
trading) received significant attention in Turkish elite and the public. According to the
newspaper accounts, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell offered a package of $6 billion
in grants and $20 billion in credit of favorable terms to Turkey in return for the
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deployment of American troops in Turkey. 275 Such negotiations and the degradation of
Turkey’s participation in economic bargaining spurred huge public outcry. It further
galvanized the Turkish public, which negatively viewed the war efforts. On one hand, the
JDP leadership, especially Erdogan, was trying to keep deputies in line despite mounting
pressure from their constituencies. In the JDP’s group meeting on February 26, Minister
of Foreign Affairs Yasar Yakis, Minister of Defense Vecdi Gonul and Minister of
Economic Affairs Ali Babacan informed the deputies about the possible outcomes of
rejecting the resolution in case it did not pass. According to their talking points, the
Kurdish state would be established and spark separatism in Turkey. Turkey would not
handle fleeing Kurdish refugees from Iraq. The U.S. would no longer support Turkey’s
EU membership bid and Turkish theses against Greece and Cyprus. Last, but not least,
Turkey might experience harsh economic crisis if the U.S. withdrew its economic
support. 276 Adding pressure to the JDP government, President Sezer reminded the
deputies that the resolution was coming to the floor of the parliament without
international approval from the United Nations. A day before the resolution’s vote, the
National Security Council did not issue an advisory. This was an unusual gesture given
that the military had used significant leverage through the NSC on major issues in
Turkish politics over the decades. 277
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On the American side, the general attitude was that Ankara could not say no
because Turkey, they thought, needed more U.S. economic backing amid the ruinous
financial crisis in 2001. Additionally, the unprecedented self-confidence of the Bush
administration was salient among American leaders following the invasion of
Afghanistan. They had a conviction that Turkey could not reject the resolution given the
U.S. primacy in the region, that it was unthinkable Turkey to pursue such a treacherous
path. 278 The structural factors were in fact pushing Turkey only in the direction of
approving the resolution, not the other way around. However, to the surprise of many, the
Turkish parliament did not pass the resolution despite the 264 yes votes and 250 no votes.
It was only 3 votes shy of fulfilling majority vote on March 1, 2003. 279 Despite the fact
that Erdogan lobbied hard in his party to pass the resolution, the TGNA sent an
unprecedented message to the U.S. indicating that it was heeding the Turkish public’s
sentiments. I argue that the March 1st rejection was the major breaking point in TurkishAmerican relations and a signifier of Turkey’s transformation from the bottom up.
Turkish domestic input into the state’s foreign policymaking had not been this visible
since the establishment of Turkey in 1923. I also claim that rejection of the resolution
brought U.S.–Turkey relations to their lowest level since the 1974 arms embargo on
Turkey and even surpassed it. In 1974, the U.S. was applying its embargo against Turkey
due to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. However, the March 1st resolution outcome was a
278
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direct refusal from Turkey that rejected the primacy and unilateralism of the U.S. against
the Iraqi invasion. The rejection was qualitatively different in asserting the “new
Turkey.” Even the JDP leadership did not see the depth and scope of opposition from the
Turkish public despite the fact that repeated surveys revealed that over 90% of the
populace opposed the war. Ironically enough, the same event shaped and redefined the
perception of Turkey both in the Middle East and Europe. Many in these regions
respected Turkey for standing up to the war that they perceived to be illegitimate. 280
Additionally, staying away from the Iraq war, as revealed in later years, saved the blood
and treasure of Turkey. 281 Turkey’s rejection of American troops also attracted sympathy
from an unlikely place. The intellectuals and some political leaders in EU nations
welcomed the result of the democratic process and noted the independent policy
orientation amid immense pressure from Washington.
While noting the emerging independent course of Ankara’s relations with
Washington, one should also note that Turkey’s policy regarding northern Iraq was
complicated further. Since Turkey did not play any role in the invasion, Washington
elevated its relations with the Kurdish factions, namely Barzani and Talabani, to strategic
levels. Turkey’s leverage over northern Iraq since 1991 diminished, as had been feared
by the foreign affairs bureaucracy for more than a decade. After the war with Saddam
Hussein concluded, Kurdish factions organized more effectively than Shia and Sunni
groups due to their experience with autonomous government since 1991.
280
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In July 2003, another incident took place that had a huge impact on the already
strained relations when U.S. troops in the city of Suleymaniyah arrested a Turkish
Special Forces unit and placed hoods on their heads. Images of Turkish troops wearing
hoods appeared in newspapers and touched a nerve in Turkey. Many believed that
Washington was trying to humiliate the Turkish military and people due to the no-vote in
March. Such a minor incident became a major phenomenon and led to the writing of
many books (such as Metal Firtina, Metal Storm) and even blockbuster films like Kurtlar
Vadisi - Irak (Valley of Wolves - Iraq), which were anti-American in nature. Public
sentiments ran high and anti-Americanism significantly increased. Seeing such a
downward spiral of Ankara’s relations with Washington, many in the U.S. repeatedly
asked questions like “who lost Turkey?” and spoke of “whether Turkey was drifting
away from the west and especially from the U.S.” The spike of negative perception of
Turkey in Washington was closely associated with the JDP’s rise to power and its
identity with an Islamic past. To better grasp the scope, depth and magnitude of the
rejection of the March 1st resolution, and the nature of Turkish-American relations
afterward, one must examine the dynamic transformation of Turkish society and politics
since the early 1980s. In the next section, I will explore Turkey’s transformation and its
implications on the relationship between Ankara and Washington.
The Contours of Turkey's Transformation in Domestic and Foreign Affairs
The shocking attacks on the U.S. in September 2001 and the U.S. signaling of a
possible war with Iraq already complicated Turkish calculations, especially on the issues
of northern Iraq and economic recovery challenges from the February 2001 crisis. At this
critical juncture, a seismic political shift in Turkish politics was around the corner.
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Mounting challenges of austerity measures and the collapse of the dysfunctional coalition
government of Democratic Left Party (DLP), NAP and MP led to an early election on
November 3, 2002. Out of 19 parties that had participated in the national elections,
surprisingly enough, only two parties succeeded in passing the parliament’s venerated
10% threshold - the Republican People’s Party and the newly established Justice and
Development Party, which was a reformed offshoot of political Islamist Virtue Party
(VP) (Fazilet Partisi). 282 What’s striking was that other major parties, DLP, NAP, MP
and others, were left outside of parliament. 283 All of these parties had been on the Turkish
political scene for more than a decade and had been prominent as either governing parties
or as opposition groups in the parliament. What made the November 2002 elections
unique was that the Turkish public literally erased the political establishment 284 and
notably placed the JDP as the new center of political authority. The RPP had already been
out of the parliament for three years and had only captured the solid Kemalist bases’ vote
that ranged from 20% to 25% over the decades. The impressive win by a newlyestablished party indicated that there was a deep transformation in Turkey’s populace in
shaping the domestic political landscape. Now with more than eight years as a ruling
party, 285 the JDP’s power showed that this was not an ephemeral political shift; in fact,

282

Tayyip Erdogan’s JDP got 34.28% of the total votes cast and 363 seats in the parliament while Deniz
Baykal’s RPP captured 19.4% of the votes and 178 seats.
283

Due to crashing results, Tansu Ciller of the True Path Party and Mesut Yilmaz of the Motherland Party
resigned from their party chair positions. Devlet Bahceli of Nationalist Action Party resigned from his post
but his resignation was not approved by the party committee, so he stayed.
284

It is important to note that the coalition partners DLP, TPP and NAP got 1.22%, 9.55 and 8.34%
respectively, all under the national threshold to enter the parliament.
285

In fact, many surveys suggested that the JPD would comfortably win another 4-year term in the
elections in June 2011. See various surveys Vatan November 24, 2010; Gazete Haberturk January 20,

133

their authority brought some of the deepest political transformations since Adnan
Menderes’ and Turgut Ozal’s reforms in the 1950s and 1980s, respectively. Indeed, JDP
transformations may well pass those two in terms of scope and magnitude both in the
domestic and foreign policy arenas. 286 As laid out in Chapter IV, Turgut Ozal’s
liberalization efforts in politics and economy between 1983 and 1993 paved the way for
the emergence of new political and economic spaces that were filled largely by
periphery, 287 the Anatolian conservative bourgeoisie. They benefitted from economic and
political openings in the early 1980s and became competitive in education and business
by the mid-1990s. These rising “Anatolian tigers” and the increasing visibility of
conservative Muslims in public spaces, especially in education, media and business, gave
way for the emergence of a new socio-political elite that engaged with the center through
active economic and political participation. Since they largely emerged in a transitional
period to capitalism under the Ozal era, they tended to be pro-free market economy and
advocated integration with the west, especially the EU, even if they were socially
conservative. 288 In this sense, they were more adaptive than the traditional Kemalist elite,
who stumbled when the EU reforms began to challenge defunct aspects of Kemalism
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such as the advancement of democracy, minority rights and privatization. As Hakan
Yavuz argued, “[p]olitical participation provides a variety of flexible learning
opportunities for religious actors to make trade-offs between their ideology and votemaximization. In order to exist as a legal party and acquire genuine popular support,
religious parties must engage in coalition building and pragmatic compromises.” 289 The
WP’s experience with the Kemalist establishment signaled that religiously-oriented
parties needed to garner genuine popular support and establish coalitions from a broad
spectrum of society in order to operate in the repressive environment and implement their
projects. The JDP’s leaders, Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gul and Bulent Arinc, had
intense learning experiences during WP’s rule in the mid 1990s. It is important to note
that from 1994 to 1998, Erdogan was the mayor of Istanbul, a metropolitan city with
more than 12 million inhabitants at the time. During his tenure, dealing with the daily
needs of ordinary people, such as overseeing trash collection and upgrading
infrastructure, shaped his ideas about governance. 290 Erdogan, Gul and Arinc’s departure
from Erbakan’s VP, and their subsequent formation of a new party should be understood
in context whereby their learning process in the office, demands and aspirations of the
rising Anatolian bourgeoisie, the interaction with Kemalist establishment and the impact
289
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of democracy and globalization intricately intermingled. I argue that the rise of the JDP
to power was largely a result of an amalgamation of the above mentioned reasons.
Therefore, one could understand why the JDP leaders branded themselves first as
“Muslim Democrats,” alluding to Christian Democrats in Europe, and then “conservative
democrats.” 291 The rise of the JDP to power and removal of the traditional political elite
in November 2002 elections, however, did not mean that people from the periphery were
taking over the Kemalist regime as many Kemalist intellectuals argued. 292 It instead
increased the visibility of entrepreneurs and youth from Anatolian cities, people with
conservative-religious values, in the center of cities like Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir,
especially in what people perceived were relatively high positions. As Ian Lesser argued,
“[i]t is not that the established elites in government, business, and intellectual life have
been displaced, but rather that Turkish society and policymaking have become more
diverse, with new influences, new sources of identity, and new alliances.” 293
At this juncture, one also needed to understand how other actors like the Kemalist
establishment and the United States perceived the JDP and its leadership when they
assumed office in November 2002. It was fascinating to see that labeling the JDP was no
easy task. There were a wide variety of adjectives used to define the party. Many
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Kemalists 294 in Turkey and neo-conservatives 295 in the U.S. perceived the JDP as
“Islamist”, “political Islamist,” “radical Islamist,” or even “Islamo-fascist.” While some
used “mildly Islamic” 296 or “Islamic”, others utilized the term “religiously oriented” 297
and “post-Islamist.” 298 It is important to note that the JDP’s rule coincided with the postSeptember 11 era, in which the U.S. was determined to eradicate Islamic terrorism and
bring democracy to the Middle East. The Bush administration’s Greater Middle East
Initiative (GMEI) entailed democracy promotion through the expansion of political rights
in the Muslim world. It would, they theorized, counter Islamic extremism. 299 On the one
hand, Turkey’s unique history as a secular and democratic nation and the JDP’s ascension
to power seemed fitting in that they promoted Turkey as a model for the Muslim
world. 300 On the other hand, the JDP government’s failure to pass the resolution on the
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stationing of U.S. troops in Turkey for Iraqi invasion and the deep suspicion of any
religiously oriented party’s agenda in the post-9/11 era, made the GMEI complicated. 301
Many in neoconservative circles in the U.S. claimed that the JDP leadership was
the prime reason behind the rising anti-Americanism in Turkey. While it was true that
public opinion towards the U.S. in Turkey had deteriorated sharply since 2002, similar
trends were evident in many other countries, especially Europe, because of the Iraq War
and Bush’s policies. A survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the U.S. in
2006 revealed that only 20% of the Turkish public felt positively about the U.S. The Pew
Global Attitudes Project indicated a sharp decline of the Turkish perception of the U.S.
from 52% in 2000 to 12% in 2006. 302 Another research done by the Uluslararasi
Stratejik Arastirmalar Kurumu (International Strategic Research Organization, ISRO) in
March 2005 found that 91% of the Turkish public did not approve the policies of the
Bush administration while only 0.5% supported. However, this did not mean that “antiAmericanism” was reflected towards the American people, but at the policies of the
government. The ISRO survey also revealed that 74% of the Turkish public still saw the
U.S. as an ally, and only 4% of the respondents said they hated the U.S. 303 I should note
that sentiments against the U.S. were shared not only by the JDP and conservative
segments of society, but also cut across social-political segments in the society, and
found representation in almost all major political and social groups except in a small
301
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cadre of liberal intellectuals. In fact, the anti-Americanism was more prominent among
the nationalist left and nationalist right as represented by the RPP and the NAP. The
transformation of Turkey’s domestic affairs since the early 1980s had major implications
for the foreign policymaking process. The Turkish public’s increasing participation in
foreign policy debates through a more diverse media had expanded vastly since the Ozal
era, and public opinion became a leading factor in the relationship between Ankara and
Washington from 2003 onward.
Turkey’s increasingly independent foreign policymaking since 2003- and its
active bilateral engagement in the Middle East- sparked discussions on the shift in
Turkish foreign policy. 304 I argue that there are three major domestic processes and two
structural ones that shaped and redefined the direction of Turkish foreign policy and its
implications on relations with Washington. First, as laid out at length in Chapters IV and
V, the change in Turkey’s economic, social and political landscape was one of the driving
forces in the transformation. The increasing visibility of new actors in the marketplace,
schools, media and politics cracked the monotonous political structure of the Kemalist
regime and diversified social and political actors. The transformation basically reflected
the demands of the Turkish populace that were once marginalized in the periphery. The
trials and errors of the emerging political class in the 1990s helped shape the political
discourse on the polarization of masses between secularist Kemalists and political
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Islamists. 305 The post-modern coup in 1997 and the political demands of the public gave
way to a new elite whose members did not define themselves as Islamists but as
conservative democrats and which developed a new vocabulary in addressing the
demands of a broad coalition of the populace. The JDP’s success in formulating domestic
and foreign policies that appealed to the larger public was both contemporary and
different in its essence. While the JDP leadership communicated with the outside world
in a common language in addressing the Turkish policies, 306 they departed from the
traditional foreign policy making that had been largely insular from the public. They
successfully, to a certain degree, infused public opinion into foreign policy. 307 Erdogan’s
charismatic leadership and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s reformulation of
Turkish foreign policy received great popular support. Consequently, the JDP took bold
initiatives in democratization, economic development, constitutional reforms and the EU
accession process. Success in these areas afforded more legitimacy and power to the JDP
in elections after 2002. More importantly, the JDP tamed the military tutelage that had
had relentless influence on Turkish politics since the 1960s. Indicting a general on
charges of plotting to topple the government was unimaginable in the 1990s, but the JDP
reforms and firm stance on civilian authority on the military made that a viable possibility
in 2009. 308
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Second, concurrent to the first process of domestic transformation, Turkey’s own
self perception and the definition of its core interests were redefined due in large part to
the change in its domestic scene. 309 Turkey’s relations with Greece, Syria, Russia, Iraq,
Armenia, Iran and the United States changed greatly. The 1990s perception of Greece
and Syria as enemies was largely abandoned. Even though Greek independence from the
Ottoman Empire, the memory of the War of Independence and the Greek invasion of
Western Turkey resulted in adversarial relations between Ankara and Athens, dynamic
diplomacy since late 1990s did erase the enmity recalling the Alexander Wendt’s
“cultures of anarchy” 310 classification and started the transition from “enmity” to
“rivalry.” More interestingly, Turkey’s relations with Syria were a good example of
Wendt’s classification that states could change their relations with others from enmity,
rivalry, to friendship or vice versa. Turkey’s rapprochement with Syria emerged from
1990s animosity and eventually evolved into friendly relations. Ankara’s relations with
Washington took a hit when the two countries’ “patron-client relationship” of the Cold
War era (Chapter II) metamorphosed into Turkey’s relative autonomy and independence
in conducting its foreign affairs.
Third, it was the rise of new political elite that enabled, channeled and
operationalized the course and the parameters of new foreign policies. The pragmatic and
activist leadership of Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul was key in guiding Turkey’s
religious and civic movement in Turkey. Eventually, generals wanted to topple the government. More than
100 high-ranking military officers were detained and charged with the crime.
309
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new orientation. These two leaders’ popularity and legitimacy in the eyes of the Turkish
public enabled them to incorporate elements of rising global values such as democracy,
freedom, market economy and their deeply held religio-conservative values. While
strongly supporting Turkey’s democratic and market-oriented course, they did not detach
themselves from the values they cherished. The third individual, Ahmet Davutoglu, thenChief Foreign Policy Adviser to Erdogan, provided the philosophical background 311 and
practical solutions to Turkey’s long-standing problems. What he dubbed the “zeroproblem with neighbors” policy in large part offered solutions to the problems with
Greece, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Russia. It even started the engagement with Armenia, but
this effort later stalled as a result of domestic constraints in both countries. His policy of
lifting visa restrictions for citizens of neighboring nations, paired with his active
economic engagement, bore fruit especially with Syria, Iraq, Russia, and Iran as of 2010.
These nations reciprocally lifted visa restrictions and increased their bilateral trade
volume tremendously. Davutoglu’s concept of “strategic depth” 312 also offered insight
into the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy; he was considered the architect of the
JDP’s foreign policy initiatives. He argued that Turkey possessed “strategic depth”
because of its geostrategic position and unique history. He considered Turkey a “central
power”- an idea in direct contrast to Turkey’s long-standing position as a “buffer –zone,”
“flank” and “bridge” in NATO and other western security definitions. In his view,
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Turkey simultaneously possessed European, Middle Eastern, Mediterranean, Balkan,
Caucasian, and African identities as a result of its Ottoman legacy, and therefore could
effectively put forth policies concurrently in those regions. Attesting to the centrality of
Turkey in these intersecting regions, Davutoglu argued that Turkey should develop its
own proactive policies and thereby claim its rightful strategic role. Using the soft power
that stemmed from its Ottoman past, Turkey could reinforce economic development,
conflict resolution, and the creation of economic interdependence. As Mohiaddin
Mesbahi argued, the concept of the “strategic depth” is an “implicit resuscitation of the
Ottoman presence and imagination in the Middle East, the Balkans, and its memory as a
great imperial power in the international system.” 313 Davutoglu’s new way of thinking
took Turkey from the peripheries of western security and political structures and placed it
in the center, making it ground-breaking in design. I think that his reformulation and
operationalization of Turkey’s foreign policy objectives has the potential of challenging
the very nature of Turkish-American relations because many U.S. administrations tended
to situate Turkey as a secondary player, a position in which Turkey has been treated as a
subject. However, Davutoglu’s imagining of modern Turkey envisioned the centrality of
Turkey, not as an accessory around the United States. As Mesbahi argued, the new
Turkish political elite under the JDP rule reflected and reformulated a “major ideational
and temperamental psycho-political change” in Turkey’s foreign affairs about “what
foreign policy actually is, what its functions and purposes are, and what Turkey actually
means to the world polity; a change that only a new elite,… with a different self-
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perception could introduce and construct.” 314 Given the repeated support of Turkish
electorate in successive elections to this new elite, the consolidation of this
transformation in both domestic and foreign policy arenas seems to go further in the near
future.
It is important, however, to note that the promise and future of the Davutoglu
Doctrine in terms of projecting Turkish soft power in the region and solving problems
with Armenia and Iraq have yet to be seen. Especially important is the question of how
and to what extent Turkey can balance engagement with neighboring nations and the
ambitions of global powers like the United States. The question becomes clearer when we
incorporate the future of U.S.-Iran relations. The U.S. push for implementing an embargo
against Iran had the possibility to harm Turkey. Even though Turkey remains opposed to
Iran’s nuclear ambitions, it knew that Iran was the major source of its natural gas and a
vital trade partner. Additionally, both countries shared the goal of containing Kurdish
separatism and neither had territorial ambitions against each other. If an Iraq War-like
escalation would emerge from the U.S., Turkey would have a difficult time formulating
properly balanced policies.
Apart from these three domestic processes as argued above, there are two
structural processes that helped shape the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. First
was the European Union membership process. Turkey’s EU bid was one of the driving
forces in pushing for economic, political and social liberalization since 1960s. It became
more visible when both Ozal in the 1980s and Erdogan in the 2000s used the EU
membership prospect to push for political reforms that could not garner a broad coalition
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of center right, center left, and liberal constituencies. Europeanization like the role of
religion and nationalism was one of the major veins in Turkish political vocabulary that
had transformative effects in redefining political language in Turkey. The JDP’s push for
democratic reforms and its efforts to tame the military’s role in politics opened a new
chapter with the EU. In October 2005, Turkey started accession talks with EU, an openended process of indefinite duration. The second transformative structural change was the
post-Cold War environment as extensively discussed throughout the dissertation.
As I argued in Chapters I, IV and V, the rise of nationalism and political Islam
among the Turkish constituency in the 1990s, in part, challenged U.S. involvement in the
region and indicated the early stages of agency’s new identity formation. Even though
structural factors mostly determined the nature of relations between Ankara and
Washington, however, Ankara’s refusal to station 62,000 American troops on Turkish
soil for Iraqi invasion, and a more assertive Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East,
crystallized the role of agency, namely the new Turkey. It was clearly a moment that
agency asserted itself against the structural compellence. It was the transformation of
Turkey’s domestic constituency that allowed for the institution of a policy that many saw
as unreasonable given the ascendancy of American unilateralism. In conclusion, the
redefinition of Turkey’s self-identity and the transformation of Turkish interests due to
domestic processes and universal trends refined its policies with the United States and
interactions between Ankara and Washington that would define the norms of future
encounters.
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION
My dissertation examined the contours of Turkish-American foreign relations in
the post-Cold War era from 1990 to 2005. While providing an interpretive analysis, I
highlighted elements of continuity and change and of convergence and divergence in the
relationship between Ankara and Washington. The primary purpose was to demonstrate
the historical evolution of Turkish-American foreign relations in the post-Cold War era,
recognizing that the “Kurdish question” was one of prime driving forces in defining the
nature and scope of the relationship, especially in the aftermath of the Gulf War.
Turkey’s encounter with its Kurdish problem at home intertwined with the emergence of
an autonomous Kurdish authority in northern Iraq after the Gulf War that left a political
vacuum in the region. The main argument of this dissertation was that since 1991, the
Kurdish question was the central element in shaping and redefining the TurkishAmerican relations and that Ankara’s relations with Washington have been conducted in
a triangulation that the Kurdish question affected in one form or another.
While Chapter I provided the literature review and theoretical discussions on the
agent-structure debate, it also put forth the foundation of my dissertation’s main
assertions. Chapter II offered a survey of Turkish-American relations from 1800 to 1990
in order to help explain the intricacies of the complex history behind Turkish-American
relations in later periods. The main motive to include such a chapter was that, in fact, the
two nations’ encounters over centuries laid the groundwork for present-day engagement.
Early encounters between the U.S. and the Ottoman Empire were based on trade and
diplomatic relations. In later decades, the relationship was diversified and became more
complicated as many protestant missionaries from the U.S. came to the Ottoman lands to
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evangelize mainly Orthodox Christian minorities to Protestantism in the Ottoman state,
primarily by opening schools. The relationship between Washington and the Sublime
Porte was further severed when mass killings of Armenians under the Ottoman rule took
place in 1915 and that the President Wilson’s progressive agenda of advocating selfdetermination clearly posed serious challenges for decaying multi-ethnic Ottoman state.
At the outset of young Turkish Republic, Ataturk did not want Turkey to be aligned with
any major western power because of the painful memory of the War of Independence.
His ambitious agenda of modernization by taking drastic domestic measures in the areas
of politics, law, economy, and culture also did not let him invest his political and
economic capital in foreign affairs. In spite of Ataturk’s insistence on charting a nonaligned and independent foreign policy during the interwar period, the new leadership
under President Inonu came to a realization that the prospect for Turkey’s future should
closely be tied to emerging post-World War II western security institutions. Otherwise,
Turkey’s independence would severely be jeopardized by the imminent threat of Soviet
invasion. Turkey had no option but to abandon its long-preferred policy of non-alignment
during the interwar period. It aligned itself with the Western powers and especially the
United States. I argued that the World War II and its aftermath was a watershed moment
that bolstered Turkey’s “western vocation.” Turkish political elite argued for the first
time that Turkey is geographically significant to Western interests especially to the
United States since the Soviets could eventually access the Middle East by first invading
Turkey. The Turkish argument iterated that Turkey is a key country and that giving in to
Soviet pressure would allow the Soviets unmitigated influence in the Middle East and
Mediterranean. This argument of the “geographic/geostrategic significance of Turkey”
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has since been a useful staple in Turkish foreign policy, enduring despite the changing
nature of enemies in the decades to come. I argued in Chapter II that Turkey’s claim to a
“strategic position” in the heart of three continents of Asia, Europe, and Africa, has been
the lifeline of the country in countering major national and international challenges since
the end of World War II. Consequently, Turkey was included in the U.S. strategic
calculations during the Cold War era by means of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall
Plan, providing monetary and security assistance to Turkey. Ankara’s inclusion in NATO
in 1952 completed its integration in the western security apparatus against the Soviet
threats. I, therefore, argued that Turkey’s foreign policy was largely pegged into the U.S.
foreign policy calculations despite occasional mishaps like the issue of Cyprus in mid1960s and 1970s.
To grasp the underlying themes and the narratives in the relations between Ankara
and Washington in the post-Cold War era, one needs to see four broadly defined
transformative periods in Turkey’s foreign policy since 1923. The first one took place
between 1923 and 1945 when the Turkish republic was established as a country whose
identity was based on a Turkish nation-state ideal on the republican premise. Even though
the founding leader Ataturk has defined young Turkey’s course forward as “western
oriented,” he insisted on following a strictly non-aligned foreign policy in that period
since the painful memory of western imperial ambitions on Turkish soil in the early 20th
century kept Turkey away from alliance formations with the West. It should also be noted
that the consolidation of Turkey’s new order necessitated more focus on domestic affairs
rather than foreign policy. The implementation of radical modernization in Turkish
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politics and society did not, by and large, let Ataturk and the new elite engage in foreign
affairs.
The second is the exclusive integration of Turkey into western security and
political institutions during the Cold War era (1945-1990), largely a result of the
imminent threat of Soviet expansion. Turkey mostly pegged its foreign policy orientation
to that of the United States and sought economic and military aid from the U.S. to
reinforce its defense against the Soviet Union. The Turkish elite also developed a
compelling argument that Turkey held a strategic position at the intersection of Europe
and Asia and had served as a bulwark of NATO's southeastern flank. Despite occasional
disagreements between two allies like the 1974 U.S. arms embargo to Turkey, the
relationship reflected the importance of structural factors in determining Ankara’s
positions towards Washington and could be categorized as “patron-client relationship.”
The third period (1990-2003) is that of the post-Cold War environment, which
signified the demise of Soviet Union and the threat therefrom, but also brought a wide
array of challenges and opportunities for Turkish foreign policy making. During this
period, Turkey had to face growing threats of instability in the neighboring regions like
the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. The advent of the Gulf War and strong
Turkish involvement on the side of the U.S., as laid out in Chapter III, became a defining
factor in Ankara’s relations with Washington. It left a lasting impact on the identification
and redefinition of Turkey’s domestic and foreign affairs, especially with the United
States. The Kurdish question both at home and in the neighborhood continued to be one
of the top agenda items for Turkey throughout the 1990s. The increasing intensity of
PKK attacks in Turkey, coupled with the ever-pressing reality of an autonomous Kurdish
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authority despite the in-fighting among the Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, resulted in
more aggressive Turkish measures, especially from the military. Some of Turkey’s antiPKK actions in southeastern Turkey led to widespread human rights violations among
Turkey’s Kurdish citizens. The United States and European nations repeatedly cautioned
Turkey on its treatment of Kurds, thereby straining their relationships with Turkey. While
the U.S.’s strategic outlook on Turkey always trumped concerns like human rights
violations, Europeans conversely pressed Turkey harder. They were bolstered by their
proximity to Turkey, a vibrant Kurdish diaspora in Europe, and the EU’s commitment to
human rights issues. Since the mid-1990s, Turkey’s domestic affairs have become
messier. As discussed in Chapter IV, weak coalition governments could not produce
stability in economy and politics and thereby incited a greater role for the Turkish
military in Turkish politics. In addition to instability in domestic affairs, Turkey’s
relations with Greece and Syria were severely strained and both came close to the brink
of war with Turkey. On the other hand, the rapprochement between Turkey and Israel and
passionate U.S. support for Turkey’s bid for European Union membership, resulted in a
new phase in the Turkish-American relations: a strategic partnership. However, this
partnership should be understood in a context whereby the United States perceived
Turkey as an indispensible ally that greatly mattered to many vital American strategic
interests. As former U.S. Ambassador Mark Parris put it “Turkey is important to the
United States of America… because of its influence on a remarkably broad range of
American interests: from bringing peace to Bosnia to bringing peace to the Middle East;
from containing Iraq and Iran to opening up the New Independent States of central Asia;
from solving the problem of Cyprus to normalizing the situation in the Caucasus; from
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combating regional terrorism to shutting down drug trafficking. Turkey is important to us
as a paradigm: it is a large, predominantly Muslim country in a troubled region with a
tradition of secular governance and expanding democracy, with a 70-year commitment to
integration and cooperation with the West, and with a 50-year record of standing shoulder
to shoulder with American forces from Korea to the Gulf War to Somalia to Bosnia.” 315
The fourth period signaled the beginning of a new era of activism in Turkish
foreign policy, which started roughly in 2003 with the Turkish rejection of U.S. troops
being stationed on Turkish soil to overthrow Saddam regime in Iraq. The U.S. assumed
that Turkey, an important partner during the Gulf War, would lend its support again. The
Bush administration underestimated the grueling impact of the economic implications on
Turkey because of the UN sanctions against Iraq, which was a major trading partner for
Turkey before the Gulf War. More importantly, Washington did not adequately
comprehend the far-reaching consequences of the Kurdish question on Turkey’s elite and
the public due in large part to the U.S. policies in northern Iraq. Repeated surveys
revealed that over 90% of the Turkish populace opposed the U.S. invasion and Turkish
involvement in the war efforts. As a result, on March 1st, 2003, the Turkish parliament
rejected the resolution that would allow American troops in Turkish soils to topple
Saddam’s regime. In Chapter V, I argued that this was a watershed moment between
Ankara and Washington in that Turkey rejected the primacy and unilateralism of the U.S.
against the Iraqi invasion. Looking from the agent-structure debate in international
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relations, the prevailing perspective was that international structure 316 would require
Turkey to let the U.S. troops on its soil despite overwhelming opposition from the
Turkish public. I put forth that systemic factors primarily prevailed in the early years of
the post-Cold War Turkish-American relations, as had been the case during the Cold War
era. However, the Turkish parliament’s rejection of the deployment of the U.S. troops in
Turkey for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 could not be explained by the primacy of
distribution of capabilities in the system. Instead, the role of identity, ideology, and
norms, and the socialization of agency through interaction and language, must be
considered. As many constructivists argue, interests and identities of actors are shaped
and redefined in an interactive process in the international system. In fact they are
constituted subjectively. By bringing both material and ideational aspects into the picture,
one can see how dynamic interaction of these elements shapes and redefines one’s
identity and interests. It should also be noted that the JDP assertive new foreign policy
reflected the growing role of the Turkish populace in foreign policy making. While
keeping its western orientation, Turkey began to assert itself as an independent and selfconfident actor who could heavily invest in the Middle Eastern affairs that Turkey
ignored for a long-period of time. It should also be noted that this activism in foreign
policy was a reflection of a wider transformation in Turkey’s own self-perception and the
definition of its core interests.
To analyze the identity and interest formation in Turkey, I argued that Turgut
Ozal’s liberalization efforts in politics and economy between 1983 and 1993 paved the
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way for the emergence of new political and economic spaces that were filled largely by
the Anatolian conservative populace. They benefitted from economic and political
openings in the early 1980s and became competitive in education and business by the mid
1990s. The rising “Anatolian tigers” and the increasing visibility of conservative Muslims
in public spaces, especially in education, media and business, gave way for the
emergence of a new socio-political elite that engaged with the center through active
political participation. The increasing visibility of new actors in the marketplace, schools,
media and politics cracked the monotonous political structure of the Kemalist regime and
diversified social and political actors. The transformation in domestic and foreign affairs
basically reflected the demands of the Turkish populace that were once marginalized in
the periphery. The JDP’s ascension to power in 2002 magnified the growing role of the
periphery in the foreign policy making arena and also reflected changes in Turkey’s own
self perception and the definition of its core interests. Ankara’s changes of heart in its
relations with Greece and Syria, both of which were once considered enemies, serves as a
good example of the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy orientation. When it
comes to its relations with the U.S, however, Turkey’s new elite (with strong backing
from the Turkish public) charted an independent orientation that had been unimaginable
for more than 50 years. The JDP leadership, especially Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan
and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, and President Abdullah Gul successfully
incorporated in their government elements of rising global values such as democracy,
freedom, market economy and their deeply held religio-conservative values. While
strongly supporting Turkey’s democratic and market-oriented course, they did not detach
themselves from the values they cherished. Especially, Davutoglu’s philosophical and
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practical approaches to foreign policy enabled Turkey to chart a relatively independent
foreign policy orientation towards the United States. He argued that Turkey a “central
power”- an idea in direct contrast to Turkey’s long-standing position as a “buffer-zone,”
“flank” and “bridge” in NATO and other western security definitions. Attesting to the
centrality of Turkey, Davutoglu argued that Turkey should develop its own proactive
policies and thereby claim its rightful strategic role. His new way of thinking took Turkey
from the peripheries of western security and political structures and placed it in the
center, making it ground-breaking in design. I argued that his reformulation and
operationalization of Turkey’s foreign policy objectives has the potential of challenging
the very nature of Turkish-American relations because many US administrations tended
to situate Turkey as a secondary player, a position in which Turkey has been treated as a
subject. However, Davutoglu’s imagining of modern Turkey envisioned the centrality of
Turkey, not as an accessory around the United States.
An activist Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East, Africa, the Caucasus, the
Balkans, the EU and Central Asia would encounter the U.S. every step of the way since
Turkey’s engagement in these regions would always intersect with Washington’s vital
strategic interests. While convergence of these engagements would be welcomed by both,
a divergence of interests could create serious friction between the two that had the
potential to disturb the strategic alliance. For example, the future of Iran’s pursuit of
nuclear weapons and the U.S. escalation against it would have the potential of
jeopardizing the relations between the U.S. and Turkey. Moreover, Turkey’s increasing
critique of Israel and possible escalation in the Iran issue would have serious
repercussions on the Turkish-American relations in coming years. While my dissertation
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provided a compelling historical analysis of Ankara’s relations with Washington between
1990 and 2005 by highlighting the elements of continuity and change, future research
should focus on the question of how and to what extent Turkey would maintain its
ambitious foreign policy objective of “zero problems with neighbors” while handling
conflicting interests among regional and global powers. More importantly, Turkish public
opinion towards the United States dropped significantly in the last eight years due in
large part to the Iraqi War of 2003. Turks also became less enthusiastic about the EU
membership given that the public support dropped from 73% in 2004 to 40% in 2010.
Since the public opinion became an important variable in shaping the Turkish foreign
policy in the last decade, further sources of friction and divergences of policy orientations
between Turkey and the west, especially the U.S., would occur. Therefore, Ankara’s
relations with Washington are no longer as predictable as had been the case in previous
decades.
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